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To Sarah, Finn and Jack

Dankwoord
Het schrijven van een doctoraal proefschrift of zoals sommigen het graag noemen ’opstel’ kan je
uiteraard niet alleen. U zal misschien denken dat dit een standaardzin is die in elk proefschrift
thuishoort en dus weinig waarde heeft. Nochtans heb ik gedurende het lange proces, dat geleid
heeft tot dit doctoraat, geleerd dat dit effectief het geval is. Zonder hulp, steun, interesse en
ideee¨n van anderen had dit proefschrift er wellicht heel anders uitgezien of - en misschien zelfs
waarschijnlijker - er niet gekomen. Vandaar dat het ook opportuun is om hier enkele mensen te
bedanken.
In de eerste plaats zou ik mijn ’Schoonheid’ (Sarah) willen bedanken voor alle steun, begrip,
ontspanning en onvoorwaardelijke liefde. Het schrijven van mijn proefschrift was niet alleen een
lange weg voor mijzelf maar ook zeker voor haar. Het is onmogelijk om te beschrijven wat zij
voor mij betekent. Ook praktisch heeft ze er voor gezorgd dat ik optimaal aan mijn doctoraat kon
werken. Ook wil ik Finn en Jack bedanken voor de hulp bij het ontstressen en om mij af en toe
een goede nachtrust te gunnen. Verder zou ik mijn ouders willen bedanken voor de kans die ze
mij geboden hebben om verder te studeren en voor de continue interesse in mijn doctoraat.
In diezelfde lijn zou ik ook mijn vrienden willen bedanken voor de vele leuke momenten die
ik met hen beleefd heb. Deze waren ideaal om alle doctoraatsbeslommeringen te vergeten. Zo
zorgden de vaste vrijdagavondafspraken in de James en de zondagse fietstochten met W.T.C.
Heyerick voor totale ontstressing en realiseerde ik mij dat er ook nog een leven was naast het
doctoraat.
Natuurlijk heb ik ook hulp gekregen bij het effectief uitwerken en schrijven van dit proefschrift.
Hierbij wil ik dan ook mijn promotor Freddy Heylen bedanken voor de kans die hij mij gegeven
heeft om te doctoreren. Ik vermoed dat ik zijn geduld meermaals op de proef gesteld heb. Zijn
enthousiasme voor macro-economie werkte reeds als student aanstekelijk. Ik was dan ook verheugd
toen hij mij terughaalde vanuit Leuven en mij de kans bood om assistent te worden aan de vakgroep
sociale economie van de Universiteit Gent. Ik wil hem ook zeker bedanken voor de interessante
discussies die we vaak hadden en voor zijn heldere uitleg van complexe problemen. Ook was hij
steeds bereid mijn werk na te lezen en verbeteringen te suggereren.
Verder mag ik mijn copromotor Gerdie Everaert niet vergeten te bedanken. Ik overdrijf niet
door te stellen dat zonder hem mijn proefschrift er niet was gekomen. Gerdie is mij altijd blijven
motiveren. Ik heb enorm veel geleerd van Gerdie, en niet alleen op econometrisch gebied. Zijn
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deur stond altijd voor mij open, alhoewel ik denk dat hij soms grijze haren kreeg van mij.
Ik zou ook graag mijn huidige groepschef op de Nationale Bank van Belgie¨, Luc Van Meensel,
bedanken. Ook hij motiveerde mij om mijn doctoraat af te werken en zorgde ervoor dat ik op de
Bank tijd kreeg om bepaalde onderzoeken te finaliseren. Ik heb bovendien ook veel opgestoken
van zijn economische kennis en dan specifiek in het domein van de overheidsfinancie¨n.
Hiernaast wil ik ook mijn, al dan niet voormalige, collega’s van de vakgroep sociale economie,
van het departement studie¨n van de Bank en mijn co-auteurs van de verschillende papers bedanken.
Het was en is altijd interessant om met hen samen te werken. De leden van mijn jury verdienen
ook een dankwoord aangezien ik van hen veel opgestoken heb en zeer blij ben met de tijd die ze
uitgetrokken hebben om mijn proefschrift te lezen.
Tot slot wil ik iedereen, familie en vrienden, bedanken die ik hier persoonlijk ben vergeten
vernoemen. Zonder jullie was dit ’opstel’ nooit een ’opstel’ geworden.
Gent, September 2015
Ruben Schoonackers
Nederlandstalige samenvatting
De financie¨le crisis die in de loop van 2007 uitbrak en in 2008 verscherpte, en de eruit voortvloeiende
economische recessie hebben de overheidsfinancie¨n in de meeste geavanceerde economiee¨n uiter-
mate zwaar getroffen. Daardoor zijn in die landen, waaronder Belgie¨, het financieringstekort
en de schuld van de overheid fors gestegen. Sedertdien hebben vrijwel alle landen aanzienlijke
inspanningen inzake begrotingsconsolidatie geleverd teneinde de onhoudbare ontwikkelingen een
halt toe te roepen. Een terugkeer naar een situatie van houdbare overheidsfinancie¨n zal echter de
komende jaren in de meeste landen nog extra inspanningen vereisen. Die nood aan extra sanerings-
maatregelen heeft bij velen de vrees aangewakkerd voor een nog diepere en langere economische
recessie.
De economische literatuur biedt echter geen eenduidig antwoord op de vraag naar het verband
tussen het budgettair beleid en de economische bedrijvigheid. Belangrijk is om een onderscheid te
maken tussen de impact op korte termijn en die op lange termijn. Zo blijkt op lange termijn een
begrotingsconsolidatie vaak positieve gevolgen te hebben op de economische activiteit. De grootte
van deze effecten hangt natuurlijk af van de precieze omstandigheden en de aard van de genomen
consolidatie-maatregelen.
Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift analyseert daarom de impact van diverse sanerings-
maatregelen op de economische groei via het kanaal van de totale factorproductiviteit (TFP). Dit
gebeurt voor een groep van 15 OESO landen over de periode 1970-2012, met behulp van een geag-
gregeerde productiefunctiebenadering. Aangezien het niet vanzelfsprekend is om de TFP in een
economie te kwantificeren, staat of valt de adequaatheid van de empirische analyse met hoe hiermee
wordt omgegaan. Zo leidt het buiten beschouwing laten van de TFP tot inconsistente ramingen
indien de TFP gecorreleerd is met de waargenomen verklarende variabelen en zelfs tot een spurious
regression probleem indien ze niet stationair is. In bestaand empirisch werk over begrotingsbeleid
en economische groei wordt doorgaans gebruik gemaakt van ad hoc proxies voor technologie (bij-
voorbeeld een gemeenschappelijke tijdstrend). In dit hoofdstuk wordt een alternatieve, mogelijks
veelbelovende, oplossing naar voren geschoven voor het probleem van de meetbaarheid van de
TFP. Concreet wordt gebruik gemaakt van de aanwezigheid van de sterke cross-sectionele corre-
latie in de gegevens om de TFP te identificeren. Dit laat ons toe om het wereldwijd beschikbaar
niveau van technologie en kennis te vatten. Verder wordt voor dit wereldwijde technologieniveau
zowel de landspecifieke toegang als de variatie hiervan over de tijd onderzocht. Op die manier
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kunnen naast de directe effecten van het begrotingsbeleid op de TFP ook indirecte effecten wor-
den ge¨ıdentificeerd. Deze lopen namelijk via de impact van het budgettair beleid op het vermogen
van een land om wereldwijde technologie te absorberen.
De resultaten van het gevoerde empirisch onderzoek onderstrepen de sleutelrol van het be-
grotingsbeleid in de ontwikkeling van de TFP. We vinden sterke bewijzen van zowel directe als
indirecte effecten en er komen een aantal duidelijke beleidsimplicaties naar voren. Een eerste
betreft het belang van een gezond begrotingsbeleid, waarmee wordt bedoeld dat de begroting
op lange termijn in evenwicht is (of zelfs in overschot). Uitgaven moeten worden gefinancierd
met overheidsontvangsten. Productieve uitgaven (zoals overheidsinvesteringen, onderwijs en R&D
uitgaven) vormen hierop een uitzondering. Zij kunnen ook met schuldopbouw gefinancierd wor-
den. Een tweede belangrijke implicatie is dat beleidsmakers niet alleen strikt zouden moeten
toezien op het niveau van overheidsbestedingen en belastingen, maar ook op de structuur ervan.
Onze resultaten verdedigen een verschuiving van de uitgaven van sociale overdrachten en de over-
heidsconsumptie naar meer productieve uitgaven, en een verschuiving van de inkomsten- en de
vennootschapsbelasting naar verbruiksbelastingen. Het bewijs dat geleverd wordt ten gunste van
een verlaging van de vennootschapsbelasting heeft voornamelijk te maken met het verhogen van
het vermogen van een land om wereldwijde beschikbare technologie te absorberen. In verband
hiermee is een laatste duidelijke beleidsimplicatie dat openheid voor de wereldhandel absoluut
moet worden aangemoedigd. Het stimuleren en bestendigen van de landspecifieke toegang tot
wereldwijd beschikbare technologie leidt immers tot een duurzame groei van de TFP en dus ook
van de economische groei.
De effecten van het begrotingsbeleid via het kanaal van de TFP zijn invloedrijk aangezien
op lange termijn de TFP de belangrijkste determinant is van de economische groei. Tijdens de
voorbije decennia is de stijging van de welvaart per capita in geavanceerde economiee¨n grotendeels
toe te schrijven aan de algemene productiviteitstoename. Echter, in de ontwikkelde landen is
de groei van de TFP reeds enkele jaren aan het vertragen. Die vertraging brengt uiteraard grote
bezorgdheid teweeg, aangezien zo het toekomstig groeipotentieel van de economie wordt aangetast.
Om de tendens te keren kunnen beleidsmakers inzetten op onderzoek en ontwikkeling (O&O). De
rol van O&O als stimulans voor groei en technologische vooruitgang is gekend. Die stimulans is
zowel direct, via de impact van O&O kapitaal op de evolutie van de TFP en innovatie binnen
een land, als indirect, door de absorptiecapaciteit van landen te vergroten en zo de transfer van
wereldtechnologie te stimuleren.
In de huidige context van budgettaire saneringen en toenemende efficie¨ntiedruk stelt zich de
vraag welke beleidsopties het meest effectief zijn in het stimuleren van private O&O-investeringen.
Dit wordt onderzocht in hoofdstuk 2 voor een groep van 14 OESO landen. De vraag is relevant,
ook omdat de voorgestelde beleidsopties talrijk zijn. Zo kunnen overheden gebruik maken van een
breed arsenaal aan steunmaatregelen gaande van directe subsidies of publieke O&O-uitgaven tot
meer indirecte fiscale stimuli. De effectiviteit van deze beleidsinstrumenten werd reeds uitgebreid
empirisch onderzocht, ook aan de hand van macrodata. Echter, in de bestaande empirische litera-
tuur wordt e´e´n belangrijke potentie¨le determinant van O&O bedrijfsinvesteringen vaak vergeten
nl. de mate van loondruk of loonmatiging in een economie.
Het debat rond de wenselijkheid van loonmatiging is in landen als Belgie¨ en Nederland soms
erg heftig en vormt vaak het centrum van conflict tussen werknemers en werkgevers. Voor-
standers wijzen traditioneel op de positieve effecten op werkgelegenheid, competitiviteit en ex-
portprestaties. Vanuit een langetermijnperspectief is echter ook de impact van loonmatiging op
de innovatie-inspanningen in een economie belangrijk. Zo argumenteren voorstanders dat loon-
matiging noodzakelijk is om bedrijfswinsten op peil te houden en aldus voldoende incentives en
middelen te vrijwaren voor O&O-investeringen. Anderen betwisten evenwel deze visie. Zij stellen
dat een focus op loonmatiging de overlevingskansen van niet-innovatieve bedrijven verhoogt, en
aldus het proces van creative destruction verlamt. Een regime van hoge loondruk zou veeleer
gunstig zijn voor innovatie. Niet innoveren zou dan immers geen optie meer zijn. De economische
theorie biedt dus geen uitsluitsel over de impact van loonmatiging op private O&O-uitgaven. Maar
wat tonen onze resultaten?
Een empirische analyse over de periode 1981-2012 duidt aan dat loonmatiging niet langer
kan ingeroepen vanuit de idee dat dit de O&O-bedrijfsinvesteringen stimuleert. In de Europese
(Belgische, Nederlandse) context van open economiee¨n en rigide arbeidsmarkten geldt eerder het
omgekeerde nl. overdreven loonmatiging ontmoedigt innovatie. Dit impliceert evenwel niet dat een
toename van de loondruk dient aangemoedigd te worden. Excessieve loondruk kan immers nadelig
zijn op andere vlakken, zeker op korte en middellange termijn (concurrentiekracht, tewerkstelling).
Alternatieve instrumenten om O&O-bedrijfsinvesteringen te stimuleren dragen dus de voorkeur.
Idealiter wordt eerder gebruik gemaakt van fiscale maatregelen of gerichte investeringen in hoger
onderwijs. Publieke of universitaire O&O-investeringen zijn op hun beurt dan weer neutraal voor
private initiatieven: er is crowding out noch additionaliteit. Tot slot tonen onze resultaten opnieuw
het belang aan van het vermogen van een economie om wereldwijd beschikbare technologie te
absorberen. Voor de Europese landen is dit namelijk een belangrijke determinant in het verklaren
van verschillen in innovatie-investeringen tussen landen.
Hoofdstuk 1 en 2 bespreken beiden beleidsopties ter stimulering van duurzame langetermijn
economische groei. Uiteraard dient niet louter gefocust te worden op de lange termijn. Op korte
termijn kunnen bepaalde budgettaire keuzes en saneringsinspanningen nadelige gevolgen hebben
op de welvaart binnen een land. Zo blijkt uit de budgettaire multiplicatoreffecten dat op de korte
termijn consolidatiemaatregelen een remmend effect hebben op de economische bedrijvigheid. De
exacte grootte van de multiplicatoren is afhankelijk van de specifieke maatregelen en omstandighe-
den. Zo wordt de impact o.a. be¨ınvloed door de mate waarin huishoudens en ondernemingen
te maken hebben met liquiditeits- of kredietbeperkingen. Een groter aandeel van de zogeheten
niet-Ricardiaanse huishoudens zal leiden tot sterkere negatieve effecten op korte termijn. Niet-
Ricardiaanse huishoudens zijn dus huishoudens die niet in staat zijn hun consumptie in de tijd af
te vlakken teneinde het hoofd te bieden aan een daling van hun beschikbaar inkomen als gevolg
van sommige consolidatiemaatregelen.
Een mogelijke invalshoek om het aandeel niet-Ricardiaanse agenten te vatten is om de gevoe-
ligheid van de geaggregeerde consumptiegroei ten opzichte van de verwachte beschikbare inkomens-
groei te bepalen, ook gekend als excess sensitivity. Indien alle huishoudens Ricardiaans zijn en dus
hun permanente inkomen consumeren dan is de consumptiegroei onvoorspelbaar. Echter, indien
economische huishoudens te maken hebben met liquiditeits- of kredietbeperkingen, indien ze aan
voorzorgsparen doen of zich enkel op de korte termijn richten, dan zal de verwachte inkomensgroei
mede de consumptiegroei voorspellen.
In hoofdstuk 3 trachten we dan ook de excess sensitivity te schatten voor de Verenigde Staten
aan de hand van kwartaaldata over de periode 1954-2014 om zo een beeld te krijgen van het
aandeel niet-Ricardiaanse huishoudens in de economie. Zowel de financie¨le liberalisatie als de
deregulering van de financie¨le markten zouden aanleiding moeten geven tot een daling van de
excess sensitivity over de tijd. Dit zou dan ook kleinere kortetermijn begrotingsmultiplicatoren
impliceren en dus budgettaire saneringen minder pijnlijk maken. Via Bayesiaanse modelselectie
wordt in dit hoofdstuk nagegaan of dit effectief klopt en of de waargenomen daling relevant is.
Onze empirische resultaten spreken deze daling over de tijd tegen en wijzen eerder op een stabiele
excess sensitivy parameter van ongeveer 0.23.
Dit impliceert dat begrotingsconsolidaties op korte termijn een grotere negatieve impact hebben
op de economische bedrijvigheid. Financie¨le liberalisatie heeft volgens onze resultaten geen verzach-
tende invloed uitgeoefend op het aandeel niet-Ricardiaanse economische agenten. Interessant voor
toekomstig werk is om na te gaan of dit resultaat extrapoleerbaar is naar de Europese setting.
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Chapter 0
Introduction
The financial crisis that erupted during 2007 and intensified in 2008, and the ensuing economic
recession, caused a marked deterioration in the public finances of most of the advanced economies.
That resulted in a sharp increase in the financing requirement and public debt in those countries.
Since then, almost all countries have made a considerable effort to achieve fiscal consolidation in
order to end the unsustainable developments. However, restoring sustainable public finances will
entail additional efforts in most countries in the years ahead. At the same time, fear has risen
that all these consolidation programs may undermine domestic demand and prolong the weakness
in economic activity.
The economic literature on the effects of fiscal consolidation is very extensive. However, it does
not offer a clear answer to the question of the link between fiscal policy and economic activity.
The impact in fact depends very much on circumstances, which may vary considerably over time
and from one country to another. It is also crucial to distinguish between the short-term and
the long-term impact. In the long run fiscal consolidation has undeniable positive effects on
economic growth. Of course, the magnitude of these effects depends on the characteristics of the
implemented measures.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, we therefore analyse the impact of different budgetary
instruments, used to continue consolidating public finances, on long-run output per capita via the
transmission channel of total factor productivity. This is done for a panel of 15 OECD countries
over the period 1970-2012, using an aggregate production function framework. An important
issue when estimating a production function is the fact that TFP is unobserved. Omitting TFP
leads to inconsistent estimates if it is correlated with the observed explanatory variables and even
to a spurious regression problem if it is non-stationary. Existing empirical work on fiscal policy
and economic activity typically employs ad hoc proxies for technology (such as a common time
trend). Here, we pursue an alternative and promising way out of the omitted variables problem by
exploiting the strong cross-sectional dependence observed in our data. This enables us to capture
the common component in TFP, which represents the world available level of technology and
knowledge. This way of looking at TFP is inspired by Parente and Prescott (2002) who argue
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that there is a set of globally available production technologies, but country-specific institutional
and political factors may prevent firms from adopting the most efficient ones. So, although there
is a common worldwide technology level, TFP may grow at different rates across countries due to
differences in countries’ absorptive capacity. These differences can be explained by country-specific
institutions and political factors. To the extend that these factors change over time, absorptive
capacity is also time-varying. As such, next to direct effects of fiscal policy on TFP, our empirical
analysis also allows for indirect effects. These indirect effects run through the impact of fiscal
policy on a country’s absorptive capacity.
Methodologically, to capture both direct and indirect effects we propose and implement a
nonlinear version of the CCEP estimator of Pesaran (2006). We further suggest to test for coin-
tegration using the panel analysis of nonstationarity in idiosyncratic and common components
(PANIC) on the composite error terms from the CCEP regressions. A small-scale Monte Carlo
simulation shows that our proposed estimator has satisfactory small sample properties.
The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate the key role of fiscal policy in the development
of TFP. We find robust evidence for both direct and indirect effects and a number of clear policy
implications emerge. A first implication concerns the importance of sound fiscal policies, meaning
government budget should be in balance (or even surplus) in the long run. Expenditures thus have
to be financed by government revenues. The only exception concerns deficit financed productive
expenditures (like public investment, R&D expenditures, schooling). A second key implication is
that policy makers should not only strictly monitor the level of government expenditures and taxes
but also their structure. Our analysis supports a restructuring of outlays from social transfers and
public consumption to productive expenditures, and a shift of revenues from personal income
taxes and corporate taxes to consumption taxes. The evidence that we obtain in favor of reducing
corporate taxes mainly concerns the possibility of increasing a country’s capacity to absorb world
technology. This result also points to the necessity of cross-country tax coordination because our
evidence illustrates the possibility of a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates. By attracting
foreign direct investments and improving access to world technology, a corporate tax rate reduction
may enhance the development of TFP. If other countries respond by also reducing corporate tax
rates, this gain disappears. What then remains are negative effects on the budget balance which
harm TFP and output per capita. Finally, our results point to an average annual growht rate of
1.23 % for the common component of TFP. Increasing access to this source of sustainable growth
is thus very fruitful and should be a priority for policy makers. Related to that, a clear final policy
implication to increase a country’s absorptive capacity is to promote openness to world trade.
The impact of fiscal policy on TFP is very important as in the long run TFP is the sole
sustainable source of economic growth. However, for some years now TFP growth has been
slowing down at macroeconomic level in all developed countries, and particularly in Europe. This
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deceleration is a source of major concern, because it affects not only the current situation of our
economies but also their future growth potential. To restore TFP growth, policy makers should
focus on stimulating research and development (R&D). This was already stressed by (Griliches,
1979, p.115) who points to R&D as “one of the few variables which public policy can affect in the
future”. Boosting R&D intensity is indeed one of the top priorities of OECD countries today. For
example, the Europe 2020 targets include that 3 % of the EU’s GDP has to be invested in R&D
and innovation (public and private combined) by 2020. The role of R&D in enhancing TFP and
economic growth is well known i.e. in addition to stimulating growth directly through innovations,
it increases a country’s absorptive capacity which encourages international technology transfers.
Nevertheless, in the current environment of restoring sustainability of public finances and
search for an increasing efficiency of public policy, the question arises which policy options are most
effective in stimulating private R&D investment. Chapter 2 of this dissertation therefore analyses
the effects of different policies on aggregate business funded and performed R&D investment in a
panel of 14 OECD countries since 1981. To stimulate private R&D intensity, governments have
a whole set of different instruments at their disposal. They can be subvidided in direct support
(such as public sector R&D and direct R&D subsidies) and indirect support (such as R&D tax
incentives).
However, one possible determinant of private R&D spending is often forgotten, i.e. the impact
of wage pressure. The monitoring of wage formation is an important feature of many OECD
countries’ economic policy as it has a direct impact on employment an a country’s competiveness.
An important additional element, especially from a long-run perspective, is the possible impact
of wage formation on a country’s innovative capacity. Arguments in favour of wage moderation
come mostly from an employer perspective and point to wage moderation as an important factor
to maintain firm probability, which is a key condition for investment in R&D. Others have argued
that an excessive focus on wage moderation may kill incentives to innovate as this increases the
survival probability of the least innovative firms and retard the process of creative destruction.
Using the framework of Ulph and Ulph (1994), we can reconcile both arguments. In the Ulph and
Ulph (1994) - model, the main factor driving firms’ innovation efforts is the expected difference
between the profits that the firm can earn once it has successfully innovated and the profits that it
would earn otherwise. In this setup high (excessive) wages represent a ’tax’ that unions impose on
the investment and the success of the firm. Lower R&D investment would be the result. However,
we argue that in some cases high wage pressure no longer reduces, but raises the profit differential
between innovating and not innovating. The reason is the very negative outcome in the non-
innovating case. We expect this positive effect of high wage pressure to exist mainly in a very
competitive environment and when firms lack the flexibility to adjust their (expensive) labour
force. It will be exactly in such an environment that high wages and lack of innovation imply huge
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losses and the risk of bankruptcy. In these economies innovation will be firms’ only competitive
strategy.
To measure the impact of wage moderation and other more traditional policies on business
R&D, wee also need to control for technology and knowledge spillovers. These spillovers affect
firms’ private returns to R&D and thus business R&D investment. Therefore, to capture the largely
unobserved world level of technology and knowledge the same approach is used as in chapter 1, i.e.
the unobserved common component is captured by exploiting the strong cross-sectional dependece
present in the data.
Our empirical analysis shows that stimulating private R&D intensity can no longer be invoked
to justify wage moderation. The policy implications of our results include a warning against
excessive wage moderation in highly open economies with rigid labour markets. Even though
wage moderation may promote employment in the short run, it may undermine the economy’s
innovative capacity and productivity in the long run. However, in our view our findings also
provide no arguments in favour of excessive wage pressure. In rigid labour markets the loss of
employment that excessive wages may cause in the short run, may persist in the longer run due
to for example hysteresis effects in bad times. To promote business investment in R&D, our
empirical results suggest better alternatives, in particular tax incentives, well-chosen innovation
subsidies and the development of high skilled human capital. Finally and in line with chapter 1, the
analysis reveals the importance of a country’s capacity to absorb world technology. The results
show that, especially for the European countries, acces to the unobserved common component
is an important factor in explaining innovation differences across countries. Chapter 1 points
to corporate tax policy and reducing barriers to trade as strategies to increase the absorptive
capacity but given its high relevance, additional research should be done to determine all possible
determinants of the capacity to absorb world technology.
Chapter 1 and 2 both discuss policy options to promote long-term sustainable growth. However,
the short-run implications of these policy measures should also be analysed as certain budgetary
choices and consolidation measures could hurt economic activity in the short run. Most econo-
metric models and empirical studies show that the fiscal multipliers, which indicate the extent to
which a particular fiscal stimulus influences the growth of activity, have a positive sign in the short
term. Generally, an expansionary fiscal policy can stimulate economic activity in the short term,
while consolidation measures have a negative impact. However the short-term multiplier effects
vary according to the different instruments and the specific circumstances. As such, the scale of
the short-term multipliers is also influenced by the degree to which households and businesses
face liquidity or credit constraints. A larger proportion of non-Ricardian households is reflected in
higher fiscal multipliers. Non-Ricardian households are households which cannot smooth out their
consumption over time in response to a decline in their disposable income resulting from certain
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consolidation measures.
A potential angle to capture the proportion of non-Ricardian households is to measure the
sensitivity of aggregate consumption growth with respect to expected disposable income growth.
Traditional permanent income and life cycle models of consumption predict that aggregate con-
sumption growth should follow a random walk. However, when economic agents face liquidity
constraints, are myopic or have precautionary saving motives, aggregate consumption growth is
excessively sensitive to anticipated disposable income growth.
In chapter 3 we will estimate this degree of excess sensitivity (ES) to get an idea on the
importance of the fraction of non-Ricardian consumers. This is done for the United States using
quarterly data since 1954. More specifically, we relax the assumption of a constant ES parameter
in favor of a time-varying specification. The reason being that financial liberalisation and the
development of financial markets could have led to a decrease in ES over time. Further on,
and following the recent literature, we take into account other forms of aggregate consumption
predictability and we adequately deal with both measurement error and time aggregation to obtain
valid estimates of the ES parameter. Finally we test whether the time variation in the degree of
ES is relevant, using Bayesian model selection for unobserved components in state space models.
Our results show that when estimating our empirical specification, the excess sensitivity para-
meter turns out to be stable around 0.23 over the entire sample period. This implies that financial
liberalisation and the deregulation of financial markets had no mitigating effect on the proportion
of non-Ricardian consumers in the economy. Moreover, this result has also implications for the
short-term impact of consolidation measures. In this scenario, a reduction in transfers, such as
social benefits, has a much more negative effect compared to the scenario where the proportion
of non-Ricardian households would have been absent. Of course, additional research would be
interesting to test whether the ES results for the United States can be extrapolated to Europe.
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Fiscal policy and TFP in the OECD:
measuring direct and indirect
effects 1
This chapter analyzes the direct and indirect effects of fiscal policy on total factor productivity
(TFP) in a panel of OECD countries over the period 1970-2012. Our contribution is twofold. First,
when estimating the impact of fiscal policy on TFP from a production function approach, we iden-
tify the worldwide available level of technology by exploiting the observed strong cross-sectional
dependence between countries instead of using ad hoc proxies for technology. Second, next to
direct effects, we allow for indirect effects of fiscal policy by modeling the access of countries to
worldwide available technology as a function of fiscal policy and other variables. Empirically, we
propose and implement a non-linear version of the Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCEP)
estimator of Pesaran (2006). The estimation results show that through the direct channel bud-
get deficits harm TFP. A shift towards productive expenditures has a strong positive impact on
TFP, whereas a shift towards social transfers reduces TFP. Through the indirect channel, signifi-
cant positive effects on a country’s access to global technology come from reducing the statutory
corporate tax rate and from reducing barriers to trade.
1.1 Introduction
Rising pressure on the welfare state due to aging and the need to bring down government debts
and deficits after the recent recession force many countries to develop policies that can effectively
enhance productivity and growth. The importance of higher productivity and per capita output
to face the pension challenge has long been demonstrated in various studies (e.g. Docquier and
1This chapter is joint work with Gerdie Eveaert and Freddy Heylen and is published in Empirical Economics,
49(2), p. 605-640.
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Michel, 1999; Fouge`re and Me´rette, 1999), and so has the importance of high growth for successful
fiscal consolidation (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Heylen and Everaert, 2000). It is well known
that total factor productivity (TFP) is a very important driver of long-run economic growth.
Among others, de La Fuente and Domenech (2001) find that TFP differences account for about
half of the differences in per capita income across OECD countries. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997) report an even higher contribution of TFP. Knowing that both the aging of the labor force
and the recent economic crisis may have a negative impact on aggregate productivity, insights in
the way governments can counter this are very important.
This chapter analyzes the influence of fiscal policy on TFP and per capita output in a panel
of 15 OECD countries over the period 1970-2012 using an aggregate production function frame-
work. More precisely, following de la Fuente (1997) and Romero-Avila (2006), among others, we
estimate a production function augmented with fiscal policy variables. Compared to previous
research on fiscal policy and economic growth our contribution is twofold. First, an important
issue in the growth literature is the fact that TFP is unobserved. Omitting TFP leads to incon-
sistent estimates if it is correlated with the observed explanatory variables and even to a spurious
regression problem if it is non-stationary. Existing empirical work on fiscal policy and economic
activity typically employs ad hoc proxies for technology. The standard approach is to include
a common time trend (or time fixed effects) and country fixed effects, as done in e.g. Kneller,
Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999), Romero-Avila (2006) and Arnold, Brys, Heady, Johansson, Schwell-
nus, and Vartia (2011). In this chapter, we pursue an alternative potentially promising, way out
of the omitted variables problem by exploiting the strong cross-sectional dependence observed in
macroeconomic data (see e.g. Coakley, Fuertes, and Smith, 2006; Westerlund, 2008) to identify
the common component in TFP. Parente and Prescott (2002) argue that there is a set of glob-
ally available production technologies but country-specific institutional and political factors may
prevent firms from adopting the most efficient ones. This common set of production technologies
implies that TFP is strongly correlated across countries, but due to different absorptive capacities
TFP may grow at different rates across countries. This way of looking at TFP fits perfectly in
the recent panel data literature (see e.g. Bai and Ng, 2004; Coakley, Fuertes, and Smith, 2006;
Pesaran, 2006) which assumes that cross-sectional dependence stems from omitted common vari-
ables or global shocks (like the worldwide level of technology) that affect each country differently
(cfr. absorptive capacity). Therefore, we model TFP as having a common factor structure with
country-specific factor loadings. More specifically, we use the Common Correlated Effects Pooled
(CCEP) estimator of Pesaran (2006), which controls for unobserved common factors by adding
cross-sectional averages of the data. As shown by Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011) this
approach is also valid in a non-stationary panel context. A second contribution of this chapter is
that we allow and model time-variation in the access of countries to worldwide technology. Next to
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direct effects of fiscal policy variables in the augmented production function, this opens the possi-
bility for indirect effects. Parente and Prescott (2002) argue that country-specific institutions and
political factors determine the absorptive capacity of a country. To the extent that these factors
change over time, absorptive capacity is also time-varying. The role of institutions for a country’s
access to world technology has also been emphasized by Alfaro, Kalemh-Ozcan, and Volosovych
(2008), Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) and Faria and Mauro (2009). We explicitly allow
for time-varying absorptive capacity by making the factor loadings a function of country-specific
explanatory variables, among which fiscal policy variables. It is precisely by allowing for this extra
source of heterogeneity, compared to a time fixed effects or to the standard CCEP specification,
that we are able to identify indirect effects of fiscal policy on TFP. These effects run through its
impact on absorptive capacity. The time-varying factor loadings imply that we cannot use the
standard CCEP estimator. Instead, we propose and use a non-linear CCEP estimator, denoted
CCEPnl. We further suggest to test for cointegration using the Panel Analysis of Non-stationarity
in Idiosyncratic and Common Components (PANIC) on the composite error terms from the CCEP
regressions. The small sample properties of our CCEPnl estimator and PANIC cointegration test
are demonstrated using a small-scale Monte Carlo simulation tailored to our empirical specification
and to the data we have available.
Our results strongly confirm earlier findings by Fischer (1993) that budget deficits harm TFP.
Other robust conclusions concern the direct impact of a change in the structure of government
expenditures. Shifting expenditures towards more productive categories has positive effects on
TFP whereas a shift towards social security expenditures reduces TFP. Through the indirect
channel, we find that reducing barriers to trade stimulates the absorptive capacity of a country.
Finally our results show that the statutory corporate tax rate is an effective fiscal policy tool for
increasing a country’s access to global technology.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes and models the
direct and indirect effects of fiscal policy on TFP. Section 1.3 discusses the properties of the data.
Section 1.4 outlines the econometric model and methodology. Section 1.5 includes and discusses
our empirical results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Empirical specification
In this section we model the impact of fiscal policy on TFP and output using a production function
approach. We allow for both direct and indirect effects of fiscal policy. The indirect effects run
via a country’s access to the unobserved worldwide available level of technology. To be able to
interpret our results, we explicitly take into account the government budget constraint.
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1.2.1 Aggregate production function and modeling TFP
We model production in country i at time t using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Qit = AitK
α1
it G
α2
it H
α3
it , (1.1)
where Qit is real output, Ait is TFP, Kit is aggregate private capital, Git is public capital and Hit
is total hours worked. The level of TFP captures the contribution to output of the overall level of
efficiency, technology and knowledge. Given our specification of the production function, Ait also
incorporates advances in human capital. Rewriting equation (1.1) in logs yields
lnQit = lnAit + α1 lnKit + α2 lnGit + α3 lnHit. (1.2)
The key variable of interest in equation (1.2) is the level of TFP. As Ait is not observed, we
model it through a common factor specification
Ait = e
γi+witδ+Ftλit+εit , (1.3)
in which we disentangle TFP into (i) a country-specific time-invariant unobserved technology term
γi, (ii) a vector of country-specific observable variables wit (expressed in logs) with homogeneous
impact δ, (iii) an unobserved common factor Ft (expressed in logs) which represents the worldwide
available level of technology and knowledge, (iv) a country-specific and time-varying factor loading
λit which captures country i’s access to world technology Ft and (v) an idiosyncratic random error
term εit.
Common factor specifications for TFP, similar to equation (1.3), can also be found in Costan-
tini and Destefanis (2009) and Eberhardt and Teal (2013). The main difference is that we allow
for time-varying factor loadings λit to capture shifts in a country’s access to worldwide technology.
This is inspired by Parente and Prescott (2002) who argue that world technology is commonly
available but that access may differ across countries and time because country-specific fundamen-
tals and policies lead to barriers that prevent firms from adopting more productive technologies.
As these country-specific fundamentals and policies can also change over time, we model λit as
λit = λi0 + zitλ, (1.4)
such that country i’s access to world technology consists of a time-invariant part λi0 and a part
that depends on time-varying (policy and fundamental) variables zit (expressed in logs). Note
that in contrast to a general common factor specification, we impose the restriction that there is
only one common factor. This is because the econometric approach to estimating the model with
9
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a time-varying factor loading λit (see Section 1.4.2) requires a decision on the number of common
factors. We justify our choice of a single common factor when discussing the results in Section
1.5.1.
1.2.2 Measuring direct and indirect effects of fiscal policy
The empirical specification in equations (1.2)-(1.4) allows fiscal policy to have both direct and
indirect effects on TFP. Country-specific fiscal policy variables that are thought to influence TFP
directly are included in wit. Their impact is measured by δ. The indirect effects of fiscal policy on
TFP run via its influence on countries’ access to world technology. Relevant variables are included
in zit and their impact is measured by λ. Our specification imposes homogeneity in the impact of
fiscal variables across countries. This assumption is fully supported by recent work of Gemmell,
Kneller, and Sanz (2011)2. Moreover, the alternative of parameter heterogeneity would come at
the cost of drastically reducing degrees of freedom. In what follows, we discuss the fiscal variables
that we include in wit and zit relying on the recent literature.
Direct effects of fiscal policy on TFP
When analyzing the direct effects of fiscal policy on economic growth and/or output, many studies
(e.g. Agell, Lindh, and Ohlsson, 1997, 1999; Folster and Henrekson, 1999, 2001) focus on the effect
of government size. Depending on methods used and on countries studied, the obtained results
are highly contradictory. However, as pointed out by Bergh and Henrekson (2011), focusing
on OECD countries and relying on panel data estimations reveals a more consistent picture.
Correlation between government size and economic growth is negative and the sign seems not to
be an unintended consequence of reverse causality. In explaining this negative relationship, most
arguments rely on distortionary effects of taxes and/or expenditures. Thus, obviously of more
importance than the mere size of the government is the composition of taxes and/or expenditures.
Knowing the effects of the various components of the government budget on output and growth
is very important for policy makers as political decisions are typically aimed at specific tax and
expenditure items. Therefore, in measuring the direct impact of fiscal policy on TFP, we do not
only look at government size (=TotalExpit), but also at the composition of total expenditures and
taxes.
On the expenditure side, we distinguish between productive and unproductive expenditures.
As productive expenditures (=ProdExpit) we include government financed R&D, education ex-
penditures and infrastructure investment (see also Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell, 1999). There
2These authors test the assumption of long-run homogeneity (pooled mean group estimation) versus long-run
heterogeneity (mean group estimation) for the impact of fiscal policy variables on growth in a highly similar panel
of 17 OECD countries for the period 1970-2004. Their Hausman test implies that the assumption of long-run
homogeneity cannot be rejected (see their Table 2).
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is a clear consensus in the literature that an increase in, or a shift towards, more productive
expenditures raises output and/or growth for given hours worked and input of physical capital.
First, public sector R&D is found to be a significant determinant of long-term output. One of the
channels through which public R&D affects TFP is through its positive impact on private R&D
spending (see among others Guellec and de la Potterie, 2004; Gonzalez and Pazo, 2008). Second,
positive effects of education expenditures on productivity and growth are obtained in both theo-
retical (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997; Docquier and Michel, 1999; Dhont and Heylen, 2009)
and empirical work (e.g. Nijkamp and Poot, 2004; Blankenau, Simpson, and Tomljanovich, 2007).
Finally, public investment in infrastructure has robust positive effects on aggregate productivity
(e.g. Munnell, 1992; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).
As unproductive expenditures we include government consumption net of education (=Gov-
Consit) and social security expenditures (=SocialExpit). All other unproductive expenditures are
labeled other expenditures (=OtherExpit). Overall effects of government consumption are typi-
cally found to be very small. Concerning the impact of social security expenditures on TFP, there
is no agreement in the literature. Some empirical studies find a negative effect, e.g. Hansson and
Henrekson (1994), Arjona, Ladaique, and Pearson (2003) and Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008),
while others obtain a positive impact, e.g. Herce, Sosvilla-Rivero, and de Lucio (2001) and Zhang
and Zhang (2004). One of the explanations for the negative effect is that high social spending
reduces inequality. Since low inequality implies a low return to high-productivity qualifications
and effort, social spending may inhibit the efficient use of factors of production (see also Lindbeck,
2006). One reason why the impact may be positive is that lower inequality may lead to a more
cohesive society. Such societies may be better able to make difficult political or economic decisions
that promote structural adjustment and efficiency. Furthermore, it has been shown that unfunded
social security programs may raise productivity by promoting investment in human capital (Zhang,
1995).
On the revenue side of fiscal policy, we analyze the impact of the total tax burden (=Taxbur-
denit) and its decomposition into corporate (=CorporateTax it), personal (=PersonalTax it), con-
sumption (=ConsTax it) and other (=OtherTax it) taxes. The latter category contains mainly
property taxes. The literature shows overall consensus that the impact of corporate and personal
taxes on TFP is negative, whereas the effects of other taxes are less clear. High corporate taxes
are expected to reduce the incentives for firms to invest in innovative activities as it reduces their
after-tax return (Arnold, Brys, Heady, Johansson, Schwellnus, and Vartia, 2011). In line with
the arguments raised by Arjona, Ladaique, and Pearson (2003) on the effects of (in)equality, high
personal taxes may reduce TFP by discouraging work effort. Personal taxes also lower the ex-
pected return to investment in schooling, thus resulting in less accumulation of human capital
(Ferreira and Pessoa, 2007). The latter effect is obvious when it involves taxes on middle aged
11
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and older workers. Taxes on labor income of young individuals, however, reduce the opportunity
cost of education and may therefore promote schooling (Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2013).
Finally, a shift towards consumption taxes is expected to have positive effects as this tax category
is considered to be the least distortionary (Courne`de, Goujard, and Pina, 2013).
We also analyze the direct effect on TFP of the overall government budget balance (=Budget-
Balanceit). A negative budget balance (deficit) is expected to have a negative impact on TFP.
The resulting debt accumulation can be associated with higher future taxes, lower future pro-
ductive expenditures and more uncertainty and instability. Elaborating on the above mentioned
arguments, this will hinder improvements in technology and efficiency (Fischer, 1993; Kumar and
Woo, 2010).
Indirect effects of fiscal policy on TFP
Many authors (e.g. Van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg, 2001; Keller, 2010) show that incoming
foreign direct investment (FDI) has an important influence on a country’s absorptive capacity and
access to global technology. A policy variable that is potentially important for attracting FDI
is a country’s corporate tax rate. A high corporate tax rate reduces the after-tax return from
investing in a country and may therefore discourage the inflow of FDI (de Mooij and Ederveen,
2003; Hajkova, Nicoletti, Vartia, and Yoo, 2006). As such, the first variable we include in zit is
a country’s relative statutory corporate tax rate (STR) (=StrRelativeit). The relative STR of a
particular country is the STR of that country as a percentage of the average of the STR’s of all
other countries. Benassy-Quere, Fontagne, and Lahreche-Revil (2005) show that for attracting
foreign investors by means of tax signals, the relative corporate tax rate is the most informative
variable.
Another crucial factor driving access to worldwide available technology is a country’s level of
human capital. This has been demonstrated in various studies (among others Nelson, Denison,
Sato, and Phelps, 1966; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009; Faria and Mauro, 2009). The
argument is that in order to be able to successfully adopt foreign technology, a country needs to
have a certain level of skills. Governments can promote human capital formation, and thereby
access to available technology, by increasing their public education expenditures. To assess the
impact of human capital on λit, we therefore include the fraction of population with a tertiary
degree (=HCapit) in zit.
Finally, international trade (especially imports) is an important channel of knowledge and tech-
nology transfers across countries (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Acharya and Keller, 2009; Coe,
Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009). As shown by Madsen (2007), there is a robust relationship be-
tween TFP and the transmission of knowledge through trade. Furthermore, he also indicates that
knowledge spillovers have been an important contributing factor behind TFP convergence among
12
- Chapter 1 -
OECD countries. When countries reduce barriers to trade, the import of embodied technology
will be facilitated and access to global technology will rise. Therefore, imports as a percentage of
GDP (=Import it) are included in zit.
1.2.3 Taking into account the government budget constraint
As all elements of the government budget are included in wit, one element must be omitted in order
to avoid perfect collinearity. The omitted variable then serves as the implicit financing category
within the government’s budget constraint. As highlighted by Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell
(1999), this approach affects the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the included fiscal
variables. The coefficients should be seen as the effect of a change in the relevant variable offset
by a change in the omitted category. Altering the omitted category will change the estimated
coefficients for the included variables and their interpretation. In our empirical analysis we will
consider four different specifications, which differ in the variables included in wit and therefore
also in the implicit financing category:
• Specification 1 (=S1): wit includes TotalExpit, ProdExpit, SocialExpit and BudgetBalanceit.
First, by keeping total government expenditures constant we measure the impact of a shift in
government expenditures from government consumption and other expenditures towards pro-
ductive and social security expenditures respectively. Second, by including BudgetBalanceit,
the coefficient on TotalExpit represents the impact of a rise in government consumption and
other expenditures, paid by increasing the overall tax burden.
• Specification 2 (=S2): wit consists of ProdExpit, SocialExpit, GovConsit, OtherExpit and
Taxburdenit. As the total tax burden is kept constant, this specification allows to analyze
the impact of a rise in each of the four different government expenditure categories financed
by accumulating more debt.
• Specification 3 (=S3): Variables included in wit are TotalExpit, Taxburdenit, PersonalTax it
and CorporateTax it. First, by keeping the total tax burden constant, we measure the effect
of a shift in the tax structure from OtherTax it and ConsTax it towards more personal and
more corporate taxes. Second, by including TotalExpit, this variable shows the effect of an
increase in total expenditures financed by issuing more debt.
• Specification 4 (=S4): wit now includes ProdExpit, BudgetBalanceit, PersonalTax it, Corpo-
rateTax it, ConsTax it and OtherTax it. By including BudgetBalanceit and ProdExpit, we can
quantify the impact of a rise in each of the four tax categories used to finance an increase in
non-productive government expenditures.
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1.3 A first look at the data
1.3.1 Data and sources
We use data for a panel of 15 OECD countries over the period 1970-2012.3 We distinguish between
three categories of variables. The first category includes standard variables that are included
in every specification: log real GDP (lnQit), log real private non-residential net capital stock
(lnKit), log real government net capital stock (lnGit) and log total hours worked (lnHit). The
second category contains the fiscal policy variables that influence TFP directly and is represented
by the vector wit. All variables in wit are expressed as a percentage of GDP and in logarithms.
The third category, represented by the vector zit, consists of policy variables that influence TFP
indirectly through their impact on a country’s access to worldwide technology. In each of our four
specifications, zit includes the variables StrRelativeit, HCapit and Import it. These variables are
also expressed in logarithms. A detailed description of the data and their sources can be found in
Appendix 1.B.
In the remainder of this section we focus on the construction of the tax variables. The tax
measures included in wit are so-called macro backward-looking indicators. They are computed
as the ratio of taxes received by the government to a measure of the tax base, here GDP. Taxes
are constructed that way to fit in the government budget constraint (see Section 1.2.3). This
approach, however, also comes at a cost. The reason is that macro backward-looking indicators
may not be the best proxies for the actual tax rates that firms and individuals take into account
when taking decisions. This is especially the case for the corporate tax rate indicator. Backward-
looking indicators reflect past investment decisions, past tax systems and past profits. Moreover,
the amount of corporate tax receipts in the numerator is the product of the tax rate and the taxable
profit. This is a serious drawback, as Devereux (2007) and Backus, Henriksen, and Storesletten
(2008) point out. Corporate tax receipts as a percentage of GDP may rise even when tax rates
are reduced. Devereux (2007) concludes that there is no straightforward relationship between
the two.4 It should then come as no surprise that the correlation between corporate income
tax receipts as a percentage of GDP and tax rates themselves is very low. In Appendix 1.A
we report correlation coefficients of the Statutory corporate Tax Rate (STR) with two so-called
micro forward-looking tax variables provided by Devereux and Griffith (2003). These authors rely
3The selection of countries and time coverage is driven by data availability. The included countries are: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingom and United States.
4As an example, consider a government who chooses to lower the effective corporate tax rate. To do that, it has
two options: (i) opting for a lower statutory corporate tax rate or (ii) choosing a smaller tax base. Both options will
stimulate investment and raise profits. As a consequence revenues from corporate taxation could rise because of
more taxable profits. This means that a lower effective corporate tax rate could result in a higher macro-backward
looking indicator.
14
- Chapter 1 -
on the theoretical features of the tax system to compute Effective Marginal Tax Rates (EMTR)
and Effective Average Tax Rates (EATR) that firms can actually expect for several types of
hypothetical investments. Correlation over all countries and available years between STR, EMTR
and EATR is above 0.6. However, the correlation (reported in Appendix 1.A) of each of these
three tax indicators with corporate tax receipts as a percentage of GDP always remains below
0.09. It goes without saying that these findings are a reason for caution when we interpret our
results on the direct impact of the corporate tax rate (included in wit) on TFP in the next section.
Note that there is also a corporate tax rate indicator included in zit to capture its impact on
the access to worldwide technology. As there is no need to take the government budget constraint
into account in zit, from the above arguments we should ideally use the relative EMTR or EATR.
However, as for these indicators data availability is limited, we use the relative statutory corporate
tax rate. As can be seen in Appendix 1.A, the STR shows strong positive correlation with the
EMTR and EATR, such that it should be considered to be an adequate proxy.
1.3.2 Properties of the data
As a guide to selecting the most appropriate estimation method in Section 1.4 below, we first look
at two important properties of the data: the degree of cross-sectional dependence and the order
of integration.
Cross-sectional dependence
The modeling and identification of each country’s TFP in equation (1.3) relies on the assumption
that there is a worldwide level of technology that affects each country differently. This should
show up as strong cross-sectional dependence in the data. Table 1.1 therefore reports the average
pairwise correlation coefficient (ρ̂) and the cross-sectional dependence (CD) test of Pesaran (2004).
As all series are potentially non-stationary, we also report results for the first-differenced data to
avoid spurious non-zero correlation. For the identification of worldwide technology, especially the
cross-sectional dependence in output is important. For completeness we also report the test results
for each of the explanatory variables.
The results in Table 1.1 show that most variables exhibit considerable positive cross-sectional
correlation. Concentrating on the first-differenced data, strong cross-sectional dependence is found
for lnQit, lnKit, lnGit, lnHit, lnTotalExpit, lnSocialExpit, lnGovConsit, lnBudgetBalanceit,
lnHCapit and ln Importit. For the other variables, cross-sectional correlation is only moderate.
Looking at the CD test, the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is strongly rejected
in all cases. The finding of significant cross-sectional dependence implies that we need to take this
into account when estimating our empirical model. However, rather than treating cross-sectional
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dependence as a nuisance which needs correction, we will use it to identify unobserved TFP.
Table 1.1: Cross-sectional dependence in the data
Sample period: 1970 -2012, 15 OECD countries
Levels First-differences Levels First-differences
ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD
lnQit 0.98 66.14 [0.00] 0.53 35.07 [0.00] lnBudgetBalanceit 0.44 29.44 [0.00] 0.43 28.45 [0.00]
lnKit 0.97 65.37 [0.00] 0.43 28.88 [0.00] lnTaxburdenit 0.58 38.64 [0.00] 0.12 7.91 [0.00]
lnGit 0.76 51.11 [0.00] 0.35 23.03 [0.00] lnPersonalTaxit 0.39 26.05 [0.00] 0.13 8.55 [0.00]
lnHit 0.28 19.04 [0.00] 0.32 21.54 [0.00] lnCorporateTaxit 0.30 19.93 [0.00] 0.19 12.51 [0.00]
lnTotalExpit 0.61 40.72 [0.00] 0.45 29.9 [0.00] lnConsTaxit 0.11 7.57 [0.00] 0.09 6.07 [0.00]
lnProdExpit 0.07 4.77 [0.00] 0.15 10.06 [0.00] lnOtherTaxit 0.33 22.48 [0.00] 0.07 4.33 0.00]
lnSocialExpit 0.68 45.51 [0.00] 0.47 31.03 [0.00] lnStrRelativeit −0.06 −3.95 [0.00] −0.06 −3.99 [0.00]
lnGovConsit 0.52 35.02 [0.00] 0.38 25.35 [0.00] lnHCapit 0.94 63.00 [0.00] 0.27 18.00 [0.00]
lnOtherExpit 0.51 34.08 [0.00] 0.19 12.47 [0.00] ln Importit 0.59 39.95 [0.00] 0.58 38.71 [0.00]
Notes: The average cross-correlation coefficient ρ̂ = (2 /N (N − 1))∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρ̂ij is the average of the country-by-country cross-correlation coef-
ficients ρ̂ij (for i 6= j). CD is the Pesaran (2004) test defined as
√
2T /N (N − 1) ∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρ̂ij , which is asymptotically standard normal under
the null of cross-sectional independence. p-values are reported in square brackets.
Time series properties
The statistical properties of the below proposed estimators depend on the order of integration
of the data. In this section we analyze the time series properties of each of the variables used.
Panel unit root tests allowing for cross-sectional dependence have been proposed by, most notably,
Pesaran (2007), Moon and Perron (2004) and Bai and Ng (2004). These tests are similar in that
they assume an observed variable xit to have the following common factor structure
xit = dit + ftpii + ξit, (1.5)
where ft is an r × 1 vector of r common factors with country-specific factor loadings pii, ξit is an
idiosyncratic error term and dit is a deterministic component which can be (i) zero, dit = 0, (ii) an
idiosyncratic intercept, dit = d0i, or (iii) an idiosyncratic intercept and idiosyncratic linear trend
dit = d0i + d1it. Cross-sectional dependence stems from the component ftpii which is correlated
over countries as it includes the common factors ft. The series xit is non-stationary if at least
one of the common factors in ft is non-stationary, or the idiosyncratic error ξit is non-stationary,
or both. The above mentioned panel unit root tests differ in the allowed number and order of
integration of the unobserved common factors and in the way these factors are eliminated.
The most general approach is the PANIC unit root test of Bai and Ng (2004) as this is the only
one that allows for non-stationarity in either the common factors, or in the idiosyncratic errors or in
both. Rather than testing the order of integration using the observed data, xit is first decomposed
according to the structure in equation (1.5). By applying the method of principal components
to the first-differenced data, the common and idiosyncratic components in first-differences can
be estimated consistently, irrespectively of their orders of integration. Next, these components
are accumulated to obtain the corresponding level estimates f̂pct and ξ̂
pc
it . These components can
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then be tested separately for unit roots. When there is only one factor, testing for a unit root in
f̂pct can be done using a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)-type test (with deterministic
terms according to the specification of dit). For multiple common factors, the MQ
c,τ
c and MQ
c,τ
f
statistics (see Bai and Ng, 2004, for details) are designed to determine the number of independent
stochastic trends r1 ≤ r in f̂pct . As under the appropriate choice for the number of common
factors, ξ̂pcit by design satisfies the cross-sectional independence assumption required for pooling,
the Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) panel unit root test can be used on ξ̂pcit . This consists of
combining p-values for the ADF tests (with no deterministic terms) on the idiosyncratic error ξ̂pcit .
The relevant distributions for the ADF tests on f̂pct and ξ̂
pc
it , for the intercept only and the linear
trend model, can be found in Bai and Ng (2004).
Monte Carlo simulation results in Bai and Ng (2004), for samples as small as (T=100, N=40),
and in Gutierrez (2006), for samples as small as (T=50, N=20), show that the PANIC approach
performs well in small samples. The ADF test on the common factor and on the MW test on the
idiosyncratic error terms both have an actual size close to the 5% nominal level and have adequate
power. Applications of the PANIC approach to unit root testing using a similar data span as ours
(T=43, N=15) can be found in, among others, Huang (2011), Byrne, Fiess, and Ronald (2011),
Costantini and Destefanis (2009) and Costantini, Demetriades, James, and Lee (2013).
Table 1.2: PANIC unit root tests
Sample period: 1970 -2012, 15 OECD countries
f̂pct ξ̂
pc
it f̂
pc
t ξ̂
pc
it
Det r r1 MW-test Det r r1 MW-test
lnQit dit 1 1 27.52 [0.60] lnBudgetBalanceit d0i 1 0 66.13 [0.00]
lnKit dit 2 2 61.62 [0.00] lnTaxburdenit dit 0 0 8.92 [1.00]
lnGit dit 3 3 137.90 [0.00] lnPersonalTaxit dit 0 0 7.46 [1.00]
lnHit dit 1 1 28.58 [0.54] lnCorporateTaxit d0i 0 0 62.71 [0.00]
lnTotalExpit dit 1 1 38.02 [0.15] lnConsTaxit d0i 0 0 27.21 [0.62]
lnProdExpit d0i 0 0 32.37 [0.35] lnOtherTaxit d0i 0 0 36.86 [0.18]
lnSocialExpit dit 1 1 33.64 [0.30] lnStrRelativeit d0i 0 0 34.41 [0.26]
lnGovConsit d0i 1 0 39.09 [0.12] lnHCapit dit 3 3 47.09 [0.02]
lnOtherExpit d0i 0 0 29.01 [0.52] ln Importit dit 1 1 42.36 [0.07]
Notes: ‘Det’ indicates the deterministic component of the model, i.e. d0i for the intercept only model and dit = d0i + d1it for the linear
trend model. The number of common factors is estimated using the BIC3 of Bai and Ng (2002). When r = 1, the number of non-
stationary factors r1 is determined using the ADF-GLS test of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) with deterministic terms according
to the specification of dit. When r > 1, r1 is determined using the MQ
c
c (intercept only model) or MQ
τ
c (linear trend model) statistic
of Bai and Ng (2004). The panel unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors is the Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) test (with no
deterministic terms). The null hypothesis for each of these tests is that the series has a unit root. p-values are reported in square brackets.
The results of the PANIC unit root test are reported in Table 1.2. For each of the variables we
estimate the number of common factors r using one of the information criteria suggested by Bai
and Ng (2002). Based on their simulation results, we prefer BIC3 because it outperforms the other
information criteria in the smallest samples they consider. This is also stressed by Moon and Perron
(2007) who state that BIC3 performs better in selecting the number of factors when min(N,T ) is
small (≤ 20), as is the case in our application. The specification of the deterministic component
dit is chosen from the observed trending behavior of the variables. The results show that, except
for lnBudgetbalanceit and lnCorporateTaxit, each of the variables is found to be non-stationary
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at the 5% level of significance. For lnGovConsit and lnStrRelativeit non-stationarity is induced
by the idiosyncratic component only while for lnKit, lnGit and lnHCapit non-stationarity is
induced by the common factor only. For the other 11 variables (lnQit, lnHit, lnTotalExpit,
lnProdExpit, lnSocialExpit, lnOtherExpit, lnTaxburdenit, lnPersonalTaxit, lnConsTaxit,
lnOtherTaxit, ln Importit), both the common factor and the idiosyncratic error are found to be
non-stationary.5
Taking into account the non-stationary of the data and the presence of significant cross-
sectional dependence, an appropriate estimation method and panel cointegration test are discussed
in the next section.
1.4 Econometric methodology
The empirical model outlined in Section 1.2 allows fiscal policy to have both direct and indirect
effects on TFP. In this section we outline our econometric methodology for estimating these effects.
We start with a simplified specification by restricting the indirect effects to be absent. This results
in a linear model that can be estimated using the standard CCEP estimator of Pesaran (2006),
which is discussed in Section 1.4.1. Next, we show how a model including also indirect effects can
be estimated using a non-linear version of the CCEP estimator, denoted CCEPnl. This is described
in Section 1.4.2. Section 1.4.3 outlines our PANIC approach to testing for cointegration from the
linear and non-linear CCEP estimates. The small sample properties of the newly proposed CCEPnl
estimator and of the PANIC cointegration test are analyzed using Monte Carlo simulations in
Section 1.4.4.
1.4.1 CCEP estimator for model with time-invariant factor loadings
We start with a simplified specification by restricting fiscal policy to have only direct effects on
TFP, i.e. setting λ = 0 in equation (1.4) such that λit = λi0. Under this restriction, the empirical
model can be obtained by substituting equation (1.3) into (1.2)
yit = γi + Ftλi0 + xitβ + εit, (1.6)
where yit = lnQit, xit = (lnKit, lnGit, lnHit, wit) and β = (α1, α2, α3, δ)
′
. The idiosyncratic
error term εit is assumed to be a zero mean stationary random term which is uncorrelated over
cross-section units and distributed independently of xit and Ft.
In line with Pesaran (2006) and Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011), we identify the
unobserved common factors Ft from the cross-section dimension of the data. Taking cross-sectional
5The overall conclusion that most variables are non-stationary does not change when changing the number of
common factors or the specification of the deterministic component.
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averages of the model in equation (1.6) yields
yt = γ + Ftλ0 + xtβ + εt, (1.7)
where yt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 yit and similarly for γ, λ0, xt and εt. For notational convenience we assume a
single common factor (r = 1) but the results straightforwardly generalize to multiple factors (see
Pesaran, 2006). Equation (1.7) can then be solved for Ft as
Ft =
1
λ0
(yt − γ − xtβ − εt) , (1.8)
which yields F̂ ca1t
F̂ ca1t =
1
λ0
(yt − γ − xtβ) , (1.9)
as a proxy for Ft. Given the assumption that εit is a zero mean stationary error term which is
uncorrelated over cross-section units, implying that plim
N→∞
εt = 0 for each t, we have that F̂
ca1
t
p−→ Ft
for N → ∞. This is the main result in Pesaran (2006) that the cross-sectional averages of the
observed data can be used as observable proxies for Ft. Although the construction of F̂
ca1
t as
a consistent estimator for Ft in equation (1.9) requires knowledge of the unknown underlying
parameters, Pesaran (2006) shows that these parameters can be estimated from an augmented
model obtained by replacing the unobserved Ft in equation (1.6) by the cross-sectional averages
of the observed data using equation (1.8)
yit = γi + (yt − γ − xtβ − εt)
λi0
λ0
+ xitβ + εit, (1.10)
= γ+i + ytλi1 + xtλi2 + xitβ + ε
+
it, (1.11)
where γ+i = γi−γλi0
/
λ0 , λi1 = λi0
/
λ0 , λi2 = λi0
/
λ0 β and ε
+
it = εit−λi0
/
λ0 εt. Since ε
+
it
p−→ εit
for N → ∞, the augmented model in equation (1.11) - ignoring any parameter restrictions - can
be estimated with least squares (LS), an approach referred to as the CCEP estimator.6
Pesaran (2006) shows that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the CCEP estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal in stationary panel regressions. Kapetanios, Pesaran, and
Yamagata (2011) show that these asymptotic results continu to hold in non-stationary panels
provided that the idiosyncratic error term εit is stationary. We outline our approach for testing
whether this assumption (of cointegration) is satisfied in Section 1.4.3 below.
6Although equation (1.11) is derived, for notational convenience, under the assumption of a single factor, exactly
the same augmented form is obtained for multiple common factors (see Pesaran, 2006).
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1.4.2 CCEPnl estimator for model with time-varying factor loadings
Allowing for a time-varying access to unobserved worldwide technology yields, from substituting
equations (1.3) and (1.4) in (1.2), the following final empirical specification
yit = γi + Ft (λi0 + zitλ) + xitβ + εit. (1.12)
Again taking cross-sectional averages
yt = γ + Ft
(
λ0 + ztλ
)
+ xtβ + εt, (1.13)
and solving for Ft
Ft =
1
λ0 + ztλ
(yt − γ − xtβ − εt) , (1.14)
now yields F̂ ca2t
F̂ ca2t =
1
λ0 + ztλ
(yt − γ − xtβ) , (1.15)
as a proxy for Ft. From plim
N→∞
εt = 0 for each t, we again have that F̂
ca2
t
p−→ Ft for N → ∞ such
that the main result in Pesaran (2006) that the cross-sectional averages of the observed data can
be used as observable proxies of Ft continues to hold. Inserting equation (1.14) in (1.12) and using
F̂ ca2t defined in equation (1.15) as a proxy for Ft yields
yit = γi +
1
λ0 + ztλ
(yt − γ − xtβ − εt)λit + xitβ + εit, (1.16a)
= γi + F̂
ca2
t (λi0 + zitλ) + xitβ + ε
+
it, (1.16b)
where ε+it = εit − (λi0 + zitλ)
/(
λ0 + ztλ
)
εt. We still have that ε
+
it
p−→ εit for N → ∞, but the
main difference compared to the ‘unrestricted’ augmented model in equation (1.11) is that the
time-varying factor loading λit requires estimating the ‘restricted’ augmented form in equation
(1.16) which (i) implies making an assumption on the number of common factors and (ii) cannot
be estimated using the standard CCEP estimator because it is non-linear in the parameters.
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In Section 1.5.1 below we show that one common factor is sufficient to model the cross-sectional
dependence in the data. Assuming a single factor, we then estimate the unknown parameters in
equation (1.16a) by minimizing the non-linear LS objective function.
SNT (λ, β, (γ1, . . . , γN ) , (λ10, . . . , λN0)) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ε+
′
it ε
+
it. (1.17)
We label this non-linear procedure the CCEPnl estimator.
Asymptotic theory for our non-linear CCEP estimator is currently not yet available and de-
riving limit distribution theory for non-linear regressions with integrated variables is very cum-
bersome.7 In a pure time series context there is already quite some literature on non-linear coin-
tegration analysis, i.e. asymptotic theory for non-linear regression with integrated processes was
developed by, among others, Park and Phillips (2001) and extended to a fairly general non-linear
model by Saikkonen and Choi (2004). However, in a panel data context literature is much more
scarce. Very similar to our model, though, Gonza´lez, Tera¨svirta, and van Dijk (2005) estimate a
fixed effects smooth transition panel cointegration model in which the regression coefficients vary
across individuals and time as a function of an observable variable. They suggest to estimate
the resulting non-linear model using a combination of fixed effects and LS. More specifically, as
the individual means depend on the unknown parameters they first condition on the unknown
parameters to calculate and remove the individual means and next use the demeaned series to
estimate the unknown parameters with LS. This procedure is then iterated until convergence.
They further argue that for normally distributed errors this non-linear procedure is equivalent to
maximum likelihood (ML) and conjecture that this ML estimator is consistent and asymptotically
normal. Palm, Urbain, and Wan (2012) formalize this estimator as the pooled non-linear least
squares dummy variable estimator and derive its asymptotic properties, confirming the conjecture
of Gonza´lez, Tera¨svirta, and van Dijk (2005).
Similar to the estimation procedure in Gonza´lez, Tera¨svirta, and van Dijk (2005), estimating
the unknown parameters from the non-linear LS objective function in equation (1.17) can also be
done by first calculating F̂ ca2t from equation (1.15), conditional on the unknown coefficients, and
next estimating the augmented linear model in equation (1.16b), conditional on F̂ ca2t , using a linear
LS-type estimator. Iterating over these two steps is equivalent to the CCEPnl estimator defined
above. The main difference with the standard CCEP estimator is that instead of augmenting
the model with cross-sectional averages of the data, we augment the regression with an estimate
of a single unobserved factor obtain from the cross-sectional averages of the data conditional on
7Note that Wan (2012, chapter 5) provides some heuristic asymptotic results for a CCEP estimator with non-
linear transformations of I(1) variables but which is still linear in the coefficients.
21
- Chapter 1 -
the unknown coefficients. As the error εt in the approximation of Ft by F̂
ca2
t shrinks to zero as
N →∞, we conjecture that this non-linear procedure yields a consistent estimator for (λ, β). The
small sample properties of the proposed CCEPnl estimator are illustrated in Section 1.4.4 using a
Monte Carlo simulation.
One additional complication is that the model is not identified as λit and F̂
ca2
t are not identified
separately, only their product is. For instance, multiplying λit by a constant a while dividing
F̂ ca2t by the same constant, which implies that λi0, λ0 and λ are multiplied by the constant
a, leaves the model in equation (1.16) unchanged as
(
F̂ ca2t /a
)
(aλit) = F̂
ca2
t λit or equivalently
aλi0+zitaλ
aλ0+ztaλ
= λi0+zitλ
λ0+ztλ
. To solve this identification problem, we impose λ0 = 1, i.e. we normalize
the average over all countries of the country-specific time-invariant access to worldwide technology
to be one.
1.4.3 Testing for cointegration from the CCEP and CCEPnl estimates
The consistency and asymptotic normality of the above presented CCEP estimators relies on
the assumption that the idiosyncratic error term εit in equation (1.6) or (1.12) is stationary
(Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata, 2011). This implies that there is cointegration (i) between
(yit, xit) if Ft ∼ I(0) or (ii) between (yit, xit, Ft) in the linear case and between (yit, xit, Ft, zitFt) in
the non-linear case if Ft ∼ I(1). In this section we outline our approach to testing for cointegration
from the CCEP(nl) estimation results.
Panel cointegration tests based on the CCEP estimator have been suggested by Banerjee and
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) and Everaert (2014). Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) first extend
the results in Kao (1999) and Phillips and Moon (1999) to panels with cross-sectional dependence
by showing that under the null of no cointegration, the linear CCEP estimator allows for consistent
estimation of the homogeneous coefficients β but not for the heterogeneous coefficients (γi, λi0).
Given this result, they suggest to obtain a consistent estimate for the composite error term eit =
γi + Ftλi0 + εit as
êit = yit − xitβ̂ = (γi + Ftλi0 + εit) ̂, (1.18)
and test for cointegration using a panel unit root test on êit that takes into account the cross-
sectional dependence induced by the unobserved common factors Ft. To this end, they suggest to
use the cross-section augmented ADF (CADF) panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007). Although
this approach can effectively sweep out a single common factor, Ft is restricted to have the same
order of integration as the idiosyncratic error term εit. This rules out that Ft ∼ I(1) and εit ∼ I(0),
i.e. cointegration between (yit, xit, Ft) in the linear model, a case which is of particular interest
to us as Ft is included in our empirical model to capture worldwide technology, which is most
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likely non-stationary. Since the structure of the composite error term eit = γi + λiFt + εit aligns
with the general factor structure of equation (1.5), an obvious alternative to the CADF test is
to apply the PANIC approach of Bai and Ng (2004).8 This allows to consistently decompose êit
in a set of common factors, denoted F̂ pct , and an idiosyncratic error term, labeled ε̂
pc
it , which can
then be separately tested for unit roots (see PANIC approach outlined in Section 1.3.2). The
main advantage of this approach is that the test whether the idiosyncratic errors εit are stationary
or not does not depend on the order of integration of Ft. As such, testing for cointegration
from the CCEP estimation results boils down to testing whether there is a unit root in ε̂pcit , for
which the MW panel unit root test can be used. Note that although cointegration only requires
the idiosyncratic errors to be I(0), the integration properties of the common factors provide
additional interesting information, i.e. when Ft ∼ I(0) there is cointegration between (yit, xit)
while for Ft ∼ I(1) there is cointegration between (yit, xit, Ft). When running the PANIC unit
root test on êit, we use the linear trend model specification of Bai and Ng (2004). The reason
for this is that the common factor F̂ pct identified below (see Section 1.5.1) shows a clear upward
trend. With no loss of generality (also see Bai and Ng, 2004, p. 1138) this can be modeled by
including an idiosyncratic linear trend, i.e. setting dit = di0 + di1t in the general common factor
structure presented in equation (1.5).
A cointegration test for the CCEPnl estimator for the model in equation (1.12) has not yet
been developed. In line with the results in Kao (1999) and Phillips and Moon (1999), for a model
with no cross-sectional dependence, and in Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011), for a model
with cross-sectional dependence as in equation (1.6), we conjecture that the CCEPnl estimator
yields consistent estimates for the homogenous coefficients β and λ and therefore, using equation
(1.15), also for Ft
9. This implies that we can obtain a consistent estimate for the composite error
term eit = γi + Ftλi0 + εit as
êit = yit − xitβ̂ − zitλ̂F̂ ca2t = (γi + Ftλi0 + εit) ̂, (1.19)
from which we again test for cointegration using the PANIC approach in the same way as in
the linear model. If the idiosyncratic error ε̂pcit is found to be stationary, there is cointegration
between (yit, xit) when Ft ∼ I(0) or between (yit, xit, Ft, zitFt) when Ft is found to be I(1). In the
next subsection, we provide numerical support for our conjecture that the CCEPnl estimator is
consistent under the null hypothesis of no cointegration and analyse the size and power properties
8Using the PANIC approach to testing for panel cointegration in the presence of common factors has also been
suggested by Gengenbach, Palm, and Urbain (2006), Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) and Bai and Carrion-
i-Silvestre (2013). The main difference between these approaches and ours lies in the estimation of the unknown
coefficients in the cointegrating relation, for which we use the CCEP estimator while the above references estimate
a model in first-differences with the common factors and factor loadings estimated using principal components.
9Note that λ̂ and F̂ ca2t are only identified up to scale (see discussion in Section 4.2) but their product used in
equation (1.19) is identified.
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of the PANIC approach applied to the CCEPnl composite error term in equation (1.19).
1.4.4 Monte Carlo simulation
The small sample behavior of the CCEP estimator is analyzed by Pesaran (2006) for stationary
panel regressions and extended to non-stationary panels by Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata
(2011). Both Monte Carlo studies show that the small sample properties in the case (T=30,
N=20) are satisfactory. However, as we extend their settings to a non-linear model, in this section
we present Monte Carlo simulation results to examine the small sample properties of the CCEPnl
estimator.
The actual size and power of a PANIC cointegration test on the composite error term of
a linear CCEP regression have already been analyzed by Everaert (2014). He finds that this
is an adequate approach to testing for cointegration between (yit, xit, Ft). In our Monte Carlo
experiment we further analyze the size and power of the PANIC cointegration test and extend the
analysis to testing for cointegration in the CCEPnl regressions. Although we are mainly interested
in the properties for the small sample we have available (T=43, N=15), we also present results for
larger sample sizes to illustrate the more general properties of the CCEPnl estimator and PANIC
cointegration test.
Simulation tailored to the actual data for T=43 and N=15
Design
To make sure that our simulation results are relevant for putting the estimates presented in
Section 1.5 in perspective, we simulate data for exactly the same sample size (T=43, N=15) that
is available to us while the data generating process (DGP) and population parameters are chosen
such that the properties of the simulated data match with those of the real data. More specifically,
we simulate artificial data for yit from its DGP, specified in equations (1.6) and (1.12) for the linear
and non-linear model respectively, using the observed data for xit and zit. We conduct a separate
experiment for each of the four different specifications we consider. The population parameters
γi, λi0, λ, β and the common factor Ft in the DGP of yit are taken from the CCEP and CCEPnl
estimation results (Table 1.8 in Section 1.5 below), when simulating according to the linear and
non-linear DGP respectively. The idiosyncratic error term εit is generated from the following
AR(1) specification
εit = θεi,t−1 + ψit, ψit ∼ N(0, σ2ψ), (1.20)
for various values of θ. To analyze the power of the PANIC cointegration test outlined in Section
1.4.3, we set θ = {0; 0.8; 0.9}. This yields three different stationary processes for εit. As our esti-
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mate for the unobserved common factor Ft is found to be non-stationary (see Section 1.5.1), these
values for θ imply that there is cointegration between (yit, xit, Ft) in the linear model (CCEP es-
timator) and between (yit, xit, Ft, zitFt) in the non-linear model (CCEPnl estimator). To analyze
the actual size of the PANIC cointegration test, we generate εit from a random walk process by
setting θ = 1 such that there is no cointegration. Using equation (1.20), we calibrate parameter
values for σψ over the different values of θ by setting σψ equal to the sample standard deviation
of ε̂it − θε̂i,t−1, with ε̂it being the estimated error term from the CCEPnl estimator in Table 1.8.
In the baseline simulation with θ = 0, σψ is calibrated to be 0.02.
10 The other calibrated values
for σψ are reported in the note to Table 1.4. For analyzing the power of the PANIC cointegration
test, the nominal size is fixed at 5%. To get a more complete picture for the actual size of the test,
we consider three different values for the nominal size (i.e. 5%, 2.5% and 1%). Each experiment
is based on 1000 iterations.
Small sample properties of the CCEPnl estimator
The simulation results for the small sample properties of the CCEPnl estimator for the non-linear
model in our baseline design (θ = 0) can be found in Table 1.3.11 We report the (i) mean bias
(bias), (ii) standard deviation (stdv), (iii) mean of the estimated standard errors (stde) of the
coefficient estimates and (iv) actual size (size). The actual size is calculated for a two-sided hy-
pothesis test at the 5% nominal level of significance for the null hypothesis that the estimated
coefficient equals the population parameter. The general picture that emerges from Table 1.3 is
that despite the limited sample size (i) the bias in estimating the coefficients is negligibly small,
(ii) the mean of the estimated standard errors is fairly close to the actual standard deviation of the
estimates and (iii) the actual size is close to the nominal level of 5%. These results imply that the
CCEPnl estimator allows for reliable estimation and valid inference in the non-linear specification
in equation (1.12) even in our limited sample (T=43, N=15).
Small sample properties of the PANIC cointegration test
The simulation results for the power and size of the PANIC cointegration test are reported in
Table 1.4. Starting with the power, this is found to be close to 100% for both the CCEP and
CCEPnl estimator when εit is a white noise error term (θ = 0). In the setting where θ = 0.8,
power is lower but still sufficiently high, certainly when taking into account that we consider a
fairly small sample (T=43, N=15). Power decreases further when setting θ = 0.9. Turning to
the actual size, the PANIC cointegration test tends to be somewhat oversized. For the CCEP
estimator in the linear model, the size distortion is not too big, though. However, for the CCEPnl
10Since θ = 0 we also have σε = 0.02 in this case. As the dependent variable lnQit is log real GDP, σε = 0.02
implies that 95% of the generated error terms εit are between -4% and 4% of real GDP.
11Simulation results for the CCEP estimator are available on request.
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estimator in the non-linear model, the actual size at the 5% nominal level varies between 7.5%
and 17.7%. Reducing the nominal size to 1% yields an actual size between 2.4% and 7.5%.
Table 1.3: Monte Carlo simulation results for the CCEPnl estimator (T=43, N=15)
S1 S3
bias stdv stde size bias stdv stde size
lnKit −0.006 0.019 0.020 0.016 lnKit −0.001 0.016 0.019 0.056
lnGit 0.001 0.014 0.013 0.048 lnGit 0.002 0.013 0.015 0.039
lnHit 0.003 0.021 0.025 0.048 lnHit 0.007 0.017 0.024 0.016
lnTotalExpit 0.002 0.032 0.033 0.047 lnTotalExpit −0.001 0.048 0.053 0.042
lnProdExpit −0.002 0.012 0.012 0.057 lnTaxburdenit 0.000 0.032 0.036 0.037
lnSocialExpit −0.001 0.017 0.017 0.048 lnPersonalTaxit 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.049
lnBudgetBalanceit 0.002 0.049 0.051 0.048 lnCorporateTaxit −0.002 0.018 0.020 0.036
lnStrRelativeit 0.020 0.090 0.096 0.030 lnStrRelativeit −0.048 0.102 0.1362 0.085
lnHCapit 0.010 0.049 0.054 0.048 lnHCapit 0.025 0.056 0.074 0.074
ln Importit −0.010 0.050 0.057 0.048 ln Importit −0.028 0.056 0.075 0.086
S2 S4
bias stdv stde size bias stdv stde size
lnKit −0.008 0.019 0.021 0.040 lnKit −0.008 0.015 0.020 0.034
lnGit 0.002 0.014 0.015 0.044 lnGit 0.001 0.012 0.014 0.028
lnHit 0.004 0.021 0.026 0.017 lnHit 0.005 0.017 0.024 0.018
lnProdExpit −0.001 0.015 0.015 0.058 lnProdExpit 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.047
lnSocialExpit 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.065 lnBudgetSurplusit −0.002 0.005 0.005 0.055
lnGovConsit 0.004 0.014 0.014 0.045 lnPersonalTaxit −0.001 0.014 0.014 0.037
lnOtherExpit 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.058 lnCorporateTaxit −0.001 0.005 0.005 0.047
lnConsTaxit 0.002 0.036 0.037 0.053
lnTaxburdenit −0.001 0.023 0.021 0.066 lnOtherTaxit 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.058
lnStrRelativeit 0.026 0.097 0.109 0.082 lnStrRelativeit −0.028 0.075 0.093 0.071
lnHCapit 0.014 0.056 0.051 0.071 lnHCapit 0.016 0.045 0.054 0.066
ln Importit −0.017 0.053 0.060 0.095 ln Importit −0.017 0.041 0.051 0.084
Notes: Data for yit are simulated from the DGP in equation (1.12) using population parameters for the coefficients taken from the CCEPnl
estimation results in Table 2.4. We further set θ = 0 and σψ = 0.020 in the DGP for the idiosyncratic error term εit in equation (1.20). Each
experiment is based on 1000 iterations.
Simulation for varying values of T and N
Important for our PANIC cointegration test procedure is that the CCEPnl estimator is consistent
under the null of no cointegration. In this section, we therefore analyse the statistical properties
of the CCEPnl estimator for varying values of T and N . Given that the PANIC cointegration test
on the composite error terms of the CCEPnl was found to be somewhat oversized for a sample
with T=43 and N=15, we further check whether this size distortion disappears for larger values
of T and N . As a benchmark, we also include results for the CCEP estimator in the linear model.
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Table 1.4: Power and actual size of the PANIC cointegration test (T=43, N=15)
Nominal CCEP estimates CCEPnl estimates
size S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
Power
θ = 0.0 5.0% 100.0% 99.7% 99.8% 99.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9%
θ = 0.8 5.0% 80.0% 77.6% 79.2% 76.1% 97.9% 97.9% 98.3% 98.7%
θ = 0.9 5.0% 22.0% 15.0% 22.0% 21.0% 57.0% 54.0% 60.0% 64.0%
Actual Size
θ = 1.0 5.0% 7.0% 7.2% 8.7% 8.5% 17.7% 15.2% 7.5% 15.9%
θ = 1.0 2.5% 4.2% 3.9% 4.8% 5.1% 12.6% 10.1% 4.9% 11.2%
θ = 1.0 1.0% 2.8% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 6.6% 5.9% 2.4% 7.5%
Notes: Data for yit are simulated from the DGP in equation (1.6) for the linear model, estimated using the CCEP estimator,
and from equation (1.12) for the non-linear model, estimated using the CCEPnl estimator. Population parameters for the
coefficients in each of the four specifications are taken from the CCEP and CCEPnl estimation results in Table 2.4. When
varying θ over the four cases θ = {0; 0.8; 0.9; 1} we calibrate σψ from equation (1.20) as σψ = {0.020; 0.012; 0.012; 0.013}.
Reported are rejection frequencies of a panel MW test for the null hypothesis of a unit root in the idiosyncratic error term
ε̂pcit , which is obtained from using PANIC on the composite error term êit of the CCEP and CCEPnl estimates in the four
different specifications. Each experiment is based on 1000 iterations.
Design
When considering larger sample sizes, we can no longer use the actual data for xit and zit and
the proxy for the common factor Ft from the CCEP(nl) estimation results. Therefore, we now
simulate data using xit = xi,t−1 +exit, zit = zi,t−1 +e
z
it and Ft = 0.1+Ft−1 +e
F
t , with e
x
it ∼ N(0, 1),
ezit ∼ N(0, 1) and eFt ∼ N(0, 1). Using these data, we then generate yit from its DGP, specified in
equations (1.6) and (1.12) for the linear and non-linear model respectively, with β = 1, λ = 0.1,
γi ∼ N(0, 1), λi0 ∼ N(1, 0.5) and the idiosyncratic error term εit generated from the AR(1) spec-
ification in equation (1.20) with ψit ∼ N(0, 1). We again vary the values for θ to analyse the size
and power properties of the PANIC cointegration test.
Properties CCEPnl estimator and PANIC cointegration test
The simulation results for the CCEPnl estimator are reported in Table 1.5. As can be seen, the
mean of the estimated coefficients is always close to their true population value with a standard
error that decrease in the sample size. Note that this main result holds irrespectively of the value
for θ. Only for the sample T=43 and N=15, there is a small downward bias in the estimates
for λ when θ = 1 but this disappears as the sample size grows larger. These results support our
conjecture in Section 1.4.3 that the CCEPnl estimator is consistent even under the null of no
cointegration.
The simulation results for the PANIC cointegration test on the CCEP and CCEPnl estimates
are reported in Table 1.6. In line with the results in Section 1.4.4, especially the PANIC cointegra-
tion test using the CCEPnl estimates is somewhat oversized for the sample size T=43 and N=15.
However, this size distortion disappears as the sample size increases. This provides additional
support for the validity of our PANIC cointegration test.
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Table 1.5: CCEPnl estimates for varying T and N
β̂ λ̂
T /N 43 /15 100 /40 100 /100 43 /15 100 /40 100 /100
θ = 0.0 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.100 0.100 0.100
(0.024) (0.005) (0.003) (0.022) (0.012) (0.007)
θ = 0.8 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.099 0.100 0.100
(0.071) (0.022) (0.013) (0.032) (0.013) (0.008)
θ = 0.9 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.098 0.100 0.100
(0.099) (0.036) (0.022) (0.037) (0.014) (0.009)
θ = 1.0 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.091 0.099 0.100
(0.166) (0.097) (0.059) (0.057) (0.021) (0.013)
Notes: Data for yit are simulated from the DGP in equation (1.6) for the linear model and from
equation (1.12) for the non-linear model, with β = 1, λ = 0.1, γi ∼ N(0, 1), λi0 ∼ N(1, 0.5) and
the idiosyncratic error term εit generated from the AR(1) specification in equation (1.20) with
ψit ∼ N(0, 1). Reported are the mean of the coefficient estimates and their standard deviation
(in parentheses). Each experiment is based on 1000 iterations.
Table 1.6: Power and actual size of the PANIC cointegration test for varying T and N
Nominal CCEP estimates CCEPnl estimates
T /N size 43 /15 100 /40 100 /100 43 /15 100 /40 100 /100
Power
θ = 0.0 5.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
θ = 0.8 5.0% 94.0% 100.0% 100.0% 93.5% 100.0% 100.0%
θ = 0.9 5.0% 37.4% 100.0% 100.0% 40.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Actual Size
θ = 1.0 5.0% 6.7% 5.9% 5.3% 9.1% 7.7% 5.8%
θ = 1.0 2.5% 3.6% 3.1% 2.6% 5.5% 4.4% 3.2%
θ = 1.0 1.0% 1.5% 1.3% 1.0% 2.3% 1.7% 1.3%
Notes: See note to Table 1.5 for how the data were generated. Reported are rejection frequencies of a panel MW
test for the null hypothesis of a unit root in the idiosyncratic error term ε̂pcit , which is obtained from using PANIC
on the composite error term êit of the CCEP and CCEPnl estimates. Each experiment is based on 1000 iterations.
The overall picture that emerges from the simulation results is that a PANIC cointegration
test on the composite error term êit of the CCEP-type estimators is an adequate approach to
testing for cointegration in our setting. However, it also shows that care should be taken when
interpreting p-values in a sample as small as ours as the PANIC test is somewhat oversized. This
suggests that we should be a bit more conservative and reject the null of no cointegration only at
sufficiently low levels of significance.
1.5 Estimation results
Our estimation results are reported in Table 1.8. As outlined in Section 1.2.3 we consider four
different specifications depending on the variables included in wit. In the first four columns of
Table 1.8, we report CCEP estimation results for the linear model in equation (1.6). Using these
results we can thus only test the direct effects of fiscal policy on TFP. In the last four columns of
Table 1.8, we report CCEPnl estimates for the non-linear model in equation (1.12). This approach
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allows for time-variation in countries’ access to world technology and thus for fiscal policy to have
also indirect effects. In what follows, we first motivate some of the basic choices that we made in
our estimations. Then we discuss our results for the direct and the indirect effects of fiscal policy
on TFP.
1.5.1 Basic Choices
The non-linear specification in equation (1.12) is richer than the linear specification in (1.6) since
it explores the time-variation in countries’ access to global technology. However, the CCEPnl
estimator used to estimate the non-linear model requires a decision on the total number of unob-
served common factors. Therefore, we first look at the empirical relevance of the common factors
in the CCEP composite error term êit defined in equation (1.18). Panel (a) in Table 1.7 reports
the cross-sectional correlation in output lnQit and in the CCEP composite error term êit after
taking out the contribution of r = (0, 1, 2, 3) common factors. For r = 0, this is the cross-sectional
correlation in the original series, while for r > 0 this is the cross-sectional correlation in the id-
iosyncratic part calculated using PANIC with r = (1, 2, 3). The results show that one factor seems
to be sufficient to remove the cross-sectional dependence from output and the CCEP composite
error term. To analyse the contribution of the estimated common factors, panel (b) of Table 1.7
reports the fraction of the total variance explained by the common factors for different values of
r. The results show that the first factor explains about 50% of the variation. When adding a
second factor, this fraction increases to 60%. As the explanatory power by construction increases
with the number of factors, information criteria with an appropriate penalization for the number
of factors are provided by Bai and Ng (2002). As outlined above, we prefer their BIC3. The
results reported in panel (c) of Table 1.7 clearly point to one common factor in the error terms of
each of the four specifications. As such, in the remainder we assume a single common factor when
using CCEPnl. To visualize our proxy for the unobserved worldwide available level of technology,
Figure 1.1 plots the estimated common component from the CCEPnl estimator in specification
1. It exhibits clear non-stationary behavior, with an annual growth rate of 1.23% over the period
1970-2012.
For most variables in Table 1.8 the estimated effects are quite similar for the CCEP and
CCEPnl estimator, which explains why we prefer a single discussion of these effects below. For two
reasons, we give a much larger weight to the CCEPnl results however. First, as already mentioned,
the CCEPnl estimator allows for time-variation in countries’ access to worldwide technology and
therefore also for richer fiscal policy effects. Figure 1.2 demonstrates the relevance of this time-
variation. In this figure we plot rolling window estimates for the factor loading λi computed
from the CCEP estimates. More specifically, we estimate the restricted model in equation (1.10)
assuming a single common factor and normalizing λ = 1. Countries like Finland, Sweden and
29
- Chapter 1 -
Table 1.7: Determining the number of relevant common factors
Sample period: 1970-2012, 15 OECD countries
(a) Cross-sectional correlation left after taking out r factors
lnQit ê
S1
it ê
S2
it ê
S3
it ê
S4
it ∆ lnQit ∆ê
S1
it ∆ê
S2
it ∆ê
S3
it ∆ê
S4
it
r = 0 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.53 0.45 0.46 0.36 0.45
r = 1 −0.05 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
r = 2 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.05 −0.05 −0.03 −0.01 −0.03 −0.03
r = 3 −0.04 −0.05 −0.05 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.05 −0.04 −0.05 −0.06
(b) Variation explained by r factors (c) BIC3
∆ lnQit ∆ê
S1
it ∆ê
S2
it ∆ê
S3
it ∆ê
S4
it ∆ lnQit ∆ê
S1
it ∆ê
S2
it ∆ê
S3
it ∆ê
S4
it
r = 0 - - - - - 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
r = 1 0.56 0.49 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.56∗ 0.66∗ 0.65∗ 0.78∗ 0.66∗
r = 2 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.49 0.56 0.58 0.73 0.72 0.86 0.72
r = 3 0.72 0.65 0.65 0.59 0.66 0.64 0.82 0.81 0.96 0.80
Notes: êS1it , ê
S2
it , ê
S3
it and ê
S4
it are the CCEP composite error terms, defined in equation (2.13), taken from specification S1,
S2, S3 and S4 respectively. Panel (a) reports the average cross-correlation ρ̂ (see Table 2.1 for the definition) after taking
out r common factors using PANIC. Panel (b) reports the average, over the N cross-sections, fraction of variation in the
data explained by the first r factors. Panel (c) reports the BIC3 of Bai and Ng (2002). The optimal number of common
factors r̂ is selected using arg min0≤r≤3BIC3(r) and is indicated with a ‘*’.
Figure 1.1: Common component from CCEPnl estimator
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t from equation (1.16b) over the N cross-sections
using the CCEPnl estimation results for specification S1. When using S2, S3 or S4 we get highly similar results.
Norway show a clear upward trend in their absorptive capacity while others like Belgium, Denmark,
Japan and Italy have experienced a notable drop in their access to world technology. By estimating
the model in equation (1.12) we try to link this time-variation to a number of explanatory variables.
A second reason for focusing on the CCEPnl estimation results is that the PANIC cointegration
test results in Table 1.8 show that for the CCEP estimates we cannot reject the presence of a unit
root in ε̂pcit .
12 Note that despite this finding, we believe it is still useful to report these results
as Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) show that pooled CCEP coefficients can be estimated
consistently even if there is no cointegration. For the CCEPnl estimates, the p-value for our
12Allowing for more than one common factor in the PANIC cointegration test on the CCEP composite error
terms does not yield a different conclusion, i.e. setting r = 2 yields p-values for the MW test on ε̂pcit equal to 0.47,
0.48, 0.85 and 0.16 in S1, S2, S3 and S4 respectively.
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Figure 1.2: Time-varying pattern for λi from rolling CCEP regressions
Notes: Time-varying estimates for λi are obtained from estimating equation (2.11) using a 26 years rolling window
assuming a single common factor and normalizing λ = 1. Reported are the results for specification S1. Similar
results are obtained for S2, S3 and S4.
cointegration test vary between 0.6 % and 3.7%. Taking into account the analysis of the small
sample properties of the PANIC cointegration test in Section 1.4.4, we should be a bit careful
with the interpretation of these p-values, though. However, given the very low p-values we obtain,
especially for S1 and S4, we are fairly confident that, despite the fact that the PANIC test is
somewhat oversized, we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at a reasonably low
level of significance. Note that the results also show that we cannot reject a unit root in the
common factor F pct at the 5% significance level. This is an interesting result as it implies that in
the non-linear case there is cointegration between (yit, xit, Ft, zitFt) but not between (yit, xit).
1.5.2 Direct effects of fiscal policy
Turning to the estimation results, we first discuss our parameter estimates for the standard factors
of production, hours worked and private and public capital, before turning to the direct effects of
fiscal policy. The indirect effects will be discussed in Section 1.5.3.
The results in Table 1.8 show decreasing returns to private and public capital and labor.
Concentrating on the CCEPnl results, both the output elasticity to private physical capital and
the output elasticity to hours worked are about 0.4. The output elasticity to public capital takes
a positive and statistically significant value of about 0.06. These values are within the range of
existing estimates in the literature, although for hours worked they are at the lower end.
The estimation results further reveal significant direct effects of fiscal policy on TFP. Very
few exceptions notwithstanding, we observe consistency in the sign of the included fiscal variables
when comparing the CCEP and CCEPnl results.
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Table 1.8: Regression results
Dependent variable: lnQit Sample period: 1970-2012, 15 OECD countries
CCEP CCEPnl
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
Coefficient estimates
Standard Variables
lnKit 0.20
∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
lnGit 0.04 0.01 0.07
∗∗∗ −0.05 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnHit 0.37
∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Direct effects
lnTotalExpit −0.03 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
lnProdExpit 0.05
∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.001 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnSocialExpit −0.16∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
lnGovConsit −0.06∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
lnOtherExpit −0.01∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.005)
lnBudgetBalanceit 0.02 0.29
∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
lnTaxburdenit 0.5 0.01 0.12
∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
lnPersonalTaxit −0.03 −0.07∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.002
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
lnCorporateTaxit −0.001 −0.01∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
lnConsTaxit 0.01 0.08
∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
lnOtherTaxit −0.01 −0.01∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Indirect effects
lnStrRelativeit −0.61∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15)
lnHCapit −0.37∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
ln Importit 0.31
∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10)
PANIC cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on F̂ pct −1.63 −2.05 −1.13 −1.59 −1.92 −2.05 −2.35 −2.15
[0.77] [0.56] [0.91] [0.78] [0.63] [0.56] [0.40] [0.50]
MW on ̂pcit 30.92 30.72 27.47 21.08 52.7
∗∗∗ 46.09∗∗ 45.26∗∗ 51.78∗∗∗
[0.42] [0.43] [0.60] [0.88] [0.006] [0.03] [0.037] [0.008]
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in square brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level respectively. Also see the notes to Table 2.2 for the PANIC test.
32
- Chapter 1 -
As has been argued, we focus on the CCEPnl results. A number of interesting conclusions
can be drawn. A first one concerns the key role of the budget balance. Our results strongly
confirm earlier findings by Fischer (1993) that budget deficits harm TFP. In this respect, S2
reveals the impact of a rise in each of the four different government spending categories, and
of a fall in the overal tax burden, financed by a change in the government budget balance (i.e.
financed by borrowing). Both policies have significant negative effects. The only exception is
the effect of a deficit financed increase in productive expenditures. There we observe no effect
on TFP meaning that the positive effect of more productive expenditures counterbalances the
negative impact on TFP of building up more debt13. The results in S3 imply similar conclusions.
Higher overall expenditures and a reduction of the tax burden, again financed by a lower budget
balance, are associated with a significant fall in TFP. Note that since we control for personal and
corporate taxes in S3, a tax reduction, which results in higher deficits, must be due to either lower
consumption or other taxes. Finally, S4 also illustrates the key role for the budget balance. In
this specification the coefficient on the budget balance measures the effect of an increasing budget
balance (or deficit reduction) financed by a cut in unproductive government expenditures. This is
found to have strong positive effects on TFP.
A second range of robust conclusions concerns the effects of changes in the structure of gov-
ernment expenditures or taxes, for given total expenditures and tax burden. S1 is informative on
the TFP effects of restructuring on the expenditure side. Controlling for total expenditures, we
observe a significant positive effect when shifting expenditures from consumption or other expen-
ditures to productive expenditures. S4 confirms this result. As in this specification we keep the
budget balance and tax burden constant, the implicit financing element is a shift within expendi-
tures. The coefficient on productive expenditures therefore captures the positive effect of a shift
in expenditures towards more productive categories. Opposite results arise when shifting expendi-
tures towards more social security expenditures. In S1 we find that this kind of shift has a negative
impact on TFP. This is also confirmed in S2, in which higher social expenditures are financed by
building up debt. Finally, S2 also confirms that a restructuring from either social, consumption or
other expenditures to productive expenditures would raise TFP. The former three categories have
significantly negative elasticities, while the elasticity to productive expenditures is positive but not
significant. The positive effect of productive expenditures on TFP is a well-established result in
the literature (see Section 1.2.2 for references). The existing literature is much more ambiguous,
however, about the effect of higher social expenditures. Our results support earlier findings by,
among others, Hansson and Henrekson (1994) and Arjona, Ladaique, and Pearson (2003). On
13For a correct interpretation of the results, note that the estimated coefficients are long-run elasticities. They
indicate the percentage change in real output associated with a one percentage change in the share of a tax or
expenditure category in GDP. To obtain the percentage change in output due to a one percentage point change in
a tax or expenditure share, the estimated elasticity should be divided by the level of the tax or expenditure share.
We report these shares for our sample in 2012 in 2.3.1, where we discuss the construction of the data
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the tax side, S3 reveals a negative effect on TFP when shifting consumption or other taxes to-
wards more personal taxes. This is in line with existing literature (see among others Ferreira and
Pessoa, 2007; Courne`de, Goujard, and Pina, 2013). Note, however, that in S3 the effect is not
statistically significant. S4 confirms the differential effects of different tax categories. The positive
and significant effect on the share of consumption taxes in combination with the (insignificant)
negative effect on personal income taxes, provides a clear indication for the potential gain in TFP
from shifting personal income taxes to consumption taxes. As a final observation, our findings
for corporate income taxes in S3 and S4 are counter-intuitive. According to our results in S3,
shifting taxes to corporate income has a positive (although not significant) impact on TFP. This
goes against the consensus in the literature (see e.g. Arnold, Brys, Heady, Johansson, Schwellnus,
and Vartia, 2011). A possible explanation lies in the construction of the tax rates, as discussed
in Section 1.3, which implies that the incentives for firms may not be adequately captured by the
ratio of corporate income tax receipts to GDP.
Final results concerning the direct effects of fiscal policy on TFP relate to changes in the over-
all level of taxes and government expenditures, for a given budget balance. In S1, where the tax
burden is the implicit financing element, the coefficient on total expenditures reveals the effect
of a tax financed increase in government consumption and other expenditures as these variables
are not controlled for in this regression. Although somewhat surprisingly, this coefficient shows
up statistically significant and positive. One reason for this positive effect can be the financing
element. Instead of being financed by building up debt, the increase in unproductive expendi-
tures is explicitly financed by revenues. A complementary explanation is given by Angelopoulos,
Philippopoulos, and Tsionas (2008), who show that an increase of government size may be growth
promoting when public efficiency is high. This specific result of S1 is further analyzed in S4,
where we see that the choice of tax instrument, to pay for these unproductive expenditures, is
very important. An increase in unproductive expenditures financed by consumption taxes has a
significant positive effect on TFP whereas when financed by other taxes (mainly property taxes)
or personal taxes, the effect on TFP turns negative. These results are in line with the findings of
Courne`de, Goujard, and Pina (2013) and further confirm that an appropriate classification into
various categories is important when analyzing the impact of taxes.
1.5.3 Indirect effects of fiscal policy
In the non-linear case we explicitly allow for time-varying factor loadings by making them a
function of country-specific variables. Each of the four different CCEPnl specifications includes
three variables that are expected to drive a country’s access to global technology. One of these
variables is the relative statutory corporate tax rate, StrRel it. In all non-linear estimations StrRel it
has a significant negative indirect effect on TFP. Reducing the corporate tax rate therefore seems
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to be an effective fiscal policy tool for a country to stimulate its absorptive capacity and raise
TFP (at least if other countries do not respond by changing their tax rate accordingly). In this
sense, our results are in line with earlier work by e.g. Hajkova, Nicoletti, Vartia, and Yoo (2006).
Significant positive effects on a country’s access to global technology also follow from an increase
in openness, i.e. a higher import share in GDP. If countries reduce barriers to trade, the import
of embodied technology will be facilitated and access to world technology will be higher. This
will enhance TFP. Our evidence here confirms the importance of international R&D spillovers
via imports of goods emphasized before by among others Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009).
Finally, and unexpectedly, our results point to a negative effect from the share of tertiary educated
people in a country on its capacity to absorb world technology. Given the existing literature (e.g.
Nelson, Denison, Sato, and Phelps, 1966; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009), this result is
most surprising. A possible reason for this could be the limited time variation observed in HCapit
in OECD countries meaning that the effect of human capital on λit may (to a large extent) already
be captured by the time-invariant part, λi0. Moreover, due to a lack of data no measure for the
quality of schooling could be included. This further weakens the relevance of our human capital
measure HCapit.
1.6 Conclusion
An important issue in the growth literature is the fact that TFP is largely unobserved. Existing
empirical work on fiscal policy and economic activity typically employs ad hoc proxies for technol-
ogy. We pursue an alternative, potentially promising way out of the omitted variables problem by
exploiting the strong cross-sectional correlation observed in our data to identify TFP. We further
explore the time-variation in a country’s access to a worldwide available level of technology. As
such, next to direct effects we are able to identify indirect effects of fiscal policy on TFP through
its impact on absorptive capacity. To deal with these indirect effects, we propose and implement
a non-linear CCEP estimator.
Our estimation results demonstrate the key role of fiscal policy in the development of TFP. We
find robust evidence for both direct and indirect effects, with the latter operating via countries’
access to the world level of technology and knowledge. A number of clear policy implications
emerge, which we now briefly summarize. A first implication concerns the importance of sound
fiscal policies, meaning budget balance (or even surplus) in the long-run. Expenditures have to
be financed by government revenues. The only exception concerns deficit financed productive
expenditures. According to our evidence, these contribute to public capital, and as a result raise
the productivity of private capital and labor without harming TFP. A second key implication
is that policy makers should not only strictly monitor the level of government expenditures and
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taxes, but also their structure. Our results support a restructuring of outlays from social transfers
and public consumption to productive expenditures, and a shift of revenues from personal income
taxes and corporate taxes to consumption taxes. The evidence that we obtain in favor of reducing
corporate taxes mainly concerns the possibility of increasing a country’s capacity to absorb world
technology. As to the latter, a clear final policy implication of our results is the importance to
promote openness to world trade.
We end up with a number of nuances, induced by the fact that our analysis focuses on pro-
ductivity and efficiency in the long-run. First of all, this focus implies that our evidence offers no
guidance for fiscal policy, e.g. the use of deficit spending, as a stabilization instrument. Second,
aggregate productivity is only one (although very important) indicator of countries’ performance.
According to our evidence, a reduction of social transfers to finance higher productive expendi-
tures or corporate tax cuts enhances productivity. It is up to policy makers, however, to evaluate
also the possible negative effects on social cohesion and protection against poverty that may come
with this productivity gain. A final element is the importance of cross-country coordination. Our
evidence illustrates the possibility of a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates. By attracting
FDI and improving a country’s access to world technology, a corporate tax rate reduction may
enhance the development of TFP. If other countries respond by also reducing corporate tax rates,
however, this gain disappears. What remains are negative effects on the budget balance, which
harm TFP.
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Appendix
1.A Coefficients of correlation between corporate tax rate
indicators
Table 1.A.1: Correlation matrix
Corp.taxreceipts
GDP STR EMTR EATR
Corp.taxreceipts
GDP 1.00
STR −0.17 1.00
EMTR 0.08 0.64 1.00
EATR 0.07 0.65 0.93 1.00
Note: Correlation across 15 countries over period 1981-2005.
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Chapter 2
On the role of public policies and
wage formation for private invest-
ment in R&D: a long-run panel anal-
ysis1
This chapter studies the drivers of business funded and performed R&D in a panel of 14 OECD
countries since 1981. More specifically, we investigate the effects of public R&D related policies
and wage formation. Following Pesaran (Econometrica, 2006) and Kapetanios et al. (Journal of
Econometrics, 2011), our empirical strategy allows for cross-sectionally correlated error terms due
to the presence of unobserved common factors, which are potentially non-stationary. We find that
tax incentives are effective. Public funding (subsidization) of R&D performed by firms can also
be effective if subsidies are not too low, neither too high. R&D performed within the government
sector and within institutions of higher education is basically neutral with respect to business
R&D. We find no evidence for crowding out, nor for complementarity. Using an indicator for wage
pressure developed by Blanchard (Economic Policy, 2006), we find that wage moderation may
contribute to innovation, but only in fairly closed economies and in economies with flexible labour
markets. In highly open economies and economies with rigid labour markets rather the opposite
holds. In these economies high wage pressure may enhance creative destruction and force firms to
innovate as competitive strategy. Our results show that a careful treatment of the properties of
the data is crucial.
1This chapter is joint work with Tim Buyse and Freddy Heylen.
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2.1 Introduction
Ageing and rising pressure on the welfare state force all OECD countries to develop effective
employment and growth policies. When it comes to long-run growth, both the theoretical and
empirical literature recognize investment in research and development (R&D) as a major factor (see
Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister,
2009). Numerous studies have therefore investigated the determinants of business investment in
R&D in many countries, both at the micro and the macro level. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe
(1997, 2003) were the first to provide an explanation at the macro level in a panel of 17 OECD
countries. In their seminal paper, they paid particular attention to the role of public policies
organized to stimulate private R&D investment i.e. tax incentives, public funding of R&D projects
in the business sector, expenditures on R&D within the government sector and R&D spending in
institutions of higher education.
Our research is inspired by two gaps in the empirical macro literature on the drivers of business
R&D. A first one relates to the impact of wage formation. Today, OECD countries are not only
called upon to develop effective growth policies, but also to create jobs and to raise employment
rates. To reach this goal, many countries adopt outspoken wage moderation policies. Interestingly,
these policies also affect incentives and available resources for firms to innovate and invest in
R&D. On the employer side, it is often argued that wage moderation is an important factor to
maintain firm profitability, which is a key condition for investment in R&D. Several researchers
have, however, argued that an excessive focus on wage moderation may kill incentives to innovate
(e.g Kleinknecht, 1998). Wage moderation may for example increase the survival probability
of the least innovative firms and retard the process of creative destruction. Weighing on the
purchasing power of households, outspoken wage moderation may also lead to lower demand-
driven innovations as demand for new products and services falls. Conversely, higher wage pressure
may force firms to innovate as a key element in their competitive strategy. To the best of our
knowledge, despite its theoretical importance, rigorous cross-country empirical work on these
conflicting hypotheses has never been done.
A second gap in the existing empirical macro literature on the determinants of R&D investment
is methodological. A key characteristic of new technology and knowledge is that it may spillover
to other firms and countries, so that all may benefit from an improvement in the world level of
technology, although not necessarily to the same extent (Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009;
Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers, 2015). Eberhardt, Helmers, and Strauss (2013) have shown
that these spillovers affect firms’ private returns to R&D and therefore business R&D investment.
A crucial econometric issue, however, follows from the fact that the world level of technology and
knowledge is largely unobserved. Technology spillovers will then manifest themselves in standard
41
- Chapter 2 -
panel R&D regressions as cross-sectional dependence in the error terms, induced by an unobserved
common factor. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (1997, 2003) and subsequent macro research (e.g.
Falk, 2006; Westmore, 2014) have neglected this issue. If omitted common factors are correlated
with the included explanatory variables, estimated parameters will be biased and inconsistent.
Even worse, when unobserved common factors are non-stationary, standard estimators yield spu-
rious results.
Our contribution in this chapter is to study the determinants of business funded and performed
R&D in 14 OECD countries in the period 1981-2012, with a special focus on the role of wage
formation and by adopting an empirical strategy that deals with cross-sectionally correlated error
terms due to the presence of unobserved common factors. For the set of countries in our empirical
analysis, Figure 2.1 shows the data for business funded and performed R&D, expressed in real
per capita terms and in 2010 PPP dollars. Huge cross-country differences stand out, both in the
level and in the evolution of R&D, making an empirical analysis highly relevant. Next to the
role of wage pressure, we also test the impact of public policies organised to stimulate private
R&D investment, in line with Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003). To estimate our model, we
use the common correlated effects pooled (CCEP) estimator of Pesaran (2006). This estimator
controls for unobserved common factors by adding cross-sectional averages of the data. As shown
by Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011), this approach is also valid in a non-stationary
panel context.
Our main findings are the following. First of all, we learn from our results that a careful
treatment of the properties of the data is crucial. The empirical analysis reveals significant cross-
sectional correlation in levels and in first-differences for most variables. All variables are also
found to be non-stationary. For most variables the non-stationarity is induced by an (unobserved)
common factor. The use of the CCEP estimator is therefore highly justified. Second, the effects
of wage pressure are significant but not uniform. We find that in economies where firms face
relatively little (foreign) competition and dispose of flexibility to adjust their employed labour
force because employment protection legislation is soft, high wage pressure has negative effects on
private R&D expenditures. In open economies where firms face sharp (foreign) competition and
run their activities in a rather rigid and regulated labour environment, however, the opposite seems
to happen. In such economies - think of many European economies - firms that do not innovate
cannot survive when wage pressure is high. Rising wages thus enhance creative destruction and
force all firms to innovate as competitive strategy. Third, our empirical analysis reveals various
ways in which governments can effectively promote business R&D investment. We observe that
both tax incentives and public funding (subsidization) of R&D projects in the business sector
can work, if chosen carefully. This condition applies in particular to public funding. For this
policy instrument, we confirm an earlier finding of Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) that the
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relationship between subsidization and private R&D expenditures is inverted U-shaped. That is,
subsidies encourage private firms to raise their own R&D spending if these subsidies are not too
low neither too high. The optimal subsidization rate may be somewhere between 6 % and 10 %.
The results also show that the available stock of human capital is an important driver of business
R&D investment implying that governments should invest in schooling in order to increase the
percentage of population with a higher degree. Furthermore, we find that R&D investment within
the government sector and within universities will also have positive effects on aggregate R&D
spending. Most of our results predict a one-to-one effect from higher spending within the public
sector to aggregate R&D. In other words, neither the idea that public R&D would crowd out
private R&D spending, nor the idea of complementarity between the two, find support in our
results.
Our focus on aggregate private R&D investment in this chapter is not common in the literature.
In comparative perspective, many more studies have investigated R&D expenditures at the firm
or the industry level (see e.g. the survey in David, Hall, and Toole, 2000, and our overview of the
literature in Section 2.2). Yet, there are very good reasons why an analysis of macroeconomic data
is important. A first one relates to the indirect effects or externalities of policies. For example, if
individual firms benefit from R&D investment subsidies, this may boost their innovation activity.
At the same time, however, also other firms may be affected. Competing firms may suffer because
of the advantage given to a direct competitor. Due to falling rates of return they may reduce their
R&D investment. Conversely, downstream customers in the supply chain may benefit from knowl-
edge spillovers induced by the innovating firm. They may raise their R&D investment. Similar
externalities can occur between industries (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2003). The potential
presence of these external effects makes the case for an empirical analysis at the macro level. A
second reason follows from the observation that (firms in) different industries may react differently
to changes in the drivers of R&D, for example because market environment and institutions are
different. In that sense, the response of R&D investment to rising wage pressure may be different
in manufacturing sectors than in services. For policy makers it will be highly interesting also to
know what the response is at the aggregate level.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 contains a brief survey
of the literature on public policy instruments to encourage business R&D investment, and on
their effects. This section also reviews the conflicting hypotheses regarding the influence of wage
formation on innovation. Section 2.3 discusses important properties of the data and sets out the
empirical model. This section also discusses the econometric methodology. In Section 2.4 we
report our estimation results. Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
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Figure 2.1: Business financed and performed R&D expenditures in 14 OECD countries
(real per capita, 2010 PPP dollars)
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2.2 Drivers of private R&D intensity: literature
Boosting R&D intensity is one of the top priorities of OECD countries today. The Europe 2020
targets include that 3% of the EU’s GDP has to be invested in R&D and innovation (public
and private combined) by 2020. To stimulate private R&D intensity, governments have different
instruments at their disposal. These instruments are used to offset market failure in the allocation
of resources to long-term and risky investment, which are key characteristics of R&D investment.
As a result, private investment in R&D is mostly lower than socially optimal, thus justifying
government support.
Section 2.2.1 discusses existing public policy instruments and some of the empirical evidence
on their impact. In Section 2.2.2. we review the literature regarding the effects of wage formation
and some underlying labour market characteristics on R&D investment and innovation. Various
countries have institutionalized wage moderation or wage control mechanisms in the second half
of the 1980s or early 1990s. Other countries have decentralized wage bargaining and introduced
legislation to reduce union power, also contributing to wage moderation. While most will agree
that these policies have positive effects on employment and competitiveness, at least in the short
run, their possible long-run effects on a country’s innovative capacity occur much less clear. In
our discussion of the arguments for and against wage moderation, we also pay attention to the
potential impact of the institutional environment within which wage formation takes place. We
end with a brief explanation of the role of product market characteristics.
2.2.1 Public policy instruments
Traditionally, R&D policy can be subdivided in direct support (such as public sector R&D and di-
rect R&D subsidies) and indirect support (such as R&D tax incentives). In addition, governments
may also provide support for the university research system and the formation of high-skilled
human capital as for formal R&D cooperation between institutions. In this section, we point at
existing, mostly empirical, evidence on the impact of policy support measures on private R&D
expenditures.
Public sector R&D and government funding of R&D in the business sector
Among the most frequently used public policy instruments to support R&D are public sector
R&D and government funding of private investment in R&D. The former refers to direct R&D
expenditures by public research institutions (intramural) and universities. The latter may either
take the form of grants or subsidies, where the results of the R&D belong to the private performer,
or it may concern funding aimed at the procurement of R&D, where the results belong to a
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recipient that is not necessarily the performer. An important question in the literature is whether
these instruments are effective tools to stimulate private investment in R&D, or not. On the
one hand, the public sector can stimulate private investment in R&D by lowering the cost of
research for the industry. One way to achieve this is by conducting basic risk research (where
the wedge between private and social returns is probably the highest) and by making its results
publicly available. It can also be done more directly by providing resources that lift potential cash
constraints in private firms or by providing a buffer when high financial risk is involved. Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2003), however, see three reasons why one may question the effectiveness
of public spending on R&D. As a worst case scenario, public spending may even crowd out private
R&D. First, government spending on R&D may increase the demand for researchers, which may
raise these researchers’ wages and make private R&D investment more expensive. This potential
source of crowding out is most likely to occur if there is a shortage in the most decisive factor of
the R&D process. That is if high-skilled labour is scarce. Second, public sector money can act as
a substitute to private money. In other words, governments may execute or subsidize projects that
would have been implemented anyway such that the same investment is performed with public
instead of private money, without any increase in total R&D. Third, the allocation of funds by the
government generally occurs less efficiently than by market forces, thereby distorting competition
and resource allocation.
As to the empirical evidence on the effects of R&D in the public sector, Goolsbee (1998), for
the United States, finds evidence of crowding out of private funding through raising wages of
scientists and engineers. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) (their Table III) report results
for a panel of 17 OECD countries that are consistent with this observation. According to their
findings, a one euro increase in R&D expenditures within the government sector tends to imply a
0.38 euro decline in business expenditures in the long run. Although this supports the hypothesis
of crowding out, the net aggregate effect of intramural government R&D would still seem to be
positive. That is, crowding out is only partial. As to R&D expenditures in universities, Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) find an effect on private spending that is basically zero, leaving an
aggregate net effect of 1. Falk (2006), on the other hand, finds indications of a significant positive
impact of R&D in the higher education sector on business R&D.
When it comes to the effects of direct funding by the government of R&D in the private sector,
David, Hall, and Toole (2000) report that one third of available, mostly firm-level, studies find
substitution effects. Overall the authors conclude that the empirical literature is inconclusive
about the net impact of public R&D subsidies. Falk (2006) and Bassanini and Ernst (2002) are
also inconclusive or report negligible effects. By contrast, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003)
find that the net long-run impact of R&D subsidies on private R&D investment is positive. A
one euro increase in government funded R&D in the business sector would induce an additional
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0.7 euro of private spending. Finally, Lach (2002) also finds that public R&D subsidies stimulate
private R&D expenditures in the long run.
In general, more recent research tends to find less evidence for crowding out and concludes in
favour of additionality effects of public R&D subsidies (see for instance Duguet, 2004; Carboni,
2011; Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hussinger, 2008; Cerulli and Poti,
2012; Oezcelik and Taymaz, 2008; Bloch and Graversen, 2012). The effects of R&D subsidies need
not be homogeneous, however. For instance, Jaumotte and Pain (2005) show that on a firm level
the positive effect of R&D subsidies is more pronounced when firms are cash-constrained. In fact,
there is broader empirical evidence that public subsidies are more effective drivers of R&D in small
(financially constrained) firms. In the same spirit Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2010) underscore
the importance of aimed targeting of subsidies. These authors observe that in many cases most
funding is awarded to larger firms that would have performed the R&D even in the absence of the
public subsidy. Some studies also report heterogeneity in effects depending on the size of public
subsidies. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003), for instance, find an inverted U-shape, where
the strongest positive effects on private R&D can be observed for public subsidy rates of 4−11 %,
while rates that are too high (>20%) tend to generate negative (crowding-out) effects. Gorg and
Strobl (2007) confirm these findings. Becker (2014) concludes that this non-linear effect suggests
that it could be more effective to provide intermediate support levels to a larger number of firms
than a large amount of support to fewer firms.
R&D tax incentives
The policy mix aimed at stimulating business R&D and innovation has seen growing use of R&D
tax incentives. Such measures are indirect since the decision to use them, and the decision on
how to use them, remain with the company. They are thus considered to be more market-oriented
than for instance direct subsidies. Companies investing in R&D are eligible to claim tax reductions
against their payable tax (Warda, 2001). As such, R&D tax incentives reduce the marginal cost
of R&D spending and are also more neutral (i.e. less distortive) than direct R&D subsidies. In
general, while direct subsidies are more targeted towards long-term research, R&D tax schemes
are more likely to encourage short-term applied research and boost incremental innovation rather
than radical breakthroughs (EC, 2003; OECD, 2014).
Fiscal incentives for R&D may take on various forms such as R&D tax credits, which are
present in countries such as France, Belgium and the UK (OECD, 2014; EC, 2003). These tax
credits are deducted from the corporate income tax and are applicable either to the level of R&D
expenditures or to the increase in these expenditures with respect to a given base. Alternatively,
some countries, such as Canada, Denmark and the UK, allow for the immediate or accelerated
depreciation of investment in machinery, equipment, and buildings devoted to R&D activities
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(Warda, 2013; Falk, 2006). Finally, tax incentives need not necessarily apply to the corporate
income tax, but may also apply to the personal income tax, as in the Netherlands and Belgium,
or to the value added tax (or other taxes such as consumption, land or property) (OECD, 2014).
An often used indicator reflecting the overall generosity of R&D tax incentives in a country
is the so-called B-index (Warda, 2001). It is a composite index that is computed as the present
value of income before taxes necessary to cover the initial cost of R&D investment and to pay
the corporate income tax so that it becomes profitable to perform research activities (Warda,
2001). Algebraically, the B-index is equal to the after-tax cost of a one euro expenditure on
R&D divided by one minus the corporate income tax rate. The after-tax cost is the net cost of
investing in R&D, taking account of all available tax incentives (corporate income tax rates, R&D
tax credits and allowances, depreciation rates). The more favourable a country’s tax treatment of
R&D investment, the lower its B-index.
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) find that most studies in the pre 2000 literature show positive
effects of fiscal incentives on R&D expenditures. More recent research into the effectiveness of tax
credits is even more unanimous in concluding that there are positive R&D effects (Becker, 2014).
For instance, both Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002) and Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe
(2003) find significant negative coefficients on the B-index in their regressions explaining business
R&D expenditures. Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002) estimate that a 10% tax cut induced
fall in the cost of R&D induces just over a 1% rise in the level of R&D in the short run, and
just under a 10% rise in R&D in the long run. That is, they find a long-run elasticity of R&D
with respect to the user cost of just below 1. Long-run elasticities vary between modest estimates
of −0.14 (Bernstein and Mamuneas, 2005; Baghana and Mohnen, 2009) to −1.5 and over (as in
Harris, Li, and Trainor, 2009; Parisi and Sembenelli, 2003). Most studies, however, find elasticities
in between these extremes (Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012; Koga, 2003; Mulkay and Mairesse, 2013).
Knowledge spillovers from the university research system and the formation of high-
skilled human capital
Governments may resort to other than the traditional policy instruments to support private R&D
expenditures. Some recent studies indicate the relevance of knowledge spillovers from university
research to firms, enhancing technological opportunities and the productivity of private R&D,
for example through personal interactions, university spin-offs and consultancy. Most empirical
studies on this topic indeed find positive (geographically localized) knowledge externalities from
university research to private R&D (see for instance Jaffe, 1989; Autant-Bernard, 2001; Karlsson
and Andersson, 2009). Policies may thus aim to facilitate and support the formation of regional
clusters of university and private R&D activity to exploit agglomeration economies. An important
role in this context is played by the (increased) availability of high-skilled personnel trained by
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universities. Some studies do indeed find important positive R&D effects of high-skilled human
capital resources2. Education policies and human capital investment thus also have a role in
increasing private R&D.
2.2.2 Wage formation, labour and product market characteristics and
innovation
The monitoring of wage formation is an important feature of many OECD countries’ economic
policy as it has a direct impact on employment and a country’s competiveness. Expected posi-
tive effects on employment generally underlie arguments in favour of wage moderation (see e.g.
Bovenberg, 1997). Lower wages may increase firm profitability, generating more resources for in-
vestment. They may improve the competitiveness of domestic firms and raise exports. And they
may make production more labour intensive. It then comes as no surprise that in many European
countries wage moderation policies have become institutionalized. Germany’s success is currently
often taken as guiding inspiration (Heylen and Buyse, 2012).
An important additional element, especially from a long-run perspective, is the possible impact
of wage formation on a country’s innovative capacity. If high (excessive) wages reduce R&D invest-
ment, their negative effects on employment and competitiveness would be multiplied. On the other
hand, if wage pressure promotes innovation, negative effects on competitiveness would be limited
to the short run, whereas in the long run competitiveness and employment would rise. Theoretical
arguments in favour of wage moderation come mostly from an employer perspective. That is, wage
moderation would imply higher profits which can subsequently be spent on innovation activities.
If a focus on wage restraint is missing, rents from innovation may be appropriated by unions
through higher wage claims. This may reduce firms’ willingness and resources to innovate. An
early statement of this argument was the so-called hold-up problem under incomplete contracts
(Grout, 1984; Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). In more recent work, Ulph and Ulph (1994)
confirm this argument in a right-to-manage model where unions and firms bargain only over the
wage. The main factor driving firms in their innovation efforts in their model is the expected
difference between the profits that the firm can earn once it has successfully innovated and the
profits that it would earn otherwise. In this setup high (excessive) wages represent a ’tax’ that
unions impose on the investment and the success of the firm. Lower R&D investment would be the
result. Conversely, a focus on wage moderation would imply higher R&D. Other authors, however,
have challenged this expectation (see e.g. Kleinknecht, 1994, 1998; Kleinknecht and Naastepad,
2Variables that are considered are the availability of highly qualified scientists and engineers (Adams, Chiang,
and Starkey, 2001; Adams, Chiang, and Jensen, 2003; Becker and Pain, 2008), the share of the number of workers
with higher education in the total number of workers (Garcia and Mohnen, 2010), the share of the population with
tertiary education in the total working age population (Wang, 2010) and the years of formal schooling (Kanwar
and Evenson, 2003).
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2004). One of their main arguments is that wage restraint raises the survival probability of low-
productive firms and non-innovators, slowing down the process of creative destruction. In a regime
of wage increases and wage pressure, by contrast, the balance would shift and lack of innovation
would no longer - or much less - be an option. In the framework of Ulph and Ulph (1994), this
argument would imply that high wage pressure no longer reduces, but raises the profit differential
between innovating and not innovating. The reason is the very negative outcome in the non-
innovating case. Intuitively, this idea raises a number of interesting extensions. One would expect
this positive effect of high wage pressure to exist mainly in a very competitive environment and
when firms lack the flexibility to adjust their (expensive) labour force. What we have in mind
are very open economies and/or economies with highly deregulated product markets, but a very
regulated labour market (e.g. extensive employment protection legislation). It will be exactly in
such an environment that high wages and lack of innovation imply huge losses and the risk of
bankruptcy. In these economies innovation will be firms’ only possible competitive strategy.
Theory being inconclusive, what do we know about the impact of wage moderation on inno-
vation and R&D empirically? First of all, it must be said that existing empirical work directly
relating wage formation and innovation is very scarce. Most studies that analyse the effect of
labour markets on innovation focus on aspects of numerical flexibility, such as the existence of
flexible employment contracts, or functional flexibility such as the possibility of outsourcing or
temporary employment. For instance, Bassanini and Ernst (2002) have estimated the impact of
labour market regulation on the industry’s R&D intensity in a cross-section of 18 manufacturing
industries and 18 OECD countries. More recently, Murphy, Siedschlag, and McQuinn (2012) ex-
amined the impact of the strictness of employment protection legislation on innovation intensity
in the OECD. Univocal results are hard to find. Observed effects depend on the system of indus-
trial relations and the characteristic of industries. We know of only one study that has directly
analysed the impact of wage changes on innovation. Pieroni and Pompei (2008) find, for a panel
of Italian manufacturing industries, that wage increases are positively related to the number of
patents (their proxy for innovation). However, the authors only look at absolute wages and do
not include an adequate measure of wage pressure (wage moderation) as we will do (See Section
2.3.1).
Next to the impact of labour market institutions, a growing number of researchers have studied
the role of product market characteristics (in particular product market competition) on innova-
tion. In a highly cited contribution, Aghion, Bloom, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) put forward an
inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of competition and investment in innovation.
The argument goes as follows. When competition is low to begin with, the economy is expected
to consist of a higher fraction of sectors with ’neck-and-neck’ competing firms. Product market
deregulation will induce these neck-and-neck firms to innovate in order to escape competition,
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since the incremental value of getting ahead rises in the degree of competition. When competition
is high to begin with, however, the economy will have a higher fraction of sectors with one tech-
nological leader and many laggards. Further deregulation then has negative effects on innovation.
Since more competition reduces the net rent that can be captured by laggards who succeed in
catching up, the incentives for them to try will get weaker. This is the Schumpeterian effect of
more competition. Although our focus in this chapter is not on product market characteristics,
we will control for them in our empirical work. Moreover, as we have mentioned above, the degree
of product market competition may also be a factor that changes the effect of wage pressure on
firms’ investment in R&D.
2.3 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis follows Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and relies on a simple R&D
investment model that considers real per capita business sector funded and performed R&D
(BERDit) to be a function of a mix of policy instruments (POLICYit), discussed in Section
2.2, and of real per capita value added generated by the business sector (V Ait). We further build
on Falk (2006) and allow for other possible determinants (Zit) driving private R&D investment.
Finally, we explicitly investigate the possible impact of wage formation (WAGEit) on BERDit,
BERDit = f(V Ait, POLICYit, Zit,WAGEit), (2.1)
where subscripts i and t respectively denote the ith country and tth period. The exact functional
form for equation (2.1) will depend on the discussion of the properties of the data in Section 2.3.1.
2.3.1 A first look at the data
Data and sources
We analyse the determinants of real per capita business sector funded and performed R&D for a
group of 14 OECD countries3 using yearly data over the period 1981-2012. An overview of the
construction of all data and their sources can be found in Appendix 2.C.
When focusing on our sample of countries, figure 2.1 reports wide variation across the countries,
both in the level and the evolution of business expenditure on R&D. Policy instruments included in
POLICYit are real per capita government intramural expenditure on R&D (GOV ERDit) and real
per capita expenditure on R&D in the higher education sector (HERDit). As a measure for direct
R&D subsidies (SUBSit) we include real per capita government funded expenditure on R&D per-
3These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. The selection of countries has been driven by data availability.
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formed in the business sector. A final measure included in POLICYit is the B-index (BINDEXit),
which captures direct R&D tax incentives4. In our empirical analysis, V Ait, BERDit and all vari-
ables in POLICYit will be expressed in logarithms.
Regarding the variables in Zit, we focus on three possible determinants of business sector
R&D, i.e. the degree of openness of the economy (OPENit), the available stock of human capital
(HCAPit) in a country and the degree of product market regulation (PMRit). The degree of
openness is included to account for international trade, which is an important channel of knowledge
and technology transfers across countries raising the return to domestic private R&D investment
(e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009; Acharya and Keller, 2009).
Based on this argument, we expect a positive effect from a higher degree of openness on BERD.
The stock of human capital is considered due to its potential double impact on private R&D
investment. First, human capital is an important factor reflecting the absorptive capacity of an
economy with regards to international technology and knowledge (see amongst others Nelson,
Denison, Sato, and Phelps, 1966; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009). Second, Acemoglu
(1998) shows that a high proportion of skilled workers in the economy stimulates high-skill biased
technological change. As to product market regulation, it would be our basic position to expect a
U-shaped relationship with R&D investment, in line with the arguments raised by Aghion, Bloom,
Griffith, and Howitt (2005) that we discussed in section 2.2.2. We measure OPENit as the sum
of imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. As a proxy for the stock
of human capital, we use the percentage of population, aged 15 and over that has completed
tertiary schooling. To capture PMRit, the OECD economy-wide product market regulation index
is employed.
As a final determinant of business funded and performed R&D, we introduce an indicator for
wage pressure. Its construction is discussed below.
An appropriate wage indicator
To assess the impact of wage formation and wage pressure on private R&D investment, we follow
Blanchard (2006) and use insights from growth theory. The approach is to compare actual (growth
of) real wage costs with the so-called ’warranted’ real wage (growth). The latter is determined by
the rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress. In growth theory, this is the rate of real wage growth
consistent with stable employment along a balanced growth path. Blanchard (2006) constructs the
rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress using the Solow residual, and dividing it by the labour
share. More formally, let Wit represent real hourly labour cost in country i at time t and let Ait be
a measure of labour efficiency driven by technological progress. The underlying CRS production
4See Section 2.2.1 for more details.
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function is
Yit = K
α
itG
β
it(AitLit)
(1−α−β), (2.2)
with Yit real output, Kit the stock of real private physical capital, Git the stock of real public
capital, Lit total hours worked, and AitLit effective labour in hours. Labour efficiency can then
be computed as:
lnAit =
1
1− α− β [lnYit − α lnKit − β lnGit − (1− α− β) lnLit] (2.3)
Following Blanchard’s reasoning, a suitable wage gap or wage pressure indicator will then be
defined as real hourly labour cost per efficiency unit of labour, WitAit . In our empirical analysis, we
will express this indicator in logs, such that we get
lnWAGEit = ln
Wit
Ait
= lnWit − lnAit (2.4)
As to data, Wit represents real compensation of employees per hour. To compute lnAit,
we estimate the production function in (2.2) for the same panel of countries that we study in
our empirical analysis of private R&D investment. In line with, amongst others, Costantini and
Destefanis (2009), Eberhardt and Teal (2013) and Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015),
we account for the presence of unobserved common factors that are potentially non-stationary.
Estimation of this production function is similar to Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015)
and results in a share of private capital in total income (α) of 0.20, a share of public capital (β) of
0.14, and a labour share (1−α−β) of 0.66. Our estimate for β is very close to the results reported
by Bom and Ligthart (2014). Building on a meta-regression analysis, they put forward 0.11 as
long-run output elasticity of public capital. Using the Blanchard indicator has the additional
advantage that it is not (directly) affected by endogenous adjustment of labour productivity, as
is the case for more traditional indicators that measure the wage gap by relating real labour cost
to labour productivity i.e. output per hour or per worker. Such indicators will give the wrong
sign when firms adjust capital intensity in response to wage changes. For example, excessive wage
increases may induce firms to substitute capital for labour. The productivity of labour will then
rise and excessive wage pressure may no longer show up in the data, implying measurement error.
Figure 2.1 shows our indicator for wage pressure (lnWAGEit) in three groups of countries:
six euro area countries, four Nordic countries and four Anglo-Saxon countries. Note that for
each country, we normalized the wage gap to zero in 1974. Although this is obviously somewhat
arbitrary, the idea is that in the early 1970s about all countries were close to full employment,
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so that wages must have been more or less at their ’warranted’ level5. All in all, our indicator is
very similar to the real wage gap of Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007), which is also based on the
Blanchard approach.
Figure 2.1: Indicator of wage pressure (lnWAGEit) for three groups of countries
(a) Euro area countries (b) Nordic countries
(c) Anglo-Saxon countries
5Even if this assumption were wrong for some countries, it will not affect our estimation results in Section 2.4,
since we control for unobserved country fixed effects. What matters is the evolution of lnWAGE over time, not its
initial level.
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Wage pressure increased strongly in most countries throughout the second half of the 1970s,
with a peak around 1982. From then onwards, the trend in the wage gap was negative in most
countries for at least one decade. Many countries such as Belgium, Italy and Sweden, institu-
tionalized mechanisms of wage restraint or wage control to keep the evolution of wages more in
line with its warranted level. Other countries, like the UK, decentralised wage bargaining, and
introduced tough legislation to reduce union power. The main exceptions to this overall pattern
are the US, the Netherlands, Canada and Spain. The evolution of wages was exceptional in the
US in that we see no excess wage growth in the 1970s. Moreover, since 1980, wage growth in
the US has only been slightly smaller than its warranted level, keeping the wage gap between 0
and -8 % all of the time. The Netherlands, by contrast, shows a steady decline of wage pressure
throughout almost the entire period under consideration. This confirms the strong focus on wage
moderation as an important policy instrument in this country. Very influential in this respect was
the so-called Wassenaar agreement of 1982, which initiated a series of national social compacts
to restrain wage growth. Unions were convinced of the need to restrain inflationary pressure in
the labour market and co-ordinated action was introduced to bring this about. Canada and Spain
differ in the sense that we see no wage moderation in these countries during the last three decades.
As a final observation, almost all countries show a sharp rise in wage pressure between 2008 and
2010.
In our regressions in Section 4 we will at first introduce lnWAGE as a separate variable.
Building on our discussion in Section 2.2.2, however, we will soon add interaction terms with
context variables that may tilt the effect of wage pressure on R&D investment. The degree
of openness (OPEN) and the degree of product market regulation (PMR), already discussed
above, affect the strength of the competition that firms experience. Another is the degree of
employment protection legislation (EPL), The higher EPL, the more difficult it may be for firms
to adapt by changing (expensive) labour. Both OPEN , EPL and PMR may thus affect the
profit differential when firms do not innovate (and wage pressure rises). These considerations
would suggest significant effects from these interaction terms on R&D investment.
Properties of the data
As a guide to selecting the most appropriate estimation method in Section 2.3.3 below and to
determine the optimal functional form for equation (2.1), we first look at two important properties
of the data: the degree of cross-sectional dependence and the order of integration.
Cross-sectional dependence
Recently, the panel data literature has seen an increasing interest in models with unobserved,
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time-varying heterogeneity that may stem from omitted (and unobserved) common variables or
global shocks that affect all units, but perhaps to a different degree (see e.g. Coakley, Fuertes, and
Smith, 2002; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011; Everaert, 2014). These omitted common variables induce
error cross-sectional dependence and may lead to inconsistent estimates if they are correlated with
the explanatory variables and to a spurious regression problem if they are non-stationary.
At the macroeconomic level, cross-sectional dependencies are rather the rule than the excep-
tion because countries are interconnected through trade, geography, international relations etc.
(Westerlund and Edgerton, 2008). When considering the potential determinants of business fi-
nanced and performed R&D intensity across OECD countries, unobserved common variables are
also likely to be present. A first potential common factor is a global business cycle, which results
from the increased business cycle synchronization across countries. Changes in this global business
cycle affect the financial constraints of both the government and the business sector and will thus
have an impact on business R&D intensity (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2003). Second, and
probably more important is the role of the unobserved available world level of technology which
causes international technology and knowledge spillovers. These could be regarded as omitted
unobserved factors for explaining business R&D expenditures. The reason being that technology
spillovers affect private R&D investment as they have a positive impact on a country’s absorptive
capacity and affect private returns to R&D investment (Eberhardt, Helmers, and Strauss, 2013).
If these unobserved common factors have indeed an impact on private sector R&D, this should
show up as strong cross-sectional dependence in the data. Table 2.1 therefore reports the average
pairwise correlation coefficient (ρˆ) and the cross-sectional dependence (CD) test of Pesaran (2004).
As all series are potentially non-stationary, we also report results for the first-differenced data to
avoid spurious nonzero correlation. To assess if common factors are really influencing private sector
funded and performed R&D, especially the cross-sectional dependence in lnBERDit is important.
For completeness, we also report the test results for each of the explanatory variables.
Table 2.1: Cross-sectional dependence in the data
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
Levels First-differences Levels First-differences
ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD
lnBERDit 0.881 47.55 [0.00] 0.194 10.277 [0.00] lnBINDEXit 0.190 10.255 [0.00] 0.037 1.965 [0.05]
lnV Ait 0.926 49.955 [0.00] 0.575 30.544 [0.00] OPENit 0.701 37.830 [0.00] 0.669 35.507 [0.00]
lnGOV ERDit 0.051 2.745 [0.01] 0.054 2.87 [0.01] HCAPit 0.930 50.185 [0.00] 0.05 2.656 [0.01]
lnHERDit 0.961 51.868 [0.00] 0.089 4.771 [0.00] lnWAGEit 0.415 2.379 [0.00] 0.447 23.745 [0.00]
lnSUBSit 0.027 1.468 [0.14] 0.043 2.262 [0.02] PMRit 0.958 51.738 [0.00] 0.191 10.147 [0.00]
Notes: The average cross-correlation coefficient ρ̂ = (2 /N (N − 1))∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρ̂ij is the average of the country-by-country cross-
correlation coefficients ρ̂ij (for i 6= j). CD is the Pesaran (2004) test defined as
√
2T /N (N − 1) ∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρ̂ij , which is asymptotically
standard normal under the null of cross-sectional independence. p-values are reported in square brackets.
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The results in Table 2.1 show that all, but one, variables exhibit considerable positive cross-
sectional correlation in levels and in first differences. lnSUBSit is the exception as the null
hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is not rejected for the variable in levels, but is rejected
for the data in first differences. The finding of significant cross-sectional dependence in lnBERDit
implies that we need to take this into account when choosing our econometric methodology and
estimating our empirical model.
Time series properties
We also analyse the time series properties of each of the variables used. This requires a panel
unit root test allowing for cross-sectional dependence. Such panel unit root tests have been pro-
posed by, most notably, Pesaran (2007), Moon and Perron (2004) and Bai and Ng (2004). These
tests are similar in that they all assume an observed variable xit to have the following common
factor structure
xit = dit + ftpii + ξit, (2.5)
where ft is an r × 1 vector of r common factors with country-specific factor loadings pii, ξit is an
idiosyncratic error term and dit is a deterministic component which can be (i) zero, dit = 0, (ii) an
idiosyncratic intercept, dit = d0i, or (iii) an idiosyncratic intercept and idiosyncratic linear trend
dit = d0i + d1it. Cross-sectional dependence stems from the component ftpii which is correlated
over countries as it includes the common factors ft. The series xit is non-stationary if at least
one of the common factors in ft is non-stationary, or the idiosyncratic error ξit is non-stationary,
or both. The above mentioned panel unit root tests differ in the allowed number and order of
integration of the unobserved common factors and in the way these factors are eliminated.
The most general panel unit root test allowing for cross-sectional dependence is the PANIC
unit root test of Bai and Ng (2004) as this is the only one that allows for non-stationarity in either
the common factors, or in the idiosyncratic errors or in both. Rather than testing the order of
integration using the observed data, xit is first decomposed according to the structure in equation
(2.5). By applying the method of principal components to the first-differenced data, the common
and idiosyncratic components in first-differences can be estimated consistently, irrespectively of
their orders of integration. Next, these components are accumulated to obtain the corresponding
level estimates f̂pct and ξ̂
pc
it . These components can then be tested separately for unit roots. When
there is only one factor, testing for a unit root in f̂pct can be done using a standard augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF)-type test (with deterministic terms according to the specification of dit). For
multiple common factors, the MQc,τc and MQ
c,τ
f statistics (see Bai and Ng, 2004, for details) are
designed to determine the number of independent stochastic trends r1 ≤ r in f̂pct . As under the
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appropriate choice for the number of common factors, ξ̂pcit by design satisfies the cross-sectional
independence assumption required for pooling, the Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) panel unit
root test can be used on ξ̂pcit . This consists of combining p-values for the ADF tests (with no
deterministic terms) on the idiosyncratic error ξ̂pcit . The relevant distributions for the ADF tests
on f̂pct and ξ̂
pc
it , for the intercept only and the linear trend model, can be found in Bai and Ng
(2004).
Monte Carlo simulation results in Bai and Ng (2004), for samples as small as (T=100, N=40),
and in Gutierrez (2006), for samples as small as (T=50, N=20), show that the PANIC approach
performs well in small samples. The ADF test on the common factor and the MW test on the
idiosyncratic error terms both have an actual size close to the 5% nominal level and adequate
power. Applications of the PANIC approach to unit root testing using a similar data span as
ours (T=32, N=14) can be found in, among others, Byrne, Fiess, and Ronald (2011), Costantini,
Demetriades, James, and Lee (2013) and Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015).
Table 2.2: PANIC unit root tests
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
f̂pct ξ̂
pc
it f̂
pc
t ξ̂
pc
it
Det r r1 MW-test Det r r1 MW-test
lnBERDit dit 1 1 37.907 [0.10] lnBINDEX0i dit 0 0 17.45 [0.93]
lnV Ait dit 3 3 24.854 [0.64] OPENit dit 2 2 12.364 [1.00]
lnGOV ERDit d0i 1 1 12.056 [1.00] HCAPit dit 5 5 42.238 [0.04]
lnHERDit dit 0 0 27.91 [0.47] lnWAGEit d0i 3 3 21.597 [0.80]
lnSUBSit dit 1 1 27.868 [0.47] PMRit dit 3 3 24.572 [0.65]
Notes: ‘Det’ indicates the deterministic component of the model, i.e. d0i for the intercept only model and dit = d0i + d1it for the
linear trend model. The number of common factors is estimated using the BIC3 of Bai and Ng (2002) with a maximum of 5 factors.
When r = 1, the number of non-stationary factors r1 is determined using the ADF-GLS test of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996)
with deterministic terms according to the specification of dit. When r > 1, r1 is determined using the MQ
c
c (intercept only model) or
MQτc (linear trend model) statistic of Bai and Ng (2004). The panel unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors is the Maddala
and Wu (1999) (MW) test (with no deterministic terms). The null hypothesis for each of these tests is that the series has a unit root.
p-values are reported in square brackets.
In Table 2.2 we report the results of the PANIC unit root tests. For each of the variables the
number of common factors r is estimated using the BIC3 information criterion suggested by Bai
and Ng (2002). We prefer the BIC3 information criterion as based on the simulation results of
Bai and Ng (2002) and Moon and Perron (2007), the BIC3 outperforms other information criteria
in small samples like ours. The specification of the deterministic component dit is chosen from
the observed trending behaviour of the variables. Results show that all variables are found to
be non-stationary at the 5 % level of significance. For all but two variables, the non-stationarity
is induced by both the common component and idisoyncratic errors. For the variable HCAPit
non-stationarity only stems from the presence of a set of unobserved common factors while for
lnHERDit non-stationarity comes from the idiosyncratic component as this variable is found to
have no common factor according to the BIC3 information criterion. When focusing on the main
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variable of interest, lnBERDit, the Bai and Ng (2002) test to determine the number of common
factors shows the presence of 1 non-stationary common factor.
2.3.2 Empirical model
When choosing the optimal functional form for (2.1), Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and
Falk (2006) estimate a log linear partial adjustment model by arguing that firms do not change
their R&D spending immediately following changes in direct or indirect public support for R&D
or changes in the other determinants. However, both Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and
Falk (2006) did not take into account two important properties of the data, i.e. the significant
degree of cross-sectional dependence due to the presence of unobserved common factors and the
non-stationarity of the variables considered. In this empirical analysis we explicitly deal with
these properties and consider as our basic specification the following long-run relationship for
lnBERDit,
lnBERDit = γi +Xitβ + µit. (2.6)
where Xit = (lnV Ait, lnPOLICYit, Zit, lnWAGEit) and β
′ = (β1, β2, β3, β4). In this equa-
tion, the individual effect γi captures unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
To deal with cross-sectional correlated errors (see Section 2.3.1) we adopt a multi-factor error
structure, where cross-sectional dependence is modelled to arise from unobserved common factors
(see e.g. Eberhardt and Teal, 2011; Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers, 2015):
µit = λ
′
ift + it, (2.7)
where ft is an rx1 vector of unobserved common factors and λi an rx1 country-specific vector of
factor loadings. The generality of the error structure in (2.7) is an advantage as it allows for an un-
known (but fixed) number of unobserved common components with heterogeneous factor loadings
(heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence). It thus also nests common time effects (homogeneous
cross-sectional dependence) as a special case and controls for possible spatial spillovers (Pesaran
and Tosetti, 2011). This last element could be important as in a recent paper Montmartin and
Herrera (2015) point to the importance of spatial dependence between private R&D activities in
OECD countries.
In the empirical analysis we will focus on determining the long-run drivers of business sector
R&D by estimating equation (2.6). Note that when estimating this equation it is important to deal
appropriately with the multi-factor error structure in (2.7) as ignoring the presence of unobserved
common factors leads to inconsistent estimates if the unobserved factors are correlated with the
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explanatory variables and to a spurious regression problem if they are non-stationary. Finally, as
all variables have a unit root we test for the existence of a cointegration relationship between the
variables in (2.6).
2.3.3 Econometric methodology
In line with Pesaran (2006) and Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011), the set of unobserved
common factors ft is identified from the cross-sectional dimension of the data. Taking cross-
sectional averages of the model represented by equations (2.6)-(2.7) yields
yt = γ + λft +Xtβ + t, (2.8)
where yit = lnBERDit and where yt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 yit and similarly for γ, λ, Xt and t. For notational
convenience we assume a single common factor (r = 1) but the results straightforwardly generalize
to multiple factors (see Pesaran, 2006). Equation (2.8) can then be solved for ft as
ft =
1
λ
(
yt − γ −Xtβ − t
)
, (2.9)
which yields f̂ cat
f̂ cat =
1
λ
(
yt − γ −Xtβ
)
, (2.10)
as a proxy for ft. Under the assumption that it is a zero mean stationary error term which is
uncorrelated over cross-section units, implying that plim
N→∞
t = 0 for each t, we have that f̂
ca
t
p−→ ft
for N → ∞. This is the main result in Pesaran (2006) that the cross-sectional averages of the
observed data can be used as observable proxies for ft. Although the construction of f̂
ca
t as
a consistent estimator for ft in equation (2.10) requires knowledge of the unknown underlying
parameters, Pesaran (2006) shows that these parameters can be estimated from an augmented
model obtained by replacing the unobserved ft in equation (2.7) by the cross-sectional averages
of the observed data using equation (2.9)
yit = γi +
(
yt − γ −Xtβ − t
) λi
λ
+Xitβ + εit, (2.11)
= γ+i + ytλi1 +Xtλi2 +Xitβ + 
+
it, (2.12)
where γ+i = γi − γλi
/
λ , λi1 = λi
/
λ , λi2 = λi
/
λ β and +it = it − λi
/
λ t. Since 
+
it
p−→ it
for N → ∞, the augmented model in equation (2.12) - ignoring any parameter restrictions - can
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be estimated with least squares (LS), an approach referred to as the CCEP estimator.6 Pesaran
(2006) shows that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the CCEP estimator is consistent
and asymptotically normal in stationary panel regressions. Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata
(2011) show that these asymptotic results continu to hold in non-stationary panels provided that
the idiosyncratic error term it is stationary. This implies that there is cointegration (i) between
(yit, Xit) if ft ∼ I(0) or (ii) between (yit, Xit, ft) if ft ∼ I(1).
As our empirical analysis involves testing for cointegration, we need an appropriate panel
cointegration test based on the CCEP estimator. These kind of tests have been suggested by
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) and Everaert (2014). Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre
(2011) show that under the null of no cointegration, the linear CCEP estimator allows for consistent
estimation of the homogeneous coefficients β but not for the heterogeneous coefficients (γi, λi).
Given this result, they suggest to obtain a consistent estimate for the composite error term eit =
γi + λift + it as
êit = yit −Xitβ̂ = ̂(γi + λift + it), (2.13)
and test for cointegration using a panel unit root test on êit that takes into account the cross-
sectional dependence induced by the set of unobserved common factors ft. To this end, they
suggest to use the cross-section augmented ADF (CADF) panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007).
Although this approach can effectively sweep out a single common factor, ft is restricted to have
the same order of integration as the idiosyncratic error term it. This rules out that ft ∼ I(1)
and it ∼ I(0), i.e. cointegration between (yit, xit, ft). Since the structure of the composite error
term eit = γi + λift + it aligns with the general factor structure of equation (2.5), an obvious
alternative to the CADF test is to apply the PANIC approach of Bai and Ng (2004).7 This allows
to consistently decompose êit in a set of common factors, denoted f̂
pc
t , and an idiosyncratic error
term, labeled ̂pcit , which can then be separately tested for unit roots (see PANIC approach outlined
in Section 2.3.1). The main advantage of this approach is that the test whether the idiosyncratic
errors it are stationary or not does not depend on the order of integration of ft. As such, testing
for cointegration from the CCEP estimation results boils down to testing whether there is a unit
root in ̂pcit , for which the MW panel unit root test can be used. Note that although cointegration
only requires the idiosyncratic errors to be I(0), the integration properties of the common factors
provide additional interesting information, i.e. when ft ∼ I(0) there is cointegration between
6Although equation (2.12) is derived, for notational convenience, under the assumption of a single factor, exactly
the same augmented form is obtained for multiple common factors (see Pesaran, 2006).
7Using the PANIC approach to testing for panel cointegration in the presence of common factors has also been
suggested by Gengenbach, Palm, and Urbain (2006), Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) and Bai and Carrion-
i-Silvestre (2013). The main difference between these approaches and ours lies in the estimation of the unknown
coefficients in the cointegrating relation, for which we use the CCEP estimator while the above references estimate
a model in first-differences with the common factors and factor loadings estimated using principal components.
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(yit, Xit) while for ft ∼ I(1) there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft). In a simulation exercise
both Everaert (2014) and Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015) show that a PANIC on the
composite error term êit is an appropriate approach to test for common-factor augmented panel
cointegration, even in small samples as ours.
2.4 Estimation results
2.4.1 Main results
The main estimation results are reported in Table 2.2. As mentioned before, our dependent
variable is the log of real per capita R&D investment financed and performed by the business
sector (lnBERDit). We estimate 10 different specifications. We start in column (1) by con-
sidering the standard set of variables that Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) introduce in
their regressions. Next to value added in the business sector (lnV Ait), there are four policy vari-
ables: public funding of R&D projects in the business sector (lnSUBSit), the B-index reflecting a
country’s tax treatment of R&D investment (lnBINDEXit), direct ’intramural’ government ex-
penditures on R&D (lnGOV ERDit) and expenditures on R&D by higher education institutions
(lnHERDit). In columns (2)-(4) we respectively extend the set of explanatory variables by the
degree of openness (OPENit), the stock of human capital (HCAPit), and by our wage pressure
indicator (lnWAGEit). Columns (5) further controls for a non-linear impact of the amount of
public subsidies whereas columns (6)-(10) test for non-linear and/or heterogeneous effects of wage
pressure.
In a first step each specification is tested for the existence of a cointegration relationship using
the PANIC approach of Bai and Ng (2004), which requires determining the number of unobserved
common factors in lnBERDit. The analysis in Table 2.2 points to the existence of 1 common
factor in lnBERDit. As an additional check, Table 2.1 reports the cross-sectional correlation
in lnBERDit and in the CCEP composite error term êit after taking out the contribution of
r = (0, 1, 2, 3) common factors. For r = 0, this is the cross-sectional correlation in the original
series, while for r > 0 this is the cross-sectional correlation in the idiosyncratic part calculated using
PANIC with r = (1, 2, 3). The results confirm the presence of one common factor as this seems
sufficient to remove the cross-sectional dependence from lnBERDit and the CCEP composite
error term.
FE results
To highlight the importance of dealing with cross-sectional dependence for the estimation results,
we first ignore any unobserved common factors and estimate the empirical model using a standard
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Table 2.1: Determining the number of relevant common factors
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
Cross-sectional correlation left after taking out r factors
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3
lnBERDit 0.881 -0.053 -0.063 -0.055 ∆ lnBERDit 0.1935 -0.048 -0.06 -0.059
êSit1 0.549 -0.015 -0.017 -0.0384 ∆ê
S
it1 0.086 -0.02 -0.013 -0.041
êSit2 0.487 -0.028 -0.041 -0.024 ∆ê
S
it2 0.096 -0.032 -0.034 -0.039
êSit3 0.194 -0.044 -0.044 -0.063 ∆ê
S
it3 0.112 -0.038 -0.032 -0.056
êSit4 0.574 -0.026 -0.040 -0.043 ∆ê
S
it4 0.092 -0.025 -0.028 -0.039
êSit5 0.131 -0.058 -0.062 -0.066 ∆ê
S
it5 0.147 -0.045 -0.048 -0.058
êSit6 0.086 -0.047 -0.039 -0.056 ∆ê
S
it6 0.128 -0.047 -0.038 -0.049
êSit7 0.089 -0.042 -0.044 -0.052 ∆ê
S
it7 0.116 -0.039 -0.04 -0.054
êSit8 0.127 -0.052 -0.063 -0.053 ∆ê
S
it8 0.154 -0.047 -0.055 -0.06
êSit9 0.817 -0.047 -0.047 -0.052 ∆ê
S
it9 0.117 -0.040 -0.036 -0.054
êSit10 0.315 -0.051 -0.043 -0.054 ∆ê
S
it10 0.103 -0.038 -0.027 -0.049
Note: êSit1, ê
S
it2,..., ê
S
it8 are the CCEP composite error terms, defined in equation (2.13) taken from specification (1),(2),...,(8)
respectively. We report the average cross-correlation ρ̂ (see Table 2.1 for the definition) after taking our r common factors using
PANIC.
FE estimator. The results can be found in Appendix 2.A. Using the FE estimator, we cannot
reject the null of no cointegration for all different specifications. The PANIC cointegration test at
the bottom of Table 2.A.1 shows that both the common factor and the idiosyncratic error terms
are non-stationary at the 5% level of significance. This is problematic as Urbain and Westerlund
(2011) show that the standard result in Phillips and Moon (1999) that panel regressions yield
consistent results even if there is no cointegration, does no longer hold when the non-stationarity
in the error term is induced by a common factor. This implies that the results from the FE
estimator, which ignores the presence of non-stationary common factors, are spurious. As such we
do not interpret these results.
CCEP results
Turning to the CCEP estimator, which controls for unobserved common factors, the cointegration
test results in Table 2.2 show that for all, but one, specifications containing our wage measure
the null of no cointegration can be rejected at low levels of significance. For specifications (6) and
(7), we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level while for specifications (4), (8)
and (10) the null can be rejected at the 5% level. For specifications (5) and (9), the null can only
be rejected at the 10 % level of significance. The importance of taking into account wage policy
as a factor influencing private R&D investment is confirmed by considering the cointegration test
results of specifications (1), (2) and (3). For these specficiations, the null of no cointegration
cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance, implying that our wage measure is an essential
part of the cointegration relationship. Looking in detail at the PANIC cointegration test results,
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the time series properties of the unobserved common factor, ft reveal that this variable is part of
the cointegration relationship. So there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft).
Regarding the estimated coefficients, the effect of total value added on R&D investment in
the business sector is robustly positive and statistically significant in all our regressions. The
estimated (partial) long-run elasticity varies between 0.43 and 0.75, the median being 0.65. As
to public policies, our estimation results reveal various ways in which governments can effectively
promote R&D investment in a country. One approach is to give tax incentives or subsidies and
grants. Another is to spend more on R&D within the public sector itself if this does not crowd
out private spending. Our evidence suggests that both options can work, if chosen appropriately.
Let us start with the former. In a majority of our regressions, we observe a negative and
statistically significant effect on the B-index of about -0.18, supporting the hypothesis that tax
incentives encourage private R&D investment. This result is clearly in line with most of the lit-
erature that we summarized in Section 2.2.1. In some of our regressions, though, the observed
negative effect is not statistically significant. For public funding of investment in the business
sector (lnSUBSit) we always obtain positive but mostly highly insignificant elasticities. Only in
specifications (9) and (10) the long-run elasticity varies around 0.4 and is significant at the 5%
level. At first sight, our results therefore seems to indicate that private firms are not encouraged
to raise their own R&D expenditures and undertake additional investments when some of their
projects are publicly funded. Neither, however, do they cut back on their own spending. The
observed positive coefficient on lnSUBSit clearly challenges the hypothesis that subsidized pri-
vate firms would just substitute public money for their own. Additional analysis, however, as in
specification (5), reveals a much richer reality behind this general result. When we follow Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and allow for different effects from public funding on private R&D
expenditures depending on the level of the subsidization percentage, we find both at low subsi-
dization rates (i.e. below 4%) and at high subsidization rates (above 11%) a negative elasticity of
public funding8. At intermediate subsidization rates, however, we find this elasticity to be positive
(0.076) and statistically significant. We conclude that direct government funding can be effective
in promoting private R&D investment, but this funding should not be too low, neither too high.
In the former case support may be too weak to help firms overcome the risks and uncertainties
involved in innovation projects. In the latter case, support may be larger than the number of
(new) projects that firms can develop, so that in the end they simply use public resources to
finance projects that would have been done anyway. In this sense we confirm earlier evidence by
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003).
8We follow Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and use the share of government funded R&D in total business
performed R&D as a proxy for the subsidization rate. We find this rate to be low (< 4 % on average over the
sample period) in Australia and Finland, and high (> 11%) in France, Italy, Norway, Spain, UK and US. The other
countries take intermediate positions.
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Table 2.2: CCEP regression results
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coefficient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 0.644
∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.428∗ 0.512∗∗
(0.18) (0.194) (0.187) (0.242) (0.227) (0.257) (0.249) (0.222) (0.230) (0.240)
lnBINDEXit −0.186∗∗ -0.114 −0.187∗∗ −0.182∗∗ −0.170∗∗ -0.103 -0.10 −0.189∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.142∗
(0.087) (0.10) (0.089) (0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.092) (0.080) (0.086) (0.082)
lnSUBSit 0.004 0.01 0.017 0.000 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.046
∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.002) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
lnGOV ERDit 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.064 0.059 0.087
∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.021 0.023 0.020
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.05) (0.042) (0.053) (0.049)
lnHERDit 0.071 0.063 -0.017 0.096 -0.057 0.042 0.032 0.074 -0.018 0.022
(0.069) (0.072) (0.071) (0.068) (0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067)
HCAPit 0.051
∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
OPENit 0.002 0.014
∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005)
lnWAGEit -0.205 0.127 −1.108∗∗ -0.085 0.383
(0.211) (0.197) (0.463) (0.202) (0.445)
PMRit 0.419
∗∗ -0.112
(0.196) (0.154)
PMR2it -0.046
(0.036)
lnSUBSit ∗ low -0.053
(0.075)
lnSUBSit ∗medium 0.076∗∗
(0.034)
lnSUBSit ∗ high −0.087∗∗
(0.040)
lnWAGEit ∗OPENit 0.014∗∗
(0.006)
lnWAGEit ∗ PMRit −0.295∗
(0.172)
lnWAGEit ∗ epllow −1.205∗∗∗
(0.447)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplmiddle 0.134
(0.474)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplhigh 0.092
(0.257)
lnWAGEit ∗ anglo -0.639
(0.464)
lnWAGEit ∗ euro 1.331∗∗∗
(0.338)
lnWAGEit ∗ nordic 0.27
(0.305)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on f̂pct -0.699 -1.392 -0.931 -0.797 -1.455 -2.105 -1.55 -2.168 -0.073 -0.344
[0.97] [0.84] [0.94] [0.96] [0.82] [0.52] [0.79] [0.49] [0.99] [0.99]
MW on ̂pcit 1.23 1.37
∗ 1.086 1.603∗∗ 1.295∗ 2.446∗∗∗ 2.918∗∗∗ 1.661∗∗ 11.460∗ 2.085∗∗
[0.11] [0.09] [0.14] [0.05] [0.10] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05] [0.07] [0.02]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For the panel cointegration test results, the unit
root test on the common factor F̂t is a ADF-GLS test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in square brackets. The unit root
test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors ̂pcit is a MW test. The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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Results on the effects of R&D spending within the government sector (lnGOV ERDit) and
within institutions of higher education (lnHERDit) all go in the same direction. The effect is
positive in almost all cases but small and mostly insignificant. Although this may sound poor
from a statistical perspective, it is not unimportant economically. It means that each euro that
the government spends on ’intramural’ R&D or on R&D within universities adds one euro to
aggregate spending on R&D. Our findings therefore go against the hypothesis of (weak) crowding
out, for which Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) found evidence, as well as against the hy-
pothesis of complementarity between public and private spending, as suggested by Falk (2006).
Only for lnGOV ERDit in columns (6) and (7) we may find some weak indications in favour of
complementarity. The regressions in these columns yield a long-run positive elasticity of about
0.19.
Important is also that governments can stimulate private R&D investment by encouraging
human capital formation. This is confirmed by our empirical results which yield very robust and
significant positive estimates on the stock of high skilled human capital (HCAPit). Considering
the lack of consistent findings in the existing literature (see for example Falk, 2006), this is an
interesting result. We also find a positive effect from the degree of openness of the economy
on business R&D spending. In column (2) this positive effect is not statistically significant. In
specification (6) it is. This may point to the importance of international transfer of technology
and knowledge for business R&D. However, in line with results that we discuss below for the wage
gap, a complementary interpretation could be that a more open economy raises the degree of
competition that firms face. Facing more competitors then seems to encourage firms to innovate.
An important potential determinant of business-funded and performed R&D is wage pressure.
Theory being inconclusive, what do we learn from our results on its impact on innovation? When
analyzing the basic effect in specifications (4) and (5) we do not find any significant effect from
wage formation on R&D investment. In column (4) the effect is insignificantly negative whereas
in column (5) it is insignificantly positive. However, a much more detailed analysis, based on
the theoretical arguments in Section 2.2.2, gives a clearer view. As wage pressure has possibly
positive effects in a very competitive environment, we allow in specification (6) for interaction
between lnWAGEit and OPENit. The basic impact of lnWAGEit is now negative and highly
significant, with an estimated long-run coefficient equal to -1.1. If wage pressure increases with 1
%point, this implies that, on average, private R&D investment drops with 1.11 %. Higher wage
pressure thus seems to undermine business R&D expenditures. An obvious explanation, and in
9The observed elasticities allow us to compute the marginal effect on business financed R&D and on aggregate
R&D spending (business + public) induced by one euro spent by the government. Considering that BERDit
relates to GOV ERDit as 5 to 1 and to SUBSit as 13 to 1 on average over all countries considered in our analysis,
elasticities of 0.126 for GOV ERDit and 0.076 for SUBSit (the highest we observe in our results) would imply that
∆BERDit
∆GOVERDit
= 0.63 and ∆BERDit
∆SUBSit
=0.99. In the case of GOV ERDit, aggregate R&D spending would thus rise
by 1.63 (1 euro public + 0.63 euro private) euro, in the case of SUBSit by 1.99 (1 euro public + 0.99 euro private)
euro.
66
- Chapter 2 -
line with Ulph and Ulph (1994), would be that higher wages reduce the profit differential between
innovating and not innovating. However, the basic hypothesis only seems to survive in economies
where firms face relatively little (foreign) competition. In a competitive environment the wage
effect may be tilted. From the interaction term in specification (6) we learn that in countries with
a degree of openess higher than 80 % the global impact of wage pressure becomes positive, meaning
that higher wages encourage private R&D investment. Specification (7) differentiates the effect of
lnWAGEit according to the level of employment protection legislation (EPLit)
10. In countries
with low average EPL a significant negative effect of wage pressure emerges, again indicating that
higher wages reduces the incentive to innovate. In (very) regulated labour markets the negative
impact disappears as for the other two groups of countries we observe (insignificant) positive
effects of wage pressure on business R&D investment. As an additional check, the possible impact
of openess and labour market characteristics are integrated in specification (8). We distinguish
three groups of countries.
The first group of Anglo-Saxon countries is characterized by a relatively low degree of openness
and low employment protection legislation. The estimated effect from lnWAGEit is clearly neg-
ative in this group (although significant only at 20%). The second group of euro area countries is
characterized by rather the opposite of a high degree of openness and rigid labour markets. Here
we observe a significant positive coefficient on lnWAGEit. The arguments raised by Kleinknecht
(1998) and co-authors that an excessive focus on wage moderation could be harmful to innovation,
would thus seem to find support for this group. The third group of Nordic countries takes an in-
termediate position. Finally, in specifications (9) and (10) we analyse the direct impact of product
market (de)regulation, PMRit, and its possible effect on the relation between wage pressure and
innovation. Following Aghion, Bloom, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), a U-shaped relationship should
be expected between PMRit and lnBERDit. In specification (9) we do not find evidence for this
U-shaped effect. On the contrary, results show that more regulated product markets increase
firms’ incentive to invest in R&D. In this view, higher product market regulation, and thus lower
competition, increases firms’ rents when investing in R&D. When also taking into account the
possible impact of PMRit on the effect of wage pressure on business funded and performed R&D,
which is done in specification (10), the direct impact of PMRit is somewhat different. Now, higher
product market regulation has a negative, but insignficant, impact on the amount of business R&D
expenditures. More interestingly is the interaction between PMRit and lnWAGEit. This inter-
action effect confirms our earlier finding. In a less competitive environment (high PMRit), higher
wage pressure reduces the incentives of firms to invest in R&D. When product markets become
more deregulated, the basic negative effect disappears and in these circumstances wage pressure
10As time variation in EPLit is too limited, we cannot interact lnWAGEit with EPLit. As a solution, we
differentiate the impact of lnWAGEit amongst three groups of countries with different average EPLit
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can even stimulate private R&D investment.
2.4.2 The importance of economic and policy related variables in ex-
plaining private investment in R&D
Our empirical results in Table 2.2 help us to understand and explain important differences in the
level and evolution of real business funded and performed R&D in the OECD during the last
decades. In what follows, we discuss the explanatory power of our estimated empirical model and
conduct a counterfactual analysis. The latter allows us to assess the contribution of changes since
1981 in public policy, wage pressure and human capital to the evolution of business R&D. What
fraction of the total change in BERD between 1981 and 2012 can these explanatory variables
explain? Which was more important, which was less important? Are the results the same for all
countries/country groups?
Explanatory power
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the capacity of our empirical model to explain the variation in business
R&D investment across countries and over time. We use the regression result in specification (6).
The upper panel in Figure 2.1 (panel a) relates our model’s prediction (economic explanation) for
the level of business R&D expenditures in 2006-2007 to the true observation11. Both prediction and
true observation are represented as percentage deviations from their overall country averages. The
lower panel (panel b) relates predicted and observed changes in business funded and performed
R&D between 1981 and 2007. We emphasize that our predictions in both panels have been
obtained solely from using the ’economic’ and ’policy related’ parts of the estimated equation.
They do not include the country-specific fixed effects nor the approximations for the country-
specific factor loadings and unobserved common factors.
Correlation in panel (a) is 0.50. Our model correctly predicts far above average business R&D
investment in 2006-2007 in the US and (far) below average R&D investment in Italy and France.
The model’s prediction of close to average performance in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark
and Norway is also quite well in line with the facts. On the other hand, using only the economic
and policy related explanatory variables in the model, it is harder to match the high level of
business R&D investment in 2006-2007 in Finland and Sweden. So it is to match relative low
investment in Spain. It is clear that for these countries the unobserved common factor was more
important than for other countries.
11We choose these years as they are the last before the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Severe shocks
to firms’ investment decisions during this crisis imply that the data are much less likely to match the long-run
equilibrium relationship that our model captures.
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Figure 2.1: Actual and predicted business R&D expenditure (Table 2.2, specification 6)
(a) Actual and predicted business R&D expenditure levels, 2006-2007
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(b) Actual and predicted change in business R&D expenditure, 2007 versus 1981
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In this respect, our results are in line with those of Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015).
Studying the drivers of TFP, they find for Finland and Sweden a relatively strong and rising
absorptive capacity to the (unobserved and common) world level of technology. Stronger inter-
national technology spillovers, and their effects on the private return to R&D, may explain an
important part of the above average business investment in innovation in these countries. The
opposite may explain weaker investment in Spain. Clearly, the observation that the common factor
plays an important role, at least for some countries, is fully in line with our earlier finding that
this factor belongs to the cointegration relationship. It supports (again) our choice for the CCEP
estimator.
Correlation in panel (b) is 0.34. The model again seems to have the main drivers of R&D
investment right for the US, France and Italy. It also explains quite well the change in business
R&D investment over time in countries like Austria and Norway. Finland is again by far the
largest outlier. On the basis of (changes in) economic and policy related variables it is impossible
to explain the strong actual rise inBERD since 1981 in this country. Dropping Finland, correlation
in panel (b) rises to 0.50.
Counterfactual analysis
Figure 2.2 reveals the estimated size of the estimated effects on business R&D expenditures of
changes in public innovation policy, wage pressure and human capital since 1981 in the US, an
average of five EU countries and the Nordic countries in our sample. Each graph compares the
model’s fitted value for these countries with (i) the simulated value if all policy variables (spending,
taxes) had remained at their 1981 level, (ii) the simulated value if all policy variables and wage
pressure had remained at their 1981 level, and (iii) the simulated value if all policy variables,
wage pressure and human capital had remained at their 1981 level. Individual country graphs are
available upon request.
All three graphs underscore the importance of public policy, wage pressure and human capital.
As indicated by the lower line in Figure 2.1a, in the US business R&D investment in 2012 would
have been only a little bit higher than in 1981 if these variables had remained unchanged. The
core EU5 countries would have realized only about 1/3 of the actual increase in BERD if policy
variables, wage pressure and human capital had remained at their 1981 level. The Nordic countries
only about 50%. In this sense, Figure 2.2 is fully consistent with our earlier findings in Figure 2.1.
The observed policy and other variables were very important for the evolution of business R&D
investment in most countries. It seems again, though, that in comparative perspective the Nordic
countries also benefited strongly from the evolution of the unobserved common factor. In the US
its impact was minimal, especially so when we consider the most recent years.
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Figure 2.2: Counterfactual analysis: fitted and simulated model (Table 2.2, specification 6)
(a) United States
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As to the relative contribution of the set of policy variables, the wage gap, and high skilled
human capital for the evolution of BERD, Figure 2.2 leaves no doubt that the latter was the most
important. In the US the increase of human capital contributed to more than 75% of the total
increase in BERD. In the core EU that was almost 70%, in the Nordic countries about 50%.
Public innovation policy comes second in line, especially in the core EU countries. In these
countries, changes in policy accounted for a little more than 20% of the observed increase in BERD
since 1981. In the Nordic countries the contribution of policy changes was about 13%, in the US
about 9%. Finally, changes in the wage gap may have contributed the least to change in business
R&D investment. This conclusion holds in particular for the US and the Nordic countries where
fairly limited changes in wage pressure, on average, had rather neutral effects. Changes in the
wage gap did matter, however, in the core EU5. The focus on wage moderation in countries like
the Netherlands, Austria and Italy in particular had an important negative impact on BERD over
time. Figure 2.2 shows that, for the evolution of BERD, the stimulating effect of public policy in
the core EU5 countries was entirely neutralized by the negative effects of wage moderation.
2.4.3 Robustness test: alternative specification of the wage indicator
To construct our wage indicator, lnWAGE, in Section 2.3.1, we used data on the share of private
capital (α), public capital (β) and labour (1 − α − β) in total income. Estimation of a basic
production function for the set of countries in our empirical analysis gave us the required informa-
tion. However, to show that our results are not sensitive to the exact choice of the income shares,
we also constructed an alternative wage indicator based on different (but evenly realistic) output
elasticities. More specifically, we set α and β equal to respectively 0.30 and 0.10, which is in
line with the results reported by Bom and Ligthart (2014), and the resulting labour share to 0.6.
Using these elasticities, we recalculated lnWAGE and re-estimated all related specifications with
the CCEP estimator. Results can be found in Appendix 2.B. For all specifications, results are
similar to the ones in Table 2.2 and the same conclusions apply. As an additional robustness check
we took into account the empirical observation that bargained wages tend to be lower the higher
the unemployment rate (see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel, and
Quintini, 2003). This may somewhat bias our wage gap indicator. As a second robustness test,
we controlled for this by following Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) and added the unemployment
rate to our wage indicator. Again, results are very similar to the ones reported in Table 2.212.
12Results using this alternative wage indicator are not reported here, but are available upon request.
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2.4.4 Direction of causation
The empirical results in Table 2.2 give proof of a long-run relationship between lnBERDit and its
determinants. To provide evidence that the long-run coefficients in Table 2.2 can be interpreted
as empirical causal effects, we apply a test for the direction of caution based on the approach of
Eberhardt and Teal (2013) which builds on the discussion in Canning and Pedroni (2008). From
the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) we know that if there exists a
cointegration relationship between the variables in the model, these series can be represented in
the form of a dynamic error correction model.
Equations (2.14)-(2.15) formalize this relationship for our empirical model. For notational
covenience, this is done under the assumption of 1 (r = 1) common factor, ft, and of 1 variable
included in Xit.
∆ lnBERDit = κ1i + α1ε̂i,t−1 + ρ1i∆ft +
J∑
j=1
φ11j∆ lnBERDi,t−j +
J∑
j=1
φ12j∆Xi,t−j + ν1it,
(2.14)
∆Xit = κ2i + α2ε̂i,t−1 + ρ2i∆ft +
J∑
j=1
φ21j∆ lnBERDi,t−j +
J∑
j=1
φ22j∆Xi,t−j + ν2it.
(2.15)
where ε̂i,t−1 represents the ’disequilibrium term’. The cointegration test results from Table 2.2
show there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft). This implies that the ’disequilibrium term’ is
constructed as ε̂it = lnBERDit−γi−Xitβ−λift and that ft is included in equations (2.14)-(2.15).
As a proxy for ft and for ε̂it, we use the results of the PANIC cointegration testing procedure
which provides us respectively with f̂pct and ̂
pc
it . Equations (2.14)-(2.15) further include lagged
differences of the observable variables in the cointegrating relationship.
For a long-run relationship to exist between lnBERDit, Xit and ft, α1 or α2 must be nonzero
. If α1 6= 0 then Xit has a causal impact on lnBERDit; if α2 6= 0 then lnBERDit has a causal
impact on Xit. If both α1 and α2 are non-zero, Xit and lnBERDit determine each other jointly.
In the above example there are only two equations, as we have two variables in the cointegration
relationship. In our empirical analysis we will have k + 1 equations, with k being the number of
variables in Xit. Empirical estimates for α1, α2,...,αk+1 are investigated using standard t-ratios,
given that all variables in the ECM regression are stationary13.
13The disequilibrium term ε̂it constructed from specifications (1), (2), (3) and (5) is not stationary at the 5%
significance level but still stationary at the 10% level for specifications (2) and (5). This implies that for the ’direction
of causation’ test based on specification (1) and (3) we should employ simulated critical values. However, in our
analysis we still use standard t-ratios with the reason being that the p-values of stationarity of the disequilibrium
term are very close to 10 % and that we are mainly interested in the specifications that include our wage measure.
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Results are presented in Table 2.3 for two lags (J = 2), but the same conclusions can be
drawns for one lag (J = 1). Due to the limited time series dimension of our data, we do not
consider extra lags. In Table 2.3, the first row of each specification refers to the estimation of α̂1,
while for all other rows, α̂2 is estimated with the dependent variable the variable mentioned in
the column ’Variable’. Table 2.3 shows that for each specification that we have estimated, Xit
has an impact on lnBERDit. This can be seen from the estimation of equation (2.14) in row
1 for each specification in Table 2.3. To be sure that the estimated impact is causal, equation
(2.15) is estimated for each element in Xit as a dependent variable. If the error correction term
of these equations is zero, then the corresponding x-variable has a causal impact on lnBERDit.
The results in Table 2.3 show that all results can be interpreted as empirical causal effects as no
error correction term is significant when estimating equation (2.15).
As an additional check we allow the short term coefficients (φ11j , φ12j , φ21j and φ22j) and
the error correction terms (α1 and α2) in equations (2.14) and (2.15) to vary across countries.
Results for the ’direction of causation’ test when allowing for this heterogeneity can be found in
Table 2.4, where the mean group results are reported. When allowing for short-term heterogeneity
across countries, conclusions on the direction of causation are somewhat different. First, there is
clear evidence that lnHERDit and lnBERDit determine each other jointly. This implies that the
coefficient on lnHERDit in our specifications should be interpreted as a correlation and not as a
causal effect. Evidence of reverse causality is also present for lnV Ait as is shown by the test results
of specification (3), (5),(7) and (8). For PMRit, the test results of specification (10) indicate a
possible problem of reverser causality, although only at the 10 % significance level. Finally, it is
also important to note that only in specification (7) there is some indication that the coefficients
on WAGEit could not be interpreted as causal. However, this is only the case at the 10% level
of significance. Moreover, all other specifications show that the estimated effect of WAGEit is
causal.
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2.5 Conclusion
The wedge between private and social returns to the creation of knowledge and technology justifies
government involvement in the area of research and development. Nevertheless, in the current
environment of restoring sustainability of public finances and search for an increasing efficiency
of public policy, the question arises which policy options are most effective in stimulating private
R&D investment. This chapter therefore analyses the effects of different policies on aggregate
business funded and performed R&D investment in a panel of 14 OECD countries since 1981.
Concerning traditional policy options, we find that tax incentives are effective. Public funding
(subsidization) of R&D performed by firms can also be effective if subsidies are not too low nor
too high. The optimal subsidization rate may be somewhere between 6 and 10%. R&D performed
within the government sector and within institutions of higher education is basically neutral with
respect to business R&D. We find no evidence for crowding out nor for complementarity, which
implies that each euro spent on R&D within the government feeds through one-to-one in aggregate
R&D. The higher education sector may, however, indirectly be of great significance. This chapter
revealed human capital accumulation at the tertiary level as the most important driver of business
funded and performed R&D in the OECD during the last decades.
One of the main contributions of this chapter is its attention to the impact of wage formation
on business R&D investment. Conflicting hypotheses have been introduced in the literature,
but not yet systematically analysed. One hypothesis is that innovation and investment in R&D
benefit from low or moderate wages, since these are important for firm profitability, which is
a key condition for investment. Wage restraint is also important to convince firms that rents
from innovation will not be appropriated by the unions through higher wages. The opposite
hypothesis is that an excessive focus on wage moderation may kill incentives to innovate. Wage
moderation may for example increase the survival probability of the least innovative firms and
retard the process of creative destruction. Conversely, according to this hypothesis, higher wage
pressure may force firms to innovate as a key element in their competitive strategy. Our empirical
analysis favours the first hypothesis in fairly closed economies and in economies with flexible labour
markets. The Anglo-Saxon countries may be the closest to this type. In highly open economies and
economies with rigid labour markets, however, rather the opposite holds and high wage pressure
may encourage innovation. Many European countries are more likely to match this type.
Our paper may also contribute to the macro R&D literature methodologically. More than
existing studies, we pay particular attention to the time series properties of the data. As most
variables in our empirical model are found to be non-stationary, we estimate a cointegrating
relationship. Moreover, we also take into account the presence of cross-sectionally correlated
error terms, which we find to be induced by an unobserved (non-stationary) common factor that
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drives private R&D spending. A sensible interpretation is that this common factor reflects the
worldwide level of technology and knowledge. To capture this, we adopt the CCEP estimator of
Pesaran (2006). We find that the standard fixed effects estimator yields spurious results.
The policy implications of our results include a warning against excessive wage moderation in
highly open economies with rigid labour markets. Even though this may promote employment in
the short run, it may undermine the economy’s innovative capacity and productivity in the long
run. The fairly poor growth of business R&D investment in a country like the Netherlands may
illustrate this long-run disadvantage. Conversely, however, in our view our findings provide no
argument in favour of excessive wage pressure. In rigid labour markets the loss of employment
that excessive wages may cause in the short run, may persist in the longer run due to for example
hysteresis effects in bad times. If promotion of business investment in R&D is the objective, our
paper suggests better alternatives, in particular tax incentives, well-chosen innovation subsidies
and the development of high skilled human capital.
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2.A Fixed effects regression results
Table 2.A.1: FE regression results
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coefficient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 1.069
∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.129) (0.127) (0.164) (0.167) (0.161) (0.174) (0.172) (0.175) (0.166)
lnBINDEXit 0.264
∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.129 0.189∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.150 0.127
(0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.105) (0.111) (0.102) (0.107) (0.105) (0.108) (0.105)
lnSUBSit 0.243
∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
lnGOV ERDit −0.182∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
lnHERDit 0.528
∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.060) (0.054) (0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.062) (0.068) (0.066)
HCAPit −0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.008 −0.012∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
OPENit 0.002 0.028
∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)
lnWAGEit 0.076 0.186 −1.738∗∗∗ 0.078 1.302∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.188) (0.340) (0.179) (0.282)
PMRit 0.123 −0.456∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.076)
PMR2it −0.043∗∗
(0.018)
lnSUBSit ∗ low 0.453∗∗∗
(0.049)
lnSUBSit ∗medium 0.124∗∗∗
(0.031)
lnSUBSit ∗ high 0.106∗∗∗
(0.035)
lnWAGEit ∗OPENit 0.031∗∗∗
(0.005)
lnWAGEit ∗ PMRit −0.446∗∗∗
(0.086)
lnWAGEit ∗ epllow −0.689∗
(0.415)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplmiddle 0.129
(0.228)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplhigh 0.124
(0.124)
lnWAGEit ∗ anglo −0.809∗∗
(0.410)
lnWAGEit ∗ euro 0.456∗∗
(0.202)
lnWAGEit ∗ nordic −0.460∗
(0.245)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on f̂pct -2.541 -2.635 -2.580 -2.538 -2.877 -2.909 -2.608 -2.736 -2.437 -2.589
[0.31] [0.27] [0.29] [0.31] [0.18] [0.17] [0.28] [0.23] [0.35] [0.29]
MW on ̂pcit -0.619 -1.325 -0.534 -0.492 -0.489 -1.469 -0.383 0.654 0.366 1.366
∗
[0.73] [0.91] [0.70] [0.69] [0.69] [0.93] [0.65] [0.26] [0.35] [0.09]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For the panel cointegration test results, the unit
root test on the common factor F̂t is a ADF-GLS test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in square brackets. The unit root
test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors ̂pcit is a MW test. The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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2.B CCEP results with alternative wage indicator based on
different production function elasticities
Table 2.B.1: CCEP regression results for alternative calculation of TFP and the wage gap
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(4’) (5’) (6’) (7’) (8’) (9’) (10’)
Coefficient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 0.375 0.597
∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.395 0.655∗∗∗ 0.314 0.357
(0.249) (0.238) (0.267) (0.258) (0.230) (0.240) (0.248)
lnBINDEXit −0.171∗∗ −0.160∗ -0.093 -0.085 −0.188∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.146∗
(0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.092) (0.022) (0.087) (0.081)
lnSUBSit 0.002 0.029 0.031 0.034 0.049
∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
lnGOV ERDit 0.067 0.068 0.092
∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.020 0.023 0.033
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.051) (0.042) (0.053) (0.050)
lnHERDit 0.100 -0.046 0.047 0.039 0.077 -0.015 0.007
(0.068) (0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
HCAPit 0.092
∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
OPENit 0.012
∗∗∗
(0.004)
lnWAGEit -0.289 0.011 −1.182∗∗∗ -0.206 0.269
(0.195) (0.186) (0.413) (0.192) (0.404)
PMRit 0.419
∗∗ -0.111
(0.198) (0.135)
PMR2it -0.045
(0.037)
lnSUBSit ∗ low -0.055
(0.076)
lnSUBSit ∗medium 0.070∗∗
(0.035)
lnSUBSit ∗ high −0.080∗∗
(0.040)
lnWAGEit ∗OPENit 0.013∗∗
(0.005)
lnWAGEit ∗ PMRit −0.308∗∗
(0.151)
lnWAGEit ∗ epllow −1.127∗∗∗
(0.391)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplmiddle 0.042
(0.432)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplhigh -0.126
(0.239)
lnWAGEit ∗ anglo -0.551
(0.413)
lnWAGEit ∗ euro 1.215∗∗∗
(0.322)
lnWAGEit ∗ nordic 0.143
(0.282)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on f̂pct -0.812 -1.498 -2.043 -1.606 -2.254 -0.091 -0.289
[0.95] [0.81] [0.55] [0.77] [0.44] [0.99] [0.99]
MW on ̂pcit 1.949
∗∗ 1.423∗ 2.524∗∗∗ 2.635∗∗∗ 1.408∗ 1.757∗∗ 3.125∗∗∗
[0.03] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.08] [0.04] [0.00]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
For the panel cointegration test results, the unit root test on the common factor F̂t is a ADF-GLS test for a model with
constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in square brackets. The unit root test on the estimated
idiosyncratic errors ̂pcit for different number of common factors r=1,2 is a MW test. The corresponding p-values are reported
in square brackets
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Chapter 3
Is the excess sensitivity time-varying?
A Bayesian model selection approach
for the US1
This chapter investigates the degree of time-variation in the excess sensitivity of aggregate con-
sumption growth to anticipated aggregate disposable income growth using quarterly US data over
the period 1954-2014 in an empirical framework containing the possibility of stickiness in aggregate
consumption growth and taking into account measurement error and time aggregation. We use
a Bayesian model selection approach to deal with the non-regular test for the null hypothesis of
no time-variation in the excess sensitivity parameter. Anticipated income growth is calculated by
incorporating an instrumental variables estimation approach in our MCMC algorithm. The results
of estimating our extended empirical specification show that the excess sensitivity parameter is
stable at around 0.23.
3.1 Introduction
Traditional permanent income and life cycle models of consumption predict that aggregate con-
sumption should follow a random walk (see Hall, 1978). Empirical studies however have revealed
that aggregate consumption growth is excessively sensitive to anticipated disposable income growth
(see e.g., Campbell and Mankiw, 1989, 1990, 1991). The most common interpretations given to
this observation are the occurrence of liquidity constraints (see e.g., Flavin, 1985; Deaton, 1991;
Ludvigson, 1999) and the prevalence of precautionary and buffer stock savings motives (see e.g.,
Carroll, 1992; Ludvigson and Michaelides, 2001) which increase the weight given by consumers to
current income in their consumption decisions. In a number of empirical studies, the assumption
that the ES parameter is constant has been relaxed in favor of time-varying specifications (see e.g.,
1This chapter is joint work with Gerdie Everaert and Lorenzo Pozzi.
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Campbell and Mankiw, 1991; McKiernan, 1996; Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997; Girardin, Sarno,
and Taylor, 2000; Peersman and Pozzi, 2007). Some of these studies report that ES has become
less important during the last decades in the US (see e.g., Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997) and in
other developed economies (see e.g., Girardin, Sarno, and Taylor, 2000; Blundell-Wignall, Browne,
and Cavaglia, 1991). This has been attributed to financial liberalization and the development of
financial markets. These structural developments are thought to have improved the possibilities
of consumers to smooth consumption over time and across states of the world, i.e., by curbing
the importance of credit constraints and precautionary saving motives in consumer decisions these
developments have, over time, reduced the ES parameter.
A number of recent papers argue that the measured degree of ES of aggregate consumption
growth becomes less important once other forms of aggregate consumption predictability are taken
into account (see e.g., Basu and Kimball, 2002; Sommer, 2007; Kiley, 2010; Carroll, Slacalek, and
Sommer, 2011). Sommer (2007) and Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011) in particular show
that the degree of ES measured in quarterly US data falls considerably in a model that contains
a mechanism - i.e., habit formation, rational inattention or imperfect information - that generates
dependency of aggregate consumption growth to its own past (i.e., ‘stickiness’). Sommer (2007)
further argues that it is necessary to adequately deal with both measurement error and time
aggregation to obtain valid estimates of the ES parameter.
Up until now a framework containing the possibility of stickiness in aggregate consumption
growth and containing an adequate treatment of measurement error and time aggregation has
only served as a benchmark for testing for ES under the assumption that the degree of ES is
constant. This chapter contributes to the literature by investigating time-varying ES in this
extended empirical framework. We allow the ES parameter to vary over time according to a
standard unobserved random walk process. The chapter further contributes to the literature by
suggesting an appropriate methodological approach that allows to test whether the time-variation
is statistically significant and that can adequately deal with all the complications that arise when
estimating time-varying ES in our extended empirical set-up.
First, a key question is whether time-variation in the ES parameter is statistically relevant.
This is a non-regular testing problem as the null hypothesis that the variance of the innovations
to the time-varying ES parameter is zero lies on the boundary of the parameter space. This
hypothesis has not yet been tested explicitly. In this chapter, we use the Bayesian model selection
approach recently suggested by Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010) to test for time variation
in the ES parameter. Their approach implies splitting the time-varying parameter in a constant
part and a time-varying part and introducing a stochastic binary model indicator which is one if
the time-varying part should be included in the model and zero otherwise. Using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, these stochastic binary indicators can then be sampled jointly
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with the other model parameters. Moreover, the standard inverse Gamma prior for the variance
parameters is replaced by a Gaussian prior centered at zero for the standard deviation. The
reason for this is that when using an inverse Gamma prior for the variance parameters, the choice
of the shape and scale hyperparameters that define this distribution have a strong influence on
the posterior when the true value of the variance is close to zero. More specifically, as the inverse
Gamma does not have probability mass at zero, using it as a prior distribution tends to push the
posterior density away from zero. This is of particular importance when estimating the variance
of the innovations to the time-varying ES parameter as we want to decide whether time-variation
is relevant or not. An interesting implication of estimating the standard deviation instead of the
variance of the the innovations to the time-varying parameters is that the sign of the standard
deviation is not identified. This offers an extra piece of information as it implies the posterior
distribution to become bimodal when there is time variation, while being unimodal at zero when
there is no time variation.
Second, as anticipated income growth is not observed, the ES parameter is estimated from the
relation between consumption growth and ex-post observed income growth using an instrumental
variables (IV) method. Time-varying ES parameter models with endogenous regressors have been
estimated by, among others, Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) and Peersman and Pozzi (2007) using
approximate methods. In a recent paper, Kim and Kim (2011) show that the control function
approach to IV estimation can be used to construct an exact state space representation which can
then be estimated using Maximum Likelihood (ML). Building on their paper, we incorporate a
control function type approach in our MCMC algorithm to deal with endogeneity. The advantage
of our Gibbs sampling approach is that it is computationally much more easy to implement and,
as such, does not suffer from the ML estimator’s numerical optimization problems reported by
Kim and Kim (2011). Moreover, as our Bayesian IV approach relies on sampling the posterior
distribution rather than using asymptotic approximations, it allows for exact inference even when
instruments are weak.
Third, stickiness in consumption growth on the one hand and time aggregation and measure-
ment error in the log level of consumption on the other hand imply that consumption growth
follows an AR(1) process with MA(3) errors. To obtain valid estimates of the ES to income
growth parameter, these ARMA terms need to be taken into account. We therefore include lagged
consumption growth in the model and follow Chib and Greenberg (1994) who developed exact
methods to analyze models with MA errors using MCMC sampling. The recursive transforma-
tions suggested in their paper allow to diagonalize the covariance matrix of the error terms such
that the conditional (on the MA coefficients) distributions are easily obtained and sampled from,
while the MA coefficients can be sampled suing a Metropolis-Hastings step within the Gibbs
sampler.
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Fourth, in the aggregate consumption growth equation we include an intercept that is allowed
to be time-varying. As such we capture and control for unspecified and/or hard-to-estimate com-
ponents of consumption growth. Our framework allows to test if the time-variaton in the intercept
is relevant and thus provides information whether other time-varying variables are influencing ag-
gregate consumption growth.
The estimation results show that in a basic model, including only anticipated income growth,
the ES of US consumption growth to anticipated income growth has decreased over time, starting
from around 0.4 in the early 1950s and ending close to 0.2 in 2014. This confirms the result
in Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) that ES drops gradually over time. However, when estimating
our extended empirical specification, modeling stickiness in consumption growth along with time
aggregation and measurement errors, the excess sensitivity parameter turns out to be stable at
around 0.23 over the entire sample period. This implies that the time-variation of the ES parameter
in the basic model is due to a specification error. In line with Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011),
the coefficient on lagged consumption growth is found to be around 0.58 showing that there is a
notable amount of stickiness in aggregate consumption growth.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present a bench-
mark theoretical model for consumption to which we add anticipated income growth to allow for
time-varying excess sensitivity. Section 3.3 outlines our empirical specification and estimation
methodology. Section 3.4 presents the estimation results for the US over the period 1954-2014.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical framework
In this section we first derive a benchmark model for aggregate consumption growth with stickiness
modeled through habit formation in consumer preferences2 and MA(3) errors to capture the effects
of time aggregation and measurement errors. Following, among others, Bacchetta and Gerlach
(1997) and Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011) we next add anticipated income growth to the
consumption growth equation to allow for time-varying ES of consumption to income.
3.2.1 A benchmark theoretical model with habit formation
Suppose a representative consumer maximizes the following stream of discounted utilities
maxEt
T∑
j=0
ρjU
(
Ct+j ;Xt+j
)
, (3.1)
2Alternative mechanisms by which stickiness can be incorporated into consumption growth are rational inat-
tention (see e.g., Reis, 2006; Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer, 2011) and imperfect information (see e.g., Pischke,
1995).
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subject to the budget constraint
At = R
[
At−1 + Y Lt − C∗t
]
, (3.2)
where Et denotes the consumer’s expectation conditional on period t information, ρ is the discount
factor, Ct is the level of period t ‘effective’ consumption, Xt is a variable or a combination of
variables that shifts marginal utility at time t3, At is the consumer’s stock of financial wealth, R is
the gross real interest rate (or interest factor), Y Lt denotes period t labor income or earnings and
C∗t is the representative agent’s consumption level in period t. Effective consumption is assumed
to be
Ct = C
∗
t − γC∗t−1, (3.3)
such that utility depends on the level of consumption C∗t relative to last period’s consumption
level C∗t−1, with the parameter γ (where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 ) capturing the strength of habits. When
γ = 0 habits are irrelevant and the consumer derives utility only from the level of consumption.
When γ = 1 habits are most important and the consumer derives utility only from the change in
consumption. When 0 < γ < 1 the consumer derives utility both from the level of consumption
and from the change in consumption. Hayashi (1985) and Dynan (2000) show that, provided
the interest rate is constant and T is large, the first-order condition under time-nonseparable
preferences can be written as
Et−1
[
Rρ
U ′(Ct;Xt)
U ′(Ct−1;Xt−1)
]
= 1, (3.4)
with U ′(Ct;Xt) =
∂U(Ct;Xt)
∂Ct
.
Assuming that the utility function is of the CRRA type, i.e., U(Ct;Xt) =
C
1−ψ
t
1−ψ Xt with ψ > 0,
so that U ′(Ct;Xt) = C
−ψ
t Xt and using this into equation (3.4) gives
Et−1
[
Rρ
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−ψ
Xt
Xt−1
]
= Et−1 [Zt] = 1, (3.5)
where Zt ≡ Rρ
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−ψ
Xt
Xt−1
. Assuming that ∆ lnCt and ∆ lnXt are jointly conditionally
normally distributed implies that lnZt = ln(Rρ) − ψ∆ lnCt + ∆ lnXt is conditionally Gaussian
as well. From the lognormal property we can therefore write
Et−1 [Zt] = exp
[
Et−1(lnZt) +
1
2
Vt−1(lnZt)
]
. (3.6)
3Examples are hours worked (see e.g., Kiley, 2010) and/or government consumption (see e.g., Evans and Karras,
1998).
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We then substitute equation (3.6) into equation (3.5) and take logs of the resulting equality to
obtain (after some rearrangement of terms)
Et−1
(
∆ lnCt
)
=
1
2ψ
σ2lnZ,t +
1
ψ
ln(Rρ) +
1
ψ
µ∆ lnX,t, (3.7)
where σ2lnZ,t ≡ Vt−1[lnZt] = Vt−1[∆ lnXt] − 2ψcovt−1[∆ lnXt,∆ lnCt] + ψ2Vt−1[∆ lnCt] and
where µ∆ lnX,t = Et−1 (∆ lnXt). This can also be written as
∆ lnCt =
1
2ψ
σ2lnZ,t +
1
ψ
ln(Rρ) +
1
ψ
µ∆ lnX,t + t, (3.8)
where t =
[
∆ lnCt − Et−1
(
∆ lnCt
)]
.
After collecting the first three terms of equation (3.8) into a time-varying variable β0t and
using the approximation ∆ lnCt = ∆ ln(C
∗
t − γC∗t−1) ≈ ∆ lnC∗t − γ∆ lnC∗t−1 as suggested by
Muellbauer (1988) and Dynan (2000), we obtain
∆ lnC∗t = β0t + γ∆ lnC
∗
t−1 + t, (3.9)
where β0t =
1
2ψσ
2
lnZ,t +
1
ψ ln(Rρ) +
1
ψµ∆ lnX,t. As such, β0t is a catch-all term that allows to
capture and control for unspecified (i.e., the conditional mean and variance of ∆ lnXt) and/or
hard-to-estimate (i.e., the conditional variance Vt−1[∆ lnCt] in σ2lnZ,t) components of aggregate
consumption growth.4
3.2.2 Time aggregation and measurement error
Assuming that consumption decisions are made more frequently than the intervals at which con-
sumption is measured causes time aggregation. Sommer (2007) shows that time aggregation in
combination with the presence of habits induces an MA(2) structure in the error term t of true
aggregate consumption growth ∆ lnC∗t , where ‘true’ refers to consumption in the absence of mea-
surement error and other transitory components. This implies that equation (3.9) should be
written as
∆ lnC∗t = β0t + γ∆ lnC
∗
t−1 + θ
ξ (L) ξt, (3.10)
with ξt an i.i.d. error term and θ
ξ (L) = 1+θξ1L+θ
ξ
2L
2 an MA(2) lag polynomial with parameters
being complicated functions of γ.5
4Note that while the model is derived under a constant interest factor R, the presence of β0t in the model
implicitly also allows to control for a time-varying interest rate in the estimation.
5Note that the proof in Sommer (2007) is based on a model with a constant mean in aggregate consumption
growth whereas we have the time-varying variable β0t in the model. We can however rewrite equation (3.9) as
(∆ lnC∗t − µt) = γ(∆ lnC∗t−1 − µt−1) + εt with µt = β0t + γµt−1 so that his proof can equally be applied to our
model.
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Sommer (2007) further notes that aggregate consumption data measured at the quarterly level
are often plagued by measurement error and other sources of transitory consumption fluctuations.
He argues that measurement error is best modeled as an MA(1) structure in the log-level of con-
sumption. This implies that measured aggregate consumption growth ∆ lnCt should be modeled
as the sum of of true aggregate consumption growth ∆ lnC∗t given by equation (3.10) and an
MA(2) error term
∆ lnCt = ∆ lnC
∗
t + θ
ζ (L) ςt, (3.11)
where ςt an i.i.d. error term and θ
ζ (L) = 1 + θζ1L + θ
ζ
2L
2 an MA(2) lag polynomial. Note that
this specification encompasses the simpler classical case where measurement error is assumed to
be a white noise error term in the log-level of consumption. This implies an MA(1) error term in
equation (3.11), with θζ1 = −1.
Combining equations (3.10) and (3.11) to obtain an expression containing only measured con-
sumption growth ∆ lnCt gives
∆ lnCt = β0t + γ∆ lnCt−1 + θζ (L) (ςt − ςt−1) + θξ (L) ξt,
= β0t + γ∆ lnCt−1 + θ (L) εt, (3.12)
with εt an i.i.d. error term and θ (L) = 1 + θ1L+ θ2L
2 + θ3L
3 an MA(3) lag polynomial.6
3.2.3 Time-varying excess sensitivity
Empirical studies have demonstrated that aggregate consumption growth is excessively sensitive
to anticipated disposable income growth (see e.g., Campbell and Mankiw, 1989, 1990, 1991). We
follow the standard approach to test for this type of ES by adding anticipated income growth
to the consumption growth model. In line with, among others, Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) we
allow the ES parameter to vary over time. More specifically, we extend our benchmark in equation
(3.12) to
∆ lnCt = β0t + β1tEt−1(∆ lnYt) + γ∆ lnCt−1 + θ (L) εt, (3.13)
where ∆ lnYt is aggregate income growth and β1t is the time-varying ES parameter. This approach
differs from the method followed by among others Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Kiley (2010)
who test for ES by writing down aggregate consumption growth as the sum or (weighted) average
between consumption growth of optimizing permanent income consumers and consumption growth
of current income (‘rule-of-thumb’) consumers.
We will use the model in equations (3.13) to test for time-varying ES of aggregate consumption
6Note that θ (L) εt is the sum of the two independent MA processes θζ (L) (ςt − ςt−1) and θξ (L) ξt, the first
being of order order 3 and the second of order 2. From Hamilton (1994) we can write the sum of two independent
MA processes as an MA process of which the order equals that of the highest order process in the sum.
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growth with respect to income growth against the benchmark model in equation (3.12). This
deviates from the past literature in a number of ways. First, ES is usually tested against a
framework where aggregate consumption growth is either white noise (i.e., the standard random
walk model) or an MA(1) process if time aggregation and classical measurement error are taken
into account (see e.g., Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997)). The results of Sommer (2007) and Carroll,
Slacalek, and Sommer (2011) show however that allowing for stickiness (i.e., the dependence of
aggregate consumption growth on its own lag) is important when testing for the ES of consumption
to income. In our model this is incorporated by introducing a habit formation mechanism. Second,
as noted by Sommer (2007), allowing for classical measurement error may not be sufficient such
that a more general framework with MA(q) errors is called for. The relevant order q will be
determined empirically. Third, the time-varying variable β0t controls for all potentially omitted
variables that may affect aggregate consumption growth (i.e., marginal utility shifters such as
hours worked and government consumption, the conditional variance of consumption growth which
reflects a potential precautionary savings motive, the interest rate that captures potential inter-
temporal substitution effects).
3.3 Empirical methodology
In this section we outline our empirical specification and econometric methodology to estimate
the model for aggregate consumption growth outlined in Section 3.2.
3.3.1 Empirical specification
We use equation (3.13) to test for time-varying ES of aggregate consumption growth with respect
to income growth against the benchmark model in equation (3.12). The empirical implementation
of equation (3.13) requires a number of further assumptions. These are outlined below.
Time-varying parameters
The parameters β0t and β1t in equation (3.13) are allowed to change over time according to a
random walk process
βi,t+1 = βit + ηit, ηit ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ2ηi), (3.14)
with i = 0, 1. his allows for a very flexible evolution over time.
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Anticipated income growth and IV
Anticipated income growth Et−1 (∆ lnYt) is not observed, but can be estimated by assuming that
observed income growth ∆ lnYt is linearly related to a set of forecasting variables Zt known to the
consumer at time t− 1
∆ lnYt = Ztδ + νt, (3.15)
such that Zt is uncorrelated with εt in equation (3.13) and where νt an i.i.d. error term unpre-
dictable at time t, i.e. Et−1νt = 0. Taking Et−1 of equation (3.15)
Et−1 (∆ lnYt) = Ztδ + Et−1νt = Ztδ, (3.16)
and substituting this in (3.13) yields
∆ lnCt = β0t + β1tZtδ + γ∆ lnCt−1 + θ (L) εt. (3.17)
Equation (3.17) is an IV-type of regression model with instruments Zt and δ estimated using
the first stage regression model (3.15). Because of common shocks to income and consumption,
equations (3.15) and (3.17) are seemingly-unrelated regressions with cross-equation parameter
restrictions. The correlation structure in the error terms νt and εt can be expressed as
Σν,ε =
 σ2ν ρσνσε
ρσνσε σ
2
ε
 , (3.18)
where ρ is the correlation between νt and εt. Using a Cholesky factorization of Σν,ε we can write νt
εt
 =
 σν 0
ρσε σε
√
1− ρ2
 µ1t
µ2t
 , (3.19)
with µ1t and µ2t being i.i.d. error terms with unit variance. Replacing εt in eq. (3.17) by
εt =
ρσε
σν
νt + σε
√
1− ρ2µ2t, (3.20)
yields
∆ lnCt = β0t + β1tZtδ + γ∆ lnCt−1 + ρν∗t + θ (L)µt, (3.21)
with ν∗t = σεθ (L) νt /σν and µt = σε
√
1− ρ2µ2t an i.i.d. error not correlated with any other
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error in the model. Equation (3.21) is a control function type of IV regression model similar to
the one outlined by Kim and Kim (2011) to deal with endogeneity in a time-varying parameter
model.7 However, in stead of using their joint or two-step ML procedure to estimate the non-linear
model implied by equations (3.15) and (3.21), we use the Gibbs sampler as outlined in Subsection
3.3.3 below. The advantage of our modeling and sampling approach is that when estimating
equation (3.21) we explicitly take into account that the error terms νt and εt may be correlated
and that δ is estimated in a first step, such that Ztδ̂ is a generated regressor. Moreover, as
our Bayesian approach relies on sampling the posterior distribution rather than using asymptotic
approximations, it allows for exact inference even when the instruments Zt are weak.
3.3.2 Stochastic model specification search
A key question in the above model is whether the ES parameter β1t is time-varying or constant.
Although β1t can be filtered using the Kalman filter and the variance of the innovations σ
2
η1
can be estimated using ML, testing whether the time-variation is statistically significant implies
testing σ2η1 = 0 against σ
2
η1 > 0, which is a non-regular testing problem as the null hypothesis lies
on the boundary of the parameter space. In a recent article, Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner
(2010) show how to extend Bayesian model selection for observed variables in standard regression
models to unobserved components in state space models. Their approach relies on a non-centered
parameterization of the state space model in which (i) binary stochastic indicators for each of
the model components are sampled together with the parameters and (ii) the standard inverse
Gamma prior for the variances of innovations to the components is replaced by a Gaussian prior
centered at zero for the square root of these variances.
Non-centered parameterization
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010) argue that a first piece of information on the hypothesis
whether the variance of innovations to a state variable is zero or not can be obtained by considering
a non-centered parameterization. This implies rearranging the data generating process for the
time-varying parameters βit in equation (3.14) to
βit = βi0 + σηiβ
∗
it, (3.22)
with β∗i,t+1 = β
∗
it + η
∗
it, β
∗
i0 = 0, η
∗
it ∼ i.i.d.N (0, 1), (3.23)
7One apparent difference is that our specification includes anticipated income growth, which is a predetermined
regressor calculated using instrumental variables, while the specification of Kim and Kim (2011) includes an en-
dogenous regressor. Next to the error terms from the first step auxiliary regression, the control function equation
in Kim and Kim (2011) therefore includes the endogenous regressor instead of Ztδ as in our equation (3.21).
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for i = 0, 1 and where βi0 is the initial value of βit when this coefficient is time-varying (σηi > 0)
while being the constant value of βit when there is no time variation (σηi = 0). A crucial aspect
of the non-centered parameterization is that it is not identified as the signs of σηi and β
∗
it can
be changed by multiplying both with -1 without changing their product in equation (3.22). As
a result of the non-identification, the likelihood function is symmetric around 0 along the σηi
dimension. When βit is time-varying (σ
2
ηi > 0) the likelihood function is bimodal with modes
−σηi and σηi . For σ2ηi = 0 the likelihood function is unimodal around zero. As such, allowing for
non-identification of σηi provides useful information on whether σ
2
ηi > 0.
Stochastic model specification
A second advantage of the non-centered parameterization in equation (3.22) is that when σ2ηi = 0
the transformed component β∗it (in contrast to βit) degenerates to zero with the time-invariant
parameter now represented by βi0. As such, the question whether the ES parameter is time-
varying or not can be expressed as a variable selection problem in equation (3.22). To this aim
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010) introduce the stochastic model specification
βit = βi0 + ιiσηiβ
∗
it, (3.24)
where ιi is a binary indicator which is either 0 or 1. If ιi = 0, the component β
∗
it drops from the
model such that βi0 represents the constant intercept or slope parameter. If ιi = 1 then β
∗
it is
included in the model and σηi is estimated from the data. In this case βi0 is the initial value of
βit.
Gaussian priors centered at zero for σηi
Our Bayesian estimation approach requires choosing prior distributions for the model parameters.
When using the standard inverse Gamma prior distribution for the variance parameters, the choice
of the shape and scale hyperparameters that define this distribution have a strong influence on
the posterior when the true value of the variance is close to zero. More specifically, as the inverse
Gamma does not have probability mass at zero, using it as a prior distribution tends to push the
posterior density away from zero. This is of particular importance when estimating the variances
σ2ηi of the innovations to the time-varying parameters βit as for these components we want to
decide whether they are relevant or not. As σ2ηi is a regression coefficient in equation (3.24) a
further important advantage of the non-centered parameterization is that it allows us to replace
the standard inverse Gamma prior on the variance parameter σ2ηi by a Gaussian prior centered
at zero on σηi . Centering the prior distribution at zero makes sense as for both σ
2
ηi = 0 and
σ2ηi > 0, σηi is symmetric around zero. Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010) show that the
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posterior density of σηi is much less sensitive to the hyperparameters of the Gaussian distribution
and is not pushed away from zero when σ2ηi = 0. As such, we choose a Gaussian prior distribution
centered at zero N (0, V0) for ση0 and ση1 , which are the standard deviations of the innovations to
the time-varying parameters.
Other priors
For the variances of the error terms σ2µ and σ
2
ν , which are always included in the model, we choose
the standard inverse Gamma prior distribution IG(c0, C0). For each of the model parameters
β00, β10, γ, ρ, θ and δ we assume a normal prior distribution N (b0, V0). Details on the chosen
hyperparameters (b0, V0) for the prior N distributions and (c0, C0) for the IG distributions are
presented in Section 3.4.2 below. For the binary indicators ι0 and ι1 we choose a uniform prior
distribution over all combinations of the indicators such that each model has the same prior
probability and each model component has a 1/2 prior probability of being included in the model,
i.e. p(ι0 = 1|ι1) = p(ι1 = 1|ι0) = 0.5.
3.3.3 Gibbs sampler
Using equation (3.24), the model in equation (3.21) can be rewritten as
∆ lnCt = (β00 + ι0ση0β
∗
0t) + (β10 + ι1ση1β
∗
1t)Ztδ + γ∆ lnCt−1 + ρν
∗
t + θ (L)µt. (3.25)
Taken together, equations (3.15) and (3.25) can be considered as the observation equations of a
state space (SS) model, with the unobserved states β∗0t and β
∗
1t evolving according to the state
equations in (3.23). In a standard linear Gaussian SS model, the Kalman filter can be used to
filter the unobserved states from the data and to construct the likelihood function such that the
unknown parameters can be estimated using Maximum Likelihood. However, the stochastic model
specification search outlined in subsection 3.3.2 implies a non-regular estimation problem for which
the standard approach via the Kalman filter and maximum likelihood is not feasible. Instead we
use the Gibbs sampler which is a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to simulate draws
from the intractable joint and marginal posterior distributions of the unknown parameters and
the unobserved states using only tractable conditional distributions. Intuitively, this amounts to
reducing the complex non-linear model into a sequence of blocks for subsets of parameters/states
that are tractable conditional on the other blocks in the sequence.
For notational convenience, define the time-varying parameter vector β∗t = (β
∗
0t, β
∗
1t), the
unknown parameter vectors φ1 =
(
δ, σ2ν
)
, φ2 =
(
β00, β10, ση0 , ση1 , γ, ρ, σ
2
µ
)
and φ = (φ1, φ2, θ) and
the model indicator M = (ι0, ι1) . Let Dt = (∆ lnCt,∆ lnYt, Zt) be the data vector. Stacking
observations over time, we denote D = {Dt}Tt=1 and similarly for β∗. The posterior density of
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interest is then given by f (φ, β∗,M|D). Building on Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010) for
the stochastic model specification part and on Chib and Greenberg (1994) for the MA part, our
MCMC scheme is as follows:
1. Sample the first step parameters φ1 from f (φ1|D) using the regression model in equation
(3.15) and calculate Ztδ and ν
∗
t .
2. Sample the MA coefficients θ from f (θ|φ1, φ2, β∗,M, D) conditional on the parameters φ2,
the time-varying parameters β∗, the binary indicators in M and Ztδ and ν∗t calculated in
the first block.
3. Sample the binary indicators M and the second step parameters φ2 using the non-centered
parameterization in equation (3.25) conditional on the MA coefficients θ, the time-varying
parameters β∗ and Ztδ and ν∗t calculated in the first block.
(a) Sample the binary indicatorsM from f (M|φ1, θ, β∗, D) marginalizing over the param-
eters φ2 for which variable selection is carried out.
(b) Sample the unrestricted parameters in φ2 from f (φ2|φ1, θ, β∗,M, D) while setting the
restricted parameters σηi (for which the corresponding component β
∗
it is not included
in the model M) equal to 0.
4. Sample the unrestricted (i.e. for which ιi = 1) time varying parameters in β
∗ from f (β∗|φ,M, D)
again using the non-centered parameterization in equation (3.25) conditional on the second
step parameters φ2, the binary indicators M and Ztδ and ν∗t calculated in the first block.
The restricted time varying parameters (for which ιi = 0) in β
∗
it are sampled directly from
their prior distribution using equation (3.23).8
5. Perform a random sign switch for σηi and {β∗it}Tt=1, i.e., σηi and {β∗it}Tt=1 are left un-
changed with probability 0.5 while with the same probability they are replaced by −σηi
and {−β∗it}Tt=1.
Given an arbitrary set of starting values, sampling from these blocks is iterated J times and,
after a sufficiently large number of burn-in draws B, the sequence of draws (B + 1, ..., J) ap-
proximates a sample from the virtual posterior distribution f (φ, β∗,M|D). Details on the exact
implementation of each of the blocks can be found in 3.A. The results reported below are based
on 10,000 Gibbs sampler iterations, with the first 5,000 draws discarded as a burn-in sequence.
8Even when ιi = 0 a sample for β
∗
it is required as this will be used to calculate the marginal likelihood of a
model with a time-varying β∗it in block 3(a).
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3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Data
To estimate our empirical model, we use quarterly data for the United States over the period
1954:q1-2014:q3. The effective sample size is 237, since 4 observations are lost as a result of
lagging. Where necessary, data are seasonally adjusted. For Ct we use real per capita expenditures
on nondurables and services (excluding clothing and footwear). For Yt real per capita personal
disposable income is used. Both are deflated by the deflator of nondurables and services (excluding
clothing and footwear) with base year 2009=100, for which also quarterly data is available. With
respect to estimating anticipated income growth, Zt contains a number of instruments suggested by
Campbell and Mankiw (1990), i.e., lagged disposable income growth, lagged consumption growth,
lagged changes in the short-term nominal interest rate and a lagged error correction term, i.e. log
consumption minus log disposable income (see also Campbell, 1987). As Campbell and Mankiw
(1990) further argue that changes in stock prices help to forecast changes in income, we also use
lagged changes in the S&P 500 index as an additional instrument. Following Fuhrer (2000) and
Kiley (2010), we further include lags of the inflation rate, calculated as the log change in the CPI
index. Finally, in line with Sommer (2007) we also use lags of the Index of Consumer sentiment
and of the change in unemployment rate. For consumption and income growth 4 lags are used
while for all other instruments we consider 2 lags.
Data for expenditures on nondurables and services (excluding clothing and footwear), for
nominal personal disposable income and for the corresponding deflator are taken from the National
Product and Income Accounts (NIPA). Population data are taken from the OECD quarterly
national accounts. For the short-term nominal interest rate, we use the three-month T-bill rate
with data taken from the Board of Governors. Data for the S&P 500 index comes from Sommer
(2007) and is updated with data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Finally, for the CPI-index
and the unemployment rate, data are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics while for consumer
sentiment the index constructed by the University of Michigan is used.
3.4.2 Prior choice
Summary information on the prior distributions for the unknown parameters is reported in Table
3.1. For the variances σ2µ and σ
2
ν of the error terms in the consumption and income growth
equations we use an inverse gamma prior distribution IG(c0, C0) where the shape c0 = ν0T and
scale C0 = c0σ
2
0 parameters are calculated from the prior belief σ
2
0 and the prior strength ν0, which
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is expressed as a fraction of the sample size T .9 Our prior belief for σµ is 0.5, implying that 95%
of the quarterly consumption growth shocks lie between -1% and 1%, while our prior belief for σν
of 0.75 implies that the 95% of the quarterly income growth shocks lie between -1.5% and +1.5%.
The smaller value for σµ reflects the idea that income is more volatile than consumption. In both
cases, the prior is fairly loose with strength set equal to 0.1.
For the remaining parameters, Gaussian prior distributions N (b0, V0) are used. First, consider
the time-varying ES parameter, β1t. For β10, the prior is given by β10 ∼ N (0.4, 0.22) which
reflects our belief that if there is no time variation in β1t (i.e., ση1 = 0) then the ES parameter
ranges from roughly 0 to 0.8. This encompasses all values found in the literature. Campbell and
Mankiw (1990) for example report values of 0.5 up to 0.7 for the U.S. Controlling for habits, Kiley
(2010) and Sommer (2007) find lower values of about 0.3 and 0.15 respectively. For the standard
deviation ση1 of the innovations to the time-varying part in β1t a Gaussian prior centered at zero
N (0, 0.22) is chosen. Note that the prior standard deviation √V0 = 0.2 implies a very loose prior
as it allows that 95% of the standard deviations of the quarterly innovations to the ES parameter
lie between −0.39 and 0.39.
For the time-varying intercept, β0t, the prior distribution for the time-invariant part is fairly
uninformative and centered at zero, β00 ∼ N (0, 1). The prior belief ση0 ∼ N (0, 0.22) about the
degree of time-variation in β0t is also centered at zero with the same prior standard deviation as
the innovations to the ES parameter.
According to Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011), the strength of habits in aggregate con-
sumption growth for the U.S. varies between 0.5 and 0.7. These results are confirmed by, amongst
others, Fuhrer (2000) and Sommer (2007) who both find a stickiness parameter around 0.7. There-
fore our prior for γ is N (0.6, 0.152) such that the 95% prior interval ranges from roughly 0.3 to
0.9.
For the degree of correlation ρ between νt and εt, an uninformative prior is chosen, i.e., ρ ∼
N (0, 0.42). A loose prior centered at zero is also used for the MA parameters θ and for the
parameters δ on the instrumental variables used to proxy Et−1(∆ lnYt).
9Since this prior is conjugate, ν0T can be interpreted as the number of fictitious observations used to construct
the prior belief σ20 .
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Table 3.1: Prior distributions of model parameters
Inverse Gamma priors: IG(c0, C0) = IG(ν0T, ν0Tσ
2
0) Percentiles
σ0 ν0 2.5% 97.5%
error term consumption equation σµ 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.62
error term income equation σν 0.75 0.10 0.63 0.94
Gaussian priors: N (b0, V0) Percentiles
Non-centered components b0
√
V0 2.5% 97.5%
std. of time-varying intercept ση0 0.00 0.20 −0.78 0.78
std. of time-varying ES parameter ση1 0.00 0.20 −0.39 0.39
Model parameters
constant value intercept β00 0.00 1.00 −1.96 1.96
constant value ES parameter β10 0.40 0.20 0.01 0.79
consumption habits parameter γ 0.60 0.15 0.31 0.89
degree of correlation between νt and εt ρ 0.00 0.40 −0.78 0.78
MA parameters θ 0.00 0.50 −0.98 0.98
parameters first stage income equation δ 0.00 0.50 −0.98 0.98
Notes: We set IG priors on the variance parameters σ2 but in the top panel of this table we report
details on the implied prior distribution for the standard deviations σ as these are easier to interpret.
Likewise, in the bottom panel of the table we report
√
V0 instead of V0.
3.4.3 Estimation results
We successively estimate 4 empirical models with increasing complexity. The fourth and last model
coincides with the empirical specification presented in Section 3. This approach facilitates the
investigation of the impact of the features incorporated into the model on the obtained estimates
for excess sensitivity and its variation over time. It also allows us to compare our findings to those
obtained in the literature. Hence, for each of the models, the importance of time variation in the
ES parameter is discussed as is the robustness of the results under different instrument sets Zt.
We end this section with the presentation of the results for the parsimonious model selected by
the stochastic model specification search.
Instrument sets
As anticipated income growth Et−1(∆ lnYt) is not observed, a set of instrumental variables Zt is
used to estimate it. As Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Kiley (2010), amongst others, show that
the choice of instruments can be critically important, inference on the significance of time varia-
tion will be reported under 3 different instrument sets. A first instrument set, Z1, is based upon
Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and includes lags 1-4 of disposable income growth and consumption
growth, a lagged error correction term and lags 1-2 of the change in the short term interest rate
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and the stock prices. In instrument set Z2 we add the first and second lag of the inflation rate
to the instruments contained in Z1 (see Fuhrer, 2000; Kiley, 2010). Following Sommer (2007), in
instrument set Z3 we further add lags 1-2 of the Consumer Sentiment Index and of the change
in the unemployment rate. Concerning the choice of lags, note that in general the presence of
autocorrelation of the MA form in the error term µt necessitates the instruments to be appropri-
ately lagged, i.e., depending on the order of the MA component in µt. However, as our empirical
approach explicitly takes into account and controls for the MA terms, we do not face this issue.
In column 2 of Table 3.2 we report the average explanatory power (R2) of the different instru-
ment sets in explaining ∆ lnYt. For all instrument sets we find an average R
2 over all iterations
of about 30%, which is very reasonable.
Model 1 (M1): no habits, no time-varying intercept, no MA in the error terms
We start by testing for time variation in the ES parameter using a basic model in which there is
no time-variation in the intercept (ση0 = 0), no dependency of aggregate consumptions growth
on its own past, and no MA structure in the error term. Based on equation (3.21), the empirical
specification for aggregate consumption growth then becomes
∆ lnCt = β00 + β1tZtδ + ρν
∗
t + µt.
where the data generating process for β1t is represented by equations (3.23) and (3.24).
We first estimate this model with the binary indicator ι1 set to 1 to generate a posterior
distribution for the standard deviation (ση1) of the innovations to the ES parameter. If this
distribution is bimodal, with low or no probability mass at zero, this can be taken as a first
indication of a time-varying ES. Figure 3.1 presents the resulting posterior distribution as well
as the mean of the posterior distribution of the time-varying ES parameter and its 90 % highest
posterior density (HPD) interval. When looking at panel (a), we find clear-cut bimodality in the
posterior distribution of the standard deviation of the innovations to the ES parameter, pointing
to a significant amount of time-variation. Panel (b) further shows the resulting time-variation in
ES, which starts at a value close to 0.4 in 1954 and increases to around 0.5 in the early 1970’s
after which it keeps on decreasing until it is lower than 0.2 in 2014.
As a more formal test for time variation, we next sample the stochastic binary indicator ι1
together with the other parameters of the model. Table 3.2 reports the posterior probabilities
that the binary indicators ιi attached to the time-varying parameters βit equal one for each of
the four different models that we estimate and for the three instrument sets discussed above. The
posterior probabilities for the binary indicators are calculated as the average selection frequencies
over all iterations of the Gibbs sampler. In the baseline scenario, we assign a 0.5 prior probability
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Figure 3.1: Stochastic model selection and time-varying parameters (binary indicators set to 1) in M1
(a) Posterior distribution ση1
−0.1 −5 · 10−2 0 5 · 10−2 0.10
50
100
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(b) Evolution time-varying ES parameter β1t
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Note: Figures are presented for the results using instrument set Z3 but are similar when using instrument sets Z1
and Z2
to each of the binary indicators being one. Results for this baseline scenario are presented in the
upper part of Table 3.2. As a sensitivity control, we re-estimate the different models with the
prior inclusion probability set to 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. The resulting posterior probabilities are
reported in the middle and lower part of Table 3.2.
For M1, the results in the baseline scenario (p(ιi = 1) = 0.5) show that when using instrument
sets Z2 and Z3 the inclusion probability of a time-varying ES parameter varies around 0.35. For
instrument set Z1 it is somewhat lower. Only when increasing the prior inclusion probability to
0.9, there is some sign of time-variation. All in all the results indicate that, despite the clear
bimodal posterior distribution of ση1 , there is no real evidence in favor of time-varying excess
sensitivity.
Model 2 (M2): no habits, no TV intercept, MA(2) error terms
In the absence of habits, time aggregation and measurement error induce an MA(2) structure in
the growth rate of consumption. This leads to the following empirical specification for aggregate
consumption growth
∆ lnCt = β00 + β1tZtδ + ρν
∗
t + θ(L)µt.
with θ(L) = 1 + θ1L+ θ2L
2 an MA(2) lag polynomial.
As we did when discussing M1, we report results for two steps. First, Figure 3.2 shows the
posterior distribution for the standard deviation ση1 and plots the time-varying ES-parameter.
Second, the individual posterior probability for the binary indicator ι1 is reported in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Posterior inclusion probabilities for the binary indicators over different models and instrument
sets
Prior Instrument set Posterior
M1 M2 M3 M4
Z R2 ι1 ι1 ι0 ι1 ι0 ι1
p(ιi = 1) = 0.5 Z
1 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.38 0.18 0.06 0.07
Z2 0.33 0.36 0.23 0.41 0.20 0.06 0.07
Z3 0.33 0.35 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.06 0.07
p(ιi = 1) = 0.1 Z
1 0.30 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01
Z2 0.33 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01
Z3 0.33 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.01
p(ιi = 1) = 0.9 Z
1 0.30 0.69 0.63 0.82 0.58 0.36 0.40
Z2 0.33 0.79 0.70 0.83 0.61 0.36 0.40
Z3 0.33 0.80 0.68 0.83 0.59 0.36 0.40
Model specification
Habits No No No Yes
TV intercept No No Yes Yes
MA error terms No MA(2) MA(2) MA(3)
Notes: The instrument set Z1 includes lags 1-4 of disposable income growth and consumption growth, a
lagged error correction term and lags 1-2 of the change in stock prices and the short term interest rate.
Instrument set Z2 adds the first and second lag of the inflation rate. Instrument set Z3 further includes lags
1-2 of the Consumer Sentiment Index and of the change in the unemployment rate.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 suggests that there is some bimodality in the posterior distribution for
ση1 but compared to M1 it is less clear. Looking at the posterior inclusion probability for the
time-varying part of the ES parameter in Table 3.2 shows that in the baseline scenario there is no
significant time-variation as for all instrument sets the probabilities vary around 0.2. For the two
other scenarios (p(ιi = 1) = 0.1 and p(ιi = 1) = 0.9) posterior probabilities are also lower than
the corresponding ones for M1.
Figure 3.2: Stochastic model selection and time-varying parameters (binary indicators set to 1) in M2
(a) Posterior distribution ση1
−0.1 −5 · 10−2 0 5 · 10−2 0.10
50
100
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200
(b) Evolution time-varying ES parameter β1t
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Note: Figures are presented for the results using instrument set Z3 but are similar when using instrument sets Z1
and Z2
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Further, to underline the importance of controlling for the MA process in the error terms, we
report the posterior distribution of the different MA coefficients θ in Table 3.3. For M2, the 95%
HPD interval of θ1 varies between -0.01 and 0.34. While there is some probability mass at zero,
it is very limited. For θ2 the 95% posterior interval ranges between 0.03 and 0.34 with a mean of
0.18 which shows us that controlling for the MA terms is necessary.
A similar model to M2 was also estimated by McKiernan (1996). Opposed to our analysis, their
results indicate that the relationship between consumption and income significantly changes over
the period 1959-1994 as a likelihood ratio test rejected the null hypothesis of a fixed parameter
model against the alternative stochastic parameter model. However, they also find no considerable
drop over time in the excess sensitivity parameter.
Table 3.3: Posterior distribution for the MA parameters over different models
MA parameter Posterior distribution
M2 M3 M4
2.5% mean 97.5% 2.5% mean 97.5% 2.5% mean 97.5%
θ1 -0.01 0.17 0.34 -0.02 0.15 0.32 -0.47 -0.29 -0.11
θ2 0.03 0.18 0.32 0.01 0.15 0.30 -0.11 0.06 0.22
θ3 -0.08 0.06 0.20
Note: Results are presented using instrument set Z3 and assuming p(ιi = 1) = 0.5 but are similar when using other
instrument sets and prior inclusion probabilities
Model 3 (M3): no habits, time-varying intercept, MA(2) error terms
Models M1 and M2 are rather restrictive as they do not allow other variables, besides expected
income growth, to have an impact on aggregate consumption growth. In M3 we allow for a
time-varying constant β0t that controls for potentially omitted variables that may affect aggregate
consumption growth. The empirical specification for ∆ lnCt then becomes
∆ lnCt = β0t + β1tZtδ + ρν
∗
t + θ(L)µt,
with θ(L) = 1 + θ1L + θ2L
2 an MA(2) lag polynomial and where equations (3.23) and (3.24)
represent the processes for the time-varying variables β0t and β1t.
As we now allow for a time-varying intercept, Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2 also provide informa-
tion on whether the time-variation in the intercept is statistically significant. When analyzing the
posterior distribution of ση0 , we notice that Figure 3.3 panel (a) provides evidence of a bimodal
distribution with low probability mass at zero, pointing to significant time-variation in the inter-
cept. When analyzing the posterior distribution of ση1 , Figure 3 panel (c) suggests that there is no
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Figure 3.3: Stochastic model selection and time-varying parameters (binary indicators set to 1) in M3
(a) Posterior distribution ση0
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(b) Evolution time-varying constant β0t
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(c) Posterior distribution ση1
−0.1 −5 · 10−2 0 5 · 10−2 0.10
50
100
150
200
(d) Evolution time-varying ES parameter β1t
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0.6
Note: Figures are presented for the results using instrument set Z3 but are similar when using instrument sets Z1
and Z2
bimodality in the posterior distribution of ση1 and thus no time variation in ES. This is confirmed
in Table 3.2 as in the baseline scenario the posterior probability of ι1 equal to 1 varies around
0.20 for all instrument sets. Even when increasing the prior inclusion probability up to 0.9, the
posterior does not exceed 0.61. The model selection thus cearly rejects time variation in the ES
parameter. For the intercept on the contrary, results are mixed. While Figure 3.3 panel (a) points
to a time-varying intercept, results on the posterior inclusion probability give no clear evidence for
time-variation in the intercept. Related to the importance of taking into account the MA process
in the error terms, Table 3.3 shows similar posterior distributions for the MA coefficients in M3
as those reported for M2.
In a comparable framework, Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) find that the ES of consumption
to income fell gradually from about 0.75 in the early 1970s to about 0.4 in the early 1990s. This
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contrasts a lot with our results as is shown by Figure 3.3 panel (d). Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997)
however did not test if the founded time-variation was statistically relevant
Model 4 (M4): habits, time-varying intercept, MA(3) error terms
Finally, in M4 we allow for habits in aggregate consumption growth and estimate the empirical
specification presented in Section 3, i.e., equation (3.21)
∆ lnCt = β0t + β1tZtδ + γ∆ lnCt−1 + ρν∗t + θ(L)µt.
with θ(L) = 1 + θ1L+ θ2L
2 + θ3L
3 an MA(3) lag polynomial as is explained in Section 3.2.2 and
where the data generating processes for β0t and β1t are shown by equations (3.23) and (3.24).
For model M4 panels (a) and (c) of Figure 3.4 clearly show that the posterior distributions
of ση0 and ση1 are unimodal at zero. This suggests that these components are stable over time.
Next, when sampling the stochastic binary indicators together with the other parameters, the
results reported in Table 3.2 support these findings. The posterior probabilities for the binary
indicators being one for the time-varying parts in the intercept and in the ES parameter are both
about 0.07 over the different instrument sets. Even when increasing the prior inclusion probability
up to 0.9, the posterior probabilities are not bigger than 0.4. The model selection thus strongly
rejects time variation in the intercept and in the ES of private consumption growth to expected
disposable income growth. The unambiguous rejection of a time-varying intercept suggests that
the omission of time-varying variables like hours worked and government consumption in our
empirical specification is not a major source of concern. While, as M3 shows, there is still some
indication of time-variation in the intercept when lagged consumption growth is not included in
the model, once we control for stickiness in aggregate consumption growth this is no longer the
case. This confirms the results of Sommer (2007) and Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011) who
argue that allowing for consumption growth to depend on its own lag is important when testing
for the ES of consumption to income. Further, when analyzing the MA structure of the residuals,
we notice that only the first MA term is relevant as the 95 % HPD for θ1 varies between -0.47
and -0.11 with a mean of -0.29 while the posterior distributions of θ2 and θ3 have considerable
probability mass at zero.
Finally, as can be seen from Table 3.1, the prior beliefs about the degree of time variation in
β0t and β1t are both centered at zero with a prior standard deviation of 0.2. To check robustness,
Table 3.4 shows results for the posterior inclusion probabilities for the time-varying parts over
alternative values for
√
V0 for M4 in the baseline scenario (ιi = 0.5). The first row shows the results
for
√
V0 = 0.2. The second row presents results for the case where
√
V0=0.05. This corresponds
to a relatively strong prior that allows for little time variation. The third row shows results for
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Figure 3.4: Stochastic model selection and time-varying parameters (binary indicators set to 1) in M4
(a) Posterior distribution ση0
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(b) Evolution time-varying constant β0t
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(c) Posterior distribution ση1
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(d) Evolution time-varying ES parameter β1t
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Note: Figures are presented for the results using instrument set Z3 but are similar when using instrument sets Z1
and Z2
a diffuse prior distribution that allows for a large variance on the time-varying component. We
can conclude that over all three prior specifications, we find no evidence of time variation in both
the intercept and the ES parameter. Compared to the baseline scenario, the posterior inclusion
probabilities fall well below 5 % when more diffuse priors are used. When the prior distribution
allows for little time variation, the inclusion probabilities increase but still remain low.10
10The increase in the posterior probability may appear counter intuitive, but is due to the fact that by restricting
the amount of time variation, the competing models (a model with and one without time variation) become similar
in their marginal likelihoods and thus the posterior probability shrinks towards the prior probability.
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Table 3.4: Posterior inclusion probabilities for the binary indicators over different priors on the degree
of time-variation in M4
prior posterior
√
V0 ι0 ι1
0.2 0.11 0.12
0.05 0.19 0.21
1.00 0.01 0.02
Note: Results are presented us-
ing instrument set Z3 but are
similar when using instrument
set Z1 and Z2.
A parsimonious model
When allowing for stickiness in aggregate consumption growth, the time variation in both the
intercept and the ES parameter is found to be irrelevant using the model selection criteria. We
therefore restricted these parameters to be time-invariant in the parsimonious model. Next, the
estimates of the MA terms reported in Table 3.3 show that, for M3, only the first MA term is
relevant. As such, we allow for only one MA term. This leads to the following specification for
aggregate consumption growth
∆ lnCt = β00 + β10Ztδ + γ∆ lnCt−1 + ρν∗t + θ(L)µt
with θ(L) = 1 + θ1L an MA(1) lag polynomial.
Descriptive statistics on the posterior distributions of the parsimonious model’s parameters
are given in Table 3.5. The results show that for the ES parameter the 95% HPD interval varies
between 0.11 and 0.35 with a mean value of 0.23. The stickiness in consumption growth parameter
ranges between 0.49 and 0.68 with a mean of 0.58. Both these results are similar to findings
of Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011) and Kiley (2010)11 and show that even if there is no
significant amount of time variation, the ES of private consumption to disposable income remains
a factor contributing to the predictability of aggregate consumption growth. With respect to the
presence of autocorrelation of the MA form in the error term, the posterior distribution points to
a negative MA coefficient. The results also indicate that it is important to control for common
shocks to income and consumption as the 95% HPD interval of ρ ranges between 0.18 and 0.44.
11More specifically, for the US Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011) find an ES parameter of 0.27 and a sticky
consumption growth coefficient of 0.55 when using an instrumental variable approach. Kiley (2010) reports an ES
parameter of 0.3 and a coefficient on lagged consumption growht of 0.65 when using their preferred instrument set
(which includes lagged levels of inflation).
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Table 3.5: Posterior distributions of model parameters (parsimonious model)
Percentiles
mean 2.5% 97.5%
error term consumption equation σµ 0.39 0.36 0.43
error term income equation σν 0.78 0.72 0.84
Percentiles
Model parameters mean 2.5% 97.5%
constant value of intercept β00 0.10 0.04 0.17
constant value of ES parameter β10 0.23 0.11 0.35
consumption stickiness γ 0.58 0.49 0.68
degree of correlation between νt and t ρ 0.30 0.18 0.44
MA(1) parameter θ1 −0.33 −0.49 −0.16
Note: Results are presented using instrument set Z3 but are similar when using instrument
set Z1 and Z2.
3.5 Conclusion
Up until now a framework containing the possibility of stickiness in aggregate consumption growth
and containing an adequate treatment of measurement error and time aggregation has only served
as a benchmark for testing for ES under the assumption that the degree of ES is constant. This
chapter contributes to the literature by investigating time-varying ES in this extended empiri-
cal framework using a Gibbs sampling approach. We allow the ES parameter to vary over time
according to a standard unobserved random walk process. We further test whether the time
variation is statistically relevant using the Bayesian model selection approach recently suggested
by Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010). Their approach implies splitting the time-varying
parameter in a constant part and a time-varying part and introducing a stochastic binary model
indicator which is one if the time-varying part should be included in the model and zero oth-
erwise. To control for endogeneity in our framework, we further incorporate a control function
type approach in our MCMC algorithm. The advantage of our Gibbs sampling approach is that
it is computationally much more easy to implement and, as such, does not suffer from the ML
estimator’s numerical optimization problems reported by Kim and Kim (2011). Moreover, as our
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Bayesian IV approach relies on sampling the posterior distribution rather than using asymptotic
approximations, it allows for exact inference even when instruments are weak.
The estimation results show that in a basic model, including only anticipated income growth,
the ES of US consumption growth to anticipated income growth has decreased over time, starting
from around 0.4 in the early 1950s and ending close to 0.2 in 2014. This confirms the result
in Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) that ES drops gradually over time. However, when estimating
our extended empirical specification, modeling stickiness in consumption growth along with time
aggregation and measurement errors, the excess sensitivity parameter turns out to be stable at
around 0.23 over the entire sample period. This implies that the time variation of the ES parameter
in the basic model is due to a specification error. In line with Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2011),
the coefficient on lagged consumption growth is found to be around 0.58 showing that there is a
notable amount of stickiness in aggregate consumption growth.
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3.A Gibbs sampling algorithm
In this appendix we provide details on the Gibbs sampling algorithm used in Subsection 3.3.3 to
jointly sample the binary indicators M, the parameters φ and the time-varying parameters β∗.
Blocks 1-3: Sampling the binary indicators M and parameters φ
For notational convenience, let us define a general regression model
yt = x
M
t b
M + θ (L) et, et ∼ N
(
0, σ2e
)
, (3.26)
where yt is a scalar dependent variable, xt an unrestricted predictor vector that contains variables
that are relevant for explaining yt, b is the corresponding parameter vector, θ (L) is a lag polynomial
of order q and et is a white noise error with variance σ
2
e . The restricted predictor matrix x
M
t and
restricted parameter vector bM exclude those elements in xt and b for which the corresponding
binary indicator in M is 0. Further let y = [y1, . . . , yT ]′, x = [x′1, . . . , x′T ]′ and Φ be a subset of φ
including all unknown parameters in equation (3.26), with restricted versions xM and ΦM.
The MA(q) errors in equation (3.26) imply a model which is non-linear in the parameters. As
suggested by Ullah, Vinod, and Singh (1986) and Chib and Greenberg (1994), conditional on θ a
linear model can be obtained from a recursive transformation of the data. For t = 1, . . . T let
y˜t = yt −
q∑
i=1
θiy˜t−i, with y˜t = 0 for t ≤ 0, (3.27)
x˜t = xt −
q∑
i=1
θix˜t−i, with x˜t = 0 for t ≤ 0, (3.28)
and further for j = 1, . . . , q
ωjt = −
q∑
i=1
θiωj,t−i + θt+j−1, with ωjt = 0 for t ≤ 0, (3.29)
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where θs = 0 for s > q. Equation (3.26) can then be transformed as
y˜t = x˜
M
t b
M + ωtλ+ et,
= w˜Mt Φ
M + et, (3.30)
with ωt = (ω1t, . . . , ωqt), w˜t = (x˜t, ωt) and Φ
M =
(
bM
′
, λ′
)′
and where λ = (e0, . . . , e−q+1)
′
are
initial conditions that can be estimated as unknown parameters. Conditional on θ, equation (3.30)
is a standard linear regression with observed variables y˜t and w˜
M
t and i.i.d. errors et. Under the
normal-inverse gamma conjugate prior
p
(
ΦM
)
= N (aM0 , AM0 σ2e) , p (σ2e) = IG (c0, C0) , (3.31)
the conditional posterior distributions of ΦM and σ2e are
p
(
ΦM|y, x, θ, σ2e ,M
)
= N (aMT , AMT σ2e) , p (σ2e |y, x, θ,M) = IG (cT , CMT ) , (3.32)
with the posterior moments aMT , A
M
T , cT and C
M
T given by
aMT = A
M
T
((
w˜M
)′
y˜ +
(
AM0
)−1
aM0
)
, (3.33)
AMT =
((
w˜M
)′
w˜M +
(
AM0
)−1)−1
, (3.34)
cT = c0 + T /2 , (3.35)
CMT = C0 + 0.5
(
y˜′y˜ +
(
aM0
)′ (
AM0
)−1
aM0 −
(
aMT
)′ (
AMT
)−1
aMT
)
. (3.36)
Block 1: Sampling the first step parameters φ1 and calculating Ztδ and ν
∗
t
Equation (3.15) can be written in the general notation of equation (3.26) as: yt = ∆ lnYt, xt = Zt,
b = δ and θ(L) = 1 such that θ(L)et = νt and σ
2
e = σ
2
ν . Sampling δ and σ
2
ν can then be done
from their posterior distributions in equation (3.32). Using the sampled δ and σ2ν , calculate
Et−1 (∆ lnYt) = Ztδ and ν∗t = σεθ (L) (∆ lnYt − Ztδ) /σν conditional on θ and σ2ε with the latter
calculated from φ2 as σ
2
ε = σ
2
µ
/
(1− ρ2) .
Block 2: Sampling the MA coefficients θ
Conditional on the parameters φ1 and φ2, on the time-varying coefficients β
∗ and on the bi-
nary indicators M, equation (3.17) can be written in the general notation of equation (3.26) as:
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yt = ∆ lnCt, xt = (1, Ztδ, β
∗
0t, β
∗
1tZtδ, ∆ lnCt−1), b = (β00, β01, ση0 , ση1 , γ) and et = εt, such
that σ2e = σ
2
ε with the latter calculated conditional on φ2 as σ
2
ε = σ
2
µ
/
(1− ρ2) . The values of the
binary indicators in M then imply the restricted xMt and bM.
Under the normal conjugate prior p (θ) = N (aθ0, Aθ0σ2e), the exact conditional distribution of
θ is given by12
p
(
θ|Φ, σ2e ,M, y, x
) ∝ T∏
t=1
exp
(
−et (θ)
2
2σ2e
)
× exp
(
−1
2
(
θ − aθ0
)′ (
Aθ0σ
2
e
)−1 (
θ − aθ0
))
, (3.37)
where et (θ) = y˜t (θ) − w˜Mt (θ) ΦM is calculated from the transformed model in equation (3.30)
further conditioning on the initial conditions λ to obtain ΦM =
(
bM
′
, λ′
)′
.
Direct sampling of θ using equation (3.37) is not possible, though, as et (θ) is a non-linear
function of θ. To solve this issue, Chib and Greenberg (1994) propose to linearize et (θ) around
θ∗ using a first-order Taylor expansion
et (θ) ≈ et (θ∗)−Ψt (θ − θ∗) , (3.38)
where Ψt = (Ψ1t, . . . ,Ψqt) is a 1× q vector including the first-order derivatives of et (θ) evaluated
at θ∗ obtained using the following recursion
Ψit = −et−i (θ∗)−
q∑
j=1
θ∗jΨi,t−j , (3.39)
where Ψit = 0 for t ≤ 0. An adequate approximation can be obtained by choosing θ∗ to be the
non-linear least squares estimate of θ conditional on the other parameters in the model, which can
be obtained as
θ∗ = argmin
θ
T∑
t=1
(et (θ))
2
, (3.40)
For given values of θ∗, equation (3.38) can then be rewritten as an approximate linear regression
model
et (θ
∗) + Ψtθ∗ ≈ Ψtθ + et (θ) , (3.41)
with dependent variable et (θ
∗) + Ψtθ∗ and explanatory variables Ψt. As such a normal approxi-
12Note that the expression in Chib and Greenberg (1994) also includes a term (p2 (θ) in their notation) which
evaluates the initial conditions (α0 in their notation) which are drawn (using a value for θ) as initial values in a
state space representation. As is apparent from equation (3.30), in a pure MA model (see also Chib and Greenberg,
1994, eq. (15)), the initial conditions are easily estimated together with β. As such, they are conditioned on in
equation (3.37).
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mation to the exact conditional distribution of θ is given by
q
(
θ|θ∗,Φ, σ2e ,M, y, x
) ∼ N (aθT , AθTσ2e) , (3.42)
with
aθT = A
θ
T
(
Ψ′Ξ +
(
Aθ0
)−1
aθ0
)
, AθT =
(
Ψ′Ψ +
(
Aθ0
)−1)−1
, (3.43)
and where Ξ is a T × 1 vector with tth element (et (θ∗) + Ψtθ∗) and Ψ is a T × q matrix with tth
row Ψt.
We can now sample θ using a Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. Suppose θ(i) is the current
draw in the Markov chain. To obtain the next draw θ(i+1), first draw a candidate θc from the
proposal distribution in equation (3.42). The MH step then implies a further randomization which
amounts to accepting the candidate draw θc with probability
α
(
θ(i), θc
)
= min
{
p
(
θc|Φ, σ2e ,M, y, x
)
p
(
θ(i)|Φ, σ2e ,M, y, x
) q (θ(i)|θ∗,Φ, σ2e ,M, y, x)
q (θc|θ∗,Φ, σ2e ,M, y, x)
, 1
}
. (3.44)
If θc is accepted, θ(i+1) is set equal to θc while if θc is rejected, θ(i+1) is set equal to θ(i).
Block 3: Sampling the binary indicators M and the second step parameters φ2
Conditional on the time-varying coefficients β∗t and on the first step results Ztδ and ν
∗
t , equa-
tion (3.25) can be written in the general notation of equation (3.26) as: yt = ∆ lnCt, xt = (1, Ztδ,
β∗0t, β
∗
1tZtδ, ∆ lnCt−1, ν
∗
t ), b = (β00, β01, ση0 , ση1 , γ, ρ) and et = µt, such that σ
2
e = σ
2
µ. Further
conditioning on the MA parameters θ, the unrestricted transformed variables y˜t and w˜t in equa-
tion (3.30) are obtained, with corresponding unrestricted extended parameter vector Φ = (b′, λ′)′.
The values of the binary indicators in M then imply the restricted w˜Mt and ΦM.
A naive implementation of the Gibbs sampler would be to first sampleM from f (M|Φ, σ2e , y˜, w˜)
and next ΦM and σ2e from f
(
ΦM, σ2e |M, y˜, w˜
)
. However, this approach does not result in an ir-
reducible Markov chain as whenever an indicator in M equals zero, the corresponding coefficient
in Φ is also zero which implies that the chain has absorbing states. Therefore, as in Fru¨hwirth-
Schnatter and Wagner (2010) we marginalize over the parameters Φ and σ2e when sampling M
and next draw the parameters ΦM and σ2e conditional on the binary indicators in M.
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Block 3(a): Sampling the binary indicators M
The posterior distribution f (M|y˜, w˜) can be obtained using Bayes’ Theorem as
f (M|y˜, w˜) ∝ f (y˜ |M, w˜ ) p (M) , (3.45)
with p (M) being the prior probability of M and f (y˜ |M, w˜ ) the marginal likelihood of the
regression model (3.30) where the effect of the parameters Φ and σ2e has been integrated out.
Under the normal-inverse gamma conjugate prior in equation (3.31), the closed form solution of
the marginal likelihood is given by:
f (y˜ |M, w˜ ) ∝
∣∣AMT ∣∣0.5∣∣AM0 ∣∣0.5
Γ (cT )C
c0
0
Γ (c0)
(
CMT
)cT , (3.46)
with Γ being the gamma function and the posterior moments aMT , A
M
T , cT and C
M
T given in
equations (3.33)-(3.36).
Following George and McCulloch (1993) we use a single-move sampler in which the binary
indicators ι0 and ι1 inM are sampled recursively from the Bernoulli distribution with probability
p (ιi = 1 |ι−i, y˜, w˜ ) = f (ιi = 1 |ι−i, y˜, w˜ )
f (ιi = 0 |ι−i, y˜, w˜ ) + f (ιi = 1 |ι−i, y˜, w˜ ) , (3.47)
for i = 0, 1. We further randomize over the sequence in which the binary indicators are drawn.
Block 3(b): Sampling the second step parameters φ2
Given the binary indicators in M, the second step parameters φ2 = (β00, β01, ση0 , ση1 , γ, ρ, σ2µ)
are sampled, together with λ, by drawing ΦM and σ2e from the general expression in equation
(3.32). Note that the unrestricted Φ = (β00, β01, ση0 , ση1 , γ, ρ, λ) is restricted to obtain Φ
M by
excluding σηi when ιi = 0. In this case σηi is not sampled but set equal to zero.
Block 4: Sampling the time-varying parameters β∗
In this block we use the forward-filtering and backward-sampling approach of Carter and Kohn
(1994) and De Jong and Shephard (1995) to sample the time-varying parameters β∗ conditionally
on the coefficients φ2 and λ, on the first step results Ztδ and ν
∗
t and on the binary indicators M.
More specifically, equation (3.25) can be rewritten as:
yt = ι0ση0β
∗
0t + ι1ση1β
∗
1tx1t + θ (L)µt, (3.48)
with yt = ∆ lnCt − β00 − β01Ztδ − γ∆ lnCt−1 − ρν∗t and x1t = Ztδ.
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Again using the recursive transformation suggested by Ullah, Vinod, and Singh (1986) and
Chib and Greenberg (1994), the model in equation (3.48) can be transformed to a model with
i.i.d. error terms as
y˜t = ι0ση0 β˜0t + ι1ση1 β˜1t + ωtλ+ µt, (3.49)
where y˜t and ωt = (ω1t, . . . , ωqt) are calculated (conditional on θ) from equations (3.27) and (3.29)
and similarly
β˜0t = β
∗
0t −
q∑
i=1
θiβ˜0,t−i, with β˜0t = 0 for t ≤ 0, (3.50)
β˜1t = β
∗
1tx1t −
q∑
i=1
θiβ˜1,t−i, with β˜1t = 0 for t ≤ 0. (3.51)
Substituting equation (3.23) in (3.50)-(3.50) yields
β˜0,t+1 = β
∗
0t −
q∑
i=1
θiβ˜0,t+1−i + η∗0t, (3.52)
β˜1,t+1 = β
∗
1tx1,t+1 −
q∑
i=1
θiβ˜1,t+1−i + x1,t+1η∗1t, (3.53)
such that the state space representation of the model in equations (3.49), (3.23) and (3.52)-(3.53)
is given by
y˜t − ωtλ =
ση︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(0 ση0 0 . . . 0) (0 ση1 0 . . . 0)
]
αt︷ ︸︸ ︷ α0t
α1t
+µt, (3.54) α0,t+1
α1,t+1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
αt+1
=
 T0t 0
0 T1t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tt
 α0t
α1t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
αt
+
 K0t 0
0 K1t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kt
 η∗0t
η∗1t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ηt
, (3.55)
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with αi,t+1 given by

β∗i,t+1
β˜i,t+1
β˜it
...
β˜i,t−(q−2)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
αi,t+1
=

1 0 . . . 0 0
xi,t+1 −θ1 . . . −θq−1 −θq
0 1 0 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tit

β∗it
β˜it
...
β˜i,t−(q−2)
β˜i,t−(q−1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
αit
+

1
xi,t+1
0
...
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kit
[
η∗it
]
,
(3.56)
for i = 0, 1 and where x0t = 1 ∀t. In line with equations (3.23) and (3.50)-(3.51), each of the
states is initialized at zero.
Equations (3.54)-(3.55) constitute a standard linear Gaussian state space model, from which
the unknown state variables αt can be filtered using the standard Kalman filter. Sampling αt from
its conditional distribution can then be done using the multimove simulation smoother of Carter
and Kohn (1994) and De Jong and Shephard (1995). Using βi0, σηi and β
∗
it, the time-varying
coefficients βit in equation (3.21) can then easily be reconstructed from equation (3.22). Note
that in a restricted model with ιi = 0, σηi is excluded from ση and αit is dropped from the state
vector αt. In this case, no forward-filtering and backward-sampling for β
∗
it is needed as this can
be sampled directly from its prior distribution using equation (3.23).
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